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ABSTRACT 
MEDICAID EXPANSION IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATE COMPARATIVE STUDY 
EXAMINING FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE STATE DECISION-MAKING 
Tiffany J. Henley 
Old Dominion University, 2016 
Director: Dr. John C. Morris 
 
 Since the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) and a 
Supreme Court ruling that the federal government cannot compel states to expand Medicaid, a 
policy window has opened for states to change Medicaid policy. States are now faced with the 
option to expand Medicaid.  Although the literature on Medicaid expansion indicates that politics 
plays a determining role on states’ decisions on Medicaid expansion, comprehensive analyses of 
dominant factors that affect these decisions on Medicaid is lacking in the field of Medicaid 
policy.  This study will explore the decision making process of state level policies and the effect 
of relevant state characteristics on Medicaid expansion. 
 This dissertation examines prominent factors that influence state decisions on Medicaid 
expansion.  Although the literature on Medicaid expansion post the ACA is limited in scope, this 
study is informed by a range of other disciplines, such as education, political science, 
intergovernmental management, and economics.  A conceptual framework is developed based on 
the interdisciplinary nature of the literature and five models are created: political, economic, 
needs-based, state capacity, and state innovation and diffusion.  A state comparative cross-
sectional research design is utilized to test the five models and a combined model of state 
decision making on Medicaid expansion using multinomial logistic regression analysis and 
descriptive statistics. 
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 The results of this study reveal that when all of the models are combined, state needs-
based factors are more influential than political, economic, state capacity, and state innovation 
and diffusion factors.  However, the political model has the most explanatory power when the 
individual models are tested separately.  This research demonstrates that the five models utilized 
in this study play a significant role in the decision making process of states on Medicaid 
expansion.  In addition, this research addresses a gap in the literature that elucidates influential 
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The expansion of Medicaid is a topic that is worthy of study for the 21st century in 
America.  While states are charged with overseeing this program, the advent of healthcare reform 
is forcing states to make policy-related health care decisions that will have long-standing impacts 
on residents, state funding and budgets, intergovernmental relationships, and state resources.  
With a system marked by great latitude in state discretion, wide variations in the delivery and 
care of patients, and rising health care costs, the opportunity to examine the effects or factors 
influencing state decision making on the adoption of Medicaid expansion has arisen.  In effect, a 
policy window has opened with the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) and changed the landscape of health care in the United States (U.S.) by allowing states to 
expand Medicaid eligibility to additional adult beneficiaries. Moreover, federal funding at 100% 
for expansion is provided for the first 3 years starting with the year 2014; thereafter 90% of 
Medicaid expansion costs are covered by 2020 (Medicaid.gov, 2015).  With increasing federal 
oversight and less state control of the U.S. health care system (Sparer, France, & Clinton, 2011), 
there are multifarious implications affecting the delivery, administration, and implementation of 
health care services.   
 The factors influencing states to adopt Medicaid expansion under the auspices of the 
ACA is the focus of this study.  The choice to adopt or expand a policy from a state perspective 
is fraught with many competing thoughts, theories, and changes in administration over time.  
Beginning with the Constitution, the prevailing governance arrangement or structure for public 
policies in the U.S. is a system of dual sovereignty between the federal government and state 
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governments.  Under this system, policy decisions, choices, and questions are handled at the 
state-level unless the federal government can establish that a policy is within its scope or 
jurisdiction for action at the national level (Adler, 2011).  While the roles of the states and 
federal government are clearly defined, the factors that influence state decisions and actions 
concerning policy problems are varied.  The literature on state policy choices primarily focus on 
state-level internal determinants such as social, political, and economic factors; and external 
determinants involving federal pressure, state competition, and emulation in regards to policy 
adoption or state action (see Berry & Berry, 2007; Gray, 1973; Olive, Gunasekara, & Raymond, 
2012; Koski, 2007; Rom, Peterson, & Scheve, 1998; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001; 
Walker, 1969). 
 In the arena of health care policy on Medicaid, the explanations for why states make 
health-related policy decisions are largely ignored, misunderstood, or shown as irrelevant.  An 
earlier generation of scholars examining health care policy (Key, 1949; Lockard, 1959) found 
that the provision of welfare services was largely influenced by political dynamics.  However, 
later studies revealed the results as premature and inconclusive (Kousser, 2002).  The next 
generation of scholars (Dye, 1966; Hofferbert, 1966; Dawson & Robinson, 1963; Winters, 1976) 
presumed that demographic and economic circumstances dictated policy decisions on state-level 
spending for health care expenditures.   Later studies found mixed results on the effect of 
political parties (Kousser, 2002).  The current literature on state policy choices, while limited, 
considers the expertise of states, levels of conflict and cooperation, and alignment of goals with 





For many decades, health care in the United States has been progressively shifting 
towards an unsustainable state as the result of rising health care costs, an aging population, and 
the advancement of medical technology (Porter, 2009).  In 2009, the U.S. Social Security 
Advisory Board reported that the rising cost of health care expenditures would affect the well-
being and economic security of retirees and workers due to high rates of out-of-pocket costs 
affecting personal income (Schieber, Bilyeu, Hardy, Katz, Kennelly, & Warshawsky, 2009).  
Moreover, rising health care costs have led to reductions in health care coverage and access to 
health services (Chernew, Hirth, & Cutler, 2003).  The enactment of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 addresses several of these issues that plague the delivery of health 
care services.  The problems affecting the health care system include a high proportion of 
uninsured adults and children, expensive health care plans, barriers associated with pre-existing 
conditions and loss of health insurance coverage for individuals with a serious illness, and 
inaccessibility to health care services for select populations such as U.S. born children of 
immigrants and underprivileged individuals (Rich, Cheung, & Lurvey, 2013).   
The major aims of the ACA include universal coverage for U.S. citizens, affordable 
health care coverage, quality-based care, access to health care services with special emphasis on 
preventative and primary care, and strategic investments through the expansion of health care 
services to strengthen the health of the public (Rosenbaum, 2011).  With the major aims of the 
ACA in mind and the problems affecting the health care system, this study seeks to examine why 
states are choosing to adopt Medicaid expansion and to identify the explanatory factors that are 
driving state responses to expand Medicaid.  
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The expansion of Medicaid is an important phenomenon of study because it is a large-
scale program that affects many stakeholders including states, citizens, physicians, hospitals, 
etc., and the cost of expanding Medicaid accounts for 45% of expenditures in overall costs 
relating to the ACA (Jacobs & Skocpol, 2010).  Medicaid is jointly funded by the federal 
government and each state within the U.S., and states are tasked with the responsibility to 
administer health care services for Medicaid recipients (Landers & Leeman, 2011).  Medicaid 
expansion would provide health insurance coverage to individuals below or up to 133% of the 
federal poverty level (Sommers, Tomasi, Swartz, & Epstein, 2012).  A 2014 report by the 
Council of Economic Advisors commissioned by the Executive Office of the President states that 
5.7 million individuals are affected by states choosing to opt-out of Medicaid expansion.  
Furthermore, the report declares that states choosing to opt-out will also lose billions of dollars in 
federal funds that could otherwise boost their economy (The Council of Economic Advisors, 
2014).  Out of 50 states, 30 have chosen to adopt Medicaid expansion, and despite additional 
funding from the federal government to expand Medicaid, 20 states have chosen to either delay 
expansion or refuse to adopt Medicaid expansion (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015; The Council 
of Economic Advisors, 2014).  
While there is much speculation as to the reasons why a state may choose to adopt or 
decline expanding Medicaid such as politics or the cost of expanding services, scholarly research 
is lacking in regards to the consequences, implications, and explanation of such decisions in the 
health care arena.  Moreover, the choice to expand Medicaid is an on-going issue that states are 
still considering even though there are available appropriations for expansion (Perkins, 2013).  
This research is important because it will test various factors that have been studied and shown to 
influence state actions.  Moreover, we will test five models derived from a body of literature that 
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spans a multitude of disciplines with special emphasis on state policy choices and decisions, and 




 The research objectives of this study are to examine the factors that influence the decision 
making process of states in the expansion of Medicaid.  As implementation efforts of the ACA 
unfold, there will be a plethora of opportunities for states to participate in initiatives that could 
revolutionize the provision and delivery of health care services.  Every decision or non-decision, 
choice or non-choice, and action or non-action has a consequence.  An examination and 
understanding of factors that influence state decision making will allow states, policymakers, and 
researchers make informed decisions.   
The research question that will guide this study is: What are the factors that influence 
states to adopt Medicaid Expansion?  Corollary questions include the following: (a) Do 
economic factors influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid? (b) Do political factors 
influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid? (c) Do state population needs influence the 
decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion? (d) Does state capacity influence the decision of 
states to adopt Medicaid expansion? (e) Do innovation and diffusion influence the decision of 
states to adopt Medicaid expansion? 
This study will test five models derived from the literature on state policy choices and 
decision making.   The first model is the political model. The proposition with this model is that 
a state’s legislative composition and party competition affect the adoption of new programs 
(Walker, 1969).  The economic model suggests that the fiscal health of a state influences the 
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adoption of a new program (Lowry, 2005). The needs-based model presupposes that new 
approaches to an existing problem may stimulate the adoption of a new program (Nice, 1994).  
The state capacity model presumes that states have the capacity to “(1) respond effectively to 
change, (2) to make decisions efficiently, effectively, and responsively, (3) to manage conflict” 
through institutional arrangements (Bowman & Kearney, 1988, p. 343).   Last, the state 
innovation and diffusion model assumes that policy choices are influenced by both internal and 
external factors.  Moreover, the policy choices of states are driven by tendencies to gravitate 
toward innovation, which is demonstrated through state actions (Berry & Berry, 2007; Gray, 
1973; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001). 
 
Methodology 
 This study uses a state comparative cross-sectional research design to test five models 
using multinomial logistic regression analysis.  The five models consist of established variables 
known to influence the decisions of states in policy research.  The corollary questions are 
indicative of the proposed models: the economic model, the political model, needs-based model, 
state capacity model, and the innovation and diffusion model.  The unit of analysis for this 
research is states and each model will be tested to determine the relationship between the factors 
within each model and the decision to adopt the expansion of Medicaid using statistical analysis 
mechanisms.   
 
Significance of this Study 
The passage of the ACA in 2010 has transformed the U.S. health care system on many 
levels.  In accordance with the law, individuals are mandated to purchase health insurance, the 
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insurance industry is required to follow state and federal guidelines for the provision of health 
care services, medical providers are tasked with following a number of regulations specified by 
the ACA, and states are given the option to expand Medicaid (Manchikanti, Caraway, Parr, 
Fellows, & Hirsch, 2011).  The choice given to states to expand Medicaid was not a part of the 
original health care plan; however, a Supreme Court ruling determined that “it was unduly 
coercive to require states to expand coverage as a condition of continuing to participate in the 
federal Medicaid program” (Brecher & Rose, 2013, p. s62).  This controversial ruling has 
upended the intended aims of the ACA and has created an additional financial burden to millions 
of low-income individuals.  As a result, states must decide to either opt-in or opt-out of Medicaid 
expansion while considering a myriad of policy alternatives, consequences, and opportunities. 
This research is important for several reasons. First, one area of particular concern is the 
effect of state policy decisions on health disparities and inequality amongst low- income 
individuals.  Since the enactment of the ACA in 2010, 30 states and the District of Columbia 
have chosen to adopt Medicaid expansion (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015).  It is estimated that 
5.7 million uninsured individuals who would meet the eligibility requirements under Medicaid 
Expansion are affected by states that have not opted to expand Medicaid (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2014; The Council of Economic Advisors, 2014).  The decision to opt out of 
Medicaid expansion creates a considerable gap in health care coverage for low-income and 
permanent residents (Crowley & Golden, 2014).  Hypothesis testing of the Needs-Based Model 
may shed light on certain characteristics that may lead a state to adopt Medicaid expansion based 
on the composition of the total population of the state, because the Needs-Based Model includes 
demographic variables.   
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Second, this study is important because the extant research is limited in the areas of 
Medicaid expansion and state decision making pertaining to policy adoption.  Two studies that 
were conducted prior to the ACA explored certain aspects of Medicaid expansion and policy 
adoption, diffusion, and innovation.  One study analyzed the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP) and examined the diffusion path of similar states using a dyad-year event 
history analysis (Volden, 2006).  The other study analyzed the probability of states adopting 
managed care programs through Medicaid also using an event history analysis (Satterthwaite, 
2002).  The last two relevant studies pertaining to this research were conducted after the ACA. 
One study focused on the variation of states implementing Medicaid expansion and real-time 
decision making of states adopting Medicaid expansion with the creation of a measure that 
assessed Medicaid Expansion based on state legislative documents (Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013).   
The other study, conducted by Barrilleaux and Rainey (2014), examined the decisions of 
governors in opposition of Medicaid expansion and theorized that the needs of citizens and 
politics affected gubernatorial decisions.  This research is different from the studies mentioned 
above because there will be an examination of factors that influence the policy adoption of 
Medicaid expansion by testing established explanators found in the literature on state policy 
adoption and health care.  
This study is pertinent to the fields of health care, public policy, and public 
administration because it examines the interaction of many factors influencing policy adoption 
and it allows the researcher to compare the proposed models explaining the adoption of Medicaid 
expansion.  Moreover, a multinomial logistic regression will be utilized for this study and an 
analysis of summary statistics will be employed to observe the likelihood that a state will adopt 
Medicaid in accordance with the independent variables.   
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This research is important because it adds understanding to what drives states to make a 
decision to adopt a policy when given the choice.  Understanding the factors that influence states 
to expand Medicaid could have several implications.  (1) The crafting of policies could be geared 
toward state preferences instead of perceived needs or issues. The alignment of evidence-based 
research and state preferences will allow researchers and policymakers to make decisions that are 
customized towards actualized state needs.  (2) Competition among state concerns could be 
sorted based on an understanding of the drivers of state responses to policy adoption.  (3) The 
ability to predict factors that may influence the adoption of Medicaid expansion may assist 
policymakers recast or re-frame policies or policy objectives in order to achieve purposeful 
optimal outcomes. 
 
Plan of this Dissertation 
 This dissertation explores the expansion of Medicaid and the influence of state decision 
making.  Chapter 1 provides an overview of Medicaid and the policy window that has opened 
due to the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Research questions and the 
significance of this study are also outlined in this chapter.  Chapter 2 provides a detailed review 
of the Medicaid program and the ACA, and develops the five models employed in the study. 
Chapter 3 details the methods used to conduct this study and offers a comprehensive description 
of the variables, statistical tests used, and data sources.  Chapter 4 provides an analytical 
discussion of the results of the study.  Chapter 5 concludes with insights from this study, 









LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY 
 
The implementation of Medicaid expansion is at a standstill.  Presently, 30 states have 
adopted Medicaid expansion, 17 states have chosen to decline expansion, and 3 states are 
undecided (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015). While the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) was formulated with an expectation of participation from the states; political 
conflicts, court proceedings, and changes in governmental leaders across all levels of 
government have contributed to disjointed portions of the law and variations in the adoption of 
Medicaid expansion among states (Jones, Bradley, & Oberlander, 2014; Jost & Rosenbaum, 
2012; Leonard, 2012. This chapter seeks to understand what factors influence states to adopt 
Medicaid expansion by reviewing the literature on Medicaid expansion in addition to relevant 
studies on the adoption of Medicaid policies and programs by states.   
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the research approach to the literature 
review and a historical account of Medicaid and the ACA in order to understand the 
circumstances surrounding and leading up to Medicaid expansion and the role of states. A 
discussion is presented on state policy choices and decisions to explain certain components of the 
decision making process and pressures facing states on public policies. A conceptual framework 
of the process of state decision making is introduced to depict the inner workings of state policy 
decisions on Medicaid expansion. A review of the literature is analyzed and summarized with 
remarks and inferences on the influencers of state decisions on Medicaid expansion and previous 
policies and programs followed by a summary of the chapter.  
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Approach to Research 
The literature on Medicaid expansion in the 21st century is limited in scope and detail due 
to the enactment of the ACA in 2010, challenges to health care reform, and changes in political 
leaders at the state-level.  As a result, this research is informed by other disciplines such as 
education, intergovernmental management, political science, economics, and welfare policy.  
The conceptual framework of state decision making on Medicaid is borne out of an analysis of 
relevant state characteristics and Medicaid policy.  
The search criteria for this research focused on topics such as Medicaid expansion, 
Medicaid policy, state decision making, state policy choices, and adoption of state policies.  The 
following databases were used: Google Scholar, Academic Search Complete, JSTOR, 
ScienceDirect, and ProQuest.  Theoretical and empirical articles were analyzed to guide the 
literature review.  For the empirical articles spanning multiple disciplines, a chart was made for 
personal use detailing the operationalization of variables used to explain the state adoption of a 
particular policy of interest.  An examination of the chart revealed the common indicators of 
state policy adoptions, which were then categorized and selected to represent the five proposed 
models in this study after an iterative process of reviewing the literature (political model, 






Historical Overview of Medicaid 
The Road to Medicaid 
 Preceding the enactment of Medicaid in 1965, the provision of medical care for 
disadvantaged individuals was sporadic, ad hoc, or nonexistent (Stevens & Stevens, 1974).  The 
depression era of the late 1920s served as an impetus for what some call the American Welfare 
State with the passing of the Social Security Act in 1935.  By means of this Act, individuals were 
given financial assistance from the government during times of hardship (Weikel & Leamond, 
1976).   As a mechanism for income protection, the Social Security Act shielded the elderly, 
disabled, widowed, and children from financial ruin by adopting and codifying into law state 
eligibility guidelines for deserving, low-income individuals (Huberfeld, 2011). 
The Social Security Act of 1935 established two types of social programs: Social 
insurance for working individuals such as worker’s compensation and pension plans, and 
unemployment insurance and financial assistance from the states for those deemed needy 
(Weikel & Leamond, 1976).  The determination of need was not defined just by professional 
standards of care according to medical practice, but included socially defined needs based on 
cultural norms and economic considerations (Kronebusch, 1997).  Due to the conceptions of the 
policymakers following the Social Security Act of 1935, the benefactors of financial assistance 
were one-parent families, the elderly, and disabled individuals.  Although medical insurance was 
not provided to recipients meeting eligibility requirements, allotted monthly payments took into 
consideration medical expenses.  State participation was optional, but the federal government 
provided matching funds (Weikel & Leamond, 1976). 
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After the passage of the Social Security Act, several amendments were passed to expand 
the scope of the program with special emphasis on providing sufficient benefits to individuals 
and families rather than financial independence and equitable distribution (Kollmann, 2000).  
However, the most historic amendment serving as a catalyst for the establishment for Medicaid 
came in the form of the Kerr-Mills legislation in 1960 (Smith & Moore, 2008).  States received 
federal funding for impoverished individuals aged 65 and older for medical expenditures under 
Kerr-Mills through the Medical Assistance to the Aged (MAA) program (Moore & Smith, 2004).   
Following the implementation of Kerr-Mills, proposals for a comprehensive bill on 
Medicare was gaining attention at the national level and was supported by the public.  In 1964, 
the President-elect, Lyndon Johnson, welcomed extended benefits for the elderly because it 
complimented his agenda on developing a Great Society.  Wilbur Mills crafted the legislation 
that included care for inpatient hospital stays and nursing home services under Medicare Part A 
and outpatient services under Medicare Part B.  In 1965, these provisions were amended to the 
Social Security Act Title XX (Olson, 2010). The services under Title XX centered on life-
sustaining and self-maintenance care.  As a result, Title XX benefits provided basic supportive 
services for the elderly (Nelson, 1982).  In 1975, a federal block grant was authorized to allow 
states to determine their own benefits based on state-specific priorities (Schram & Hurley, 1977).  
The design of the new amendments to Medicare was carefully planned and it appealed to many 
stakeholders including opponents of changes to the MAA program because it focused on an 
insurance plan rather than a collectivist approach to managing health care (Olson, 2010).   
Medicaid on the hand was, “the third piece of what Mills labeled a ‘three-layer cake,’ 
Medicaid (Title X1X of the 1965 Social Security Act) was more hastily devised, emerging after 
only minimal debate” (Olson, 2010, p. 25).  The bill created by Mills and other members of the 
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House Ways and Means committee included three separate and competing proposals or layers, 
which became known as Medicare Part A, Medicare Part B, and Medicaid (Stevens & Stevens, 
1974).  While most of the congressional debates focused on Medicare, the formulation of 
Medicaid lacked clear goals, a projection of current and future program costs, and the insight to 
handle programmatic problems (Weikel & Leamond, 1976).   The enactment and implementation 
of Medicaid were further overshadowed by major events such as the Civil Rights movement, the 
Vietnam War, and Watergate (Smith & Moore, 2008).  
 Although Medicaid was conceived as an afterthought, many states implemented the 
program within the first few years of enactment, eventually leading to full participation of all 
states within the U.S. (Huberfeld, 2011).  Currently, Medicaid is a program that services low-
income Americans through a joint partnership between the states and the federal government.  
States are given a great deal of discretion to consider or make administrative policy choices and 
decisions (Kronebusch, 1997).  There are basic statutory guidelines established by the federal 
government that each state must adhere to in order to ensure essential health services and access 
to Medicaid and services, irrespective of “the state’s ability to pay for the medical assistance” 
(Huberfeld, 2011).  Members meeting the requirements of a deserving group included poor 
mothers and children or families, pregnant women, the elderly, the disabled, and the blind with 
incomes below state poverty levels.  However, individuals seeking such benefits had to meet 
eligibility at the state poverty level and be deemed a member of a deserving group (Tanenbaum, 
1995).  
 Since the inception of Medicaid, there has been a multitude of amendments to the 
Medicaid Act.  The major changes included the following.  In the 1960s, Medicaid was governed 
by the Social Rehabilitation Administration and costs were curbed by setting eligibility 
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requirements through asset and income determinations. Other changes included providing 
coverage for certain populations such as the blind, disabled, and families with dependent 
children (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008; Moore & Smith, 2004).  Additionally, states were 
limited by federal rules in implementing Medicaid (Ferguson & Leddy, 1999).  In the 1970s, 
states were allowed to reduce spending on Medicaid with the abolishment of the “maintenance of 
effort” (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008). As health expenditures increased, many states 
responded by imposing strict eligibility requirements and cutting benefits (Brown & Sparer, 
2003) 
In the 1980s, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act allowed for a reduction in federal matching 
funds to states (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008).  Federal reductions in aid, a depressed 
economy, and changing views on providing cash assistance to the needy contributed to the 
diminution of poverty level thresholds (Brecher & Rose, 2013).  Additionally, many states 
contracted with private insurance companies to provide managed care to use state resources 
efficiently (Oberg & Polich, 1988).  In the 1990s, the Clinton administration encouraged state 
expansion of Medicaid using section 1115 waivers, which allowed states to experiment with new 
programs and policies with exemption from federal Medicaid requirements (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2008; Schneider, 1997).   During this era, the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996 was enacted, which replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children cash assistance program with a block grant program under Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008).  Modifications to federal law in regards to 
Medicaid expanded state discretion and allowed great flexibility in implementing Medicaid 
policies (Cantor, Thompson, & Farnham, 2013).  In the 2000s, regulations were put in place to 
crack down on upper payment limits and the Bush administration supported the use of section 
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1115 waivers (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008).  As changes in Medicaid occurred over time, 
the next transformation in Medicaid transpired with the passage of the ACA.  
 
The History of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
The Current State of Health Care in the United States 
 Prior to the enactment of the ACA, the United States experienced a recession with a 
national unemployment rate of 5% in 2007, ending at 10% in 2009 (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2012).   A Kaiser Family Foundation poll, assessing the attitudes of Americans, found 
that 54% of the population considered health care a priority and 50% indicated rising health care 
costs contributed to postponing care for a medical need (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009).  
Although previous presidential administrations have advocated for health care reform, endeavors 
were met with much resistance to change by opposing political parties and constituent groups.  
Nonetheless, extreme rhetoric, steadfastness, cooperation, tremendous organizational efforts, and 
voting along party lines changed the course of health care in the United States, thus leading to 
the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Beaussier, 2012). 
 The formulation of the ACA was riddled with many hindrances and differences of 
opinion in how the current health care system should be restructured.  Three proposals were 
drafted with the perception that the process was occurring in a transparent and open manner to 
influence the public and stakeholders in supporting universal health insurance (Frakes, 2012).  
The first proposal was led by senators through a bipartisan partnership. The plan included 
subsidies to economically disadvantaged citizens, an individual mandate, and decreased spending 
in Medicare (Hayes, 2011; Jacobs & Skocpol, 2010).  The senators in the bipartisan partnership 
disbanded over ideological differences and party conflicts, and the proposal was disregarded 
 17 
(Jacobs & Skocpol, 2010).  The second proposal was created by the House of Representatives 
and revised to maintain party support (Beaussier, 2012). The proposal consisted of a public 
option, an employer mandate for corporations with 50 employees or more, a national health 
insurance exchange, and subsidies for both middle and low-income individuals for the purchase 
of health insurance (Jacobs & Skocpol, 2010).  The third proposal was developed by the Senate 
and passed with support from both Republicans and Democrats; it included an individual 
mandate and state-based health insurance exchanges (Hayes, 2011; Jacobs & Skocpol, 2010). 
 During the merger of both the Senate and the House of Representative proposals, the 
Democratic Party lost a Senate seat and a filibuster-proof majority due to the death of Senator 
Ted Kennedy (Flint, 2014; Hayes, 2011).  A bipartisan summit was instituted to settle 
differences and to garner an agreement on the finalized proposal for health care reform. The call 
for cooperation through the summit reached an impasse with refusals to reach common ground 
on the legislation (Jacobs & Skocpol, 2010).  Although there was much opposition in passing the 
ACA, the Senate bill was approved without the vote of the new republican Senator Scott Brown 
(Farley, 2010).  Two days later, President Obama signed PPACA on March 23, 2010 (Quadagno, 
2014). 
The Current State of Medicaid in the United States 
 Many factors contributed to the passage of the ACA: politics, interest groups, and policy 
entrepreneurs.  Opponents of the ACA objected to many aspects of the bill, and some parts of the 
law were challenged. Republican leaders and governors called for the repeal of the ACA (Jones, 
Bradley, & Oberlander, 2014).  Commentators suggested that opponents appealed to political 
theatrics, antics from the Tea Party, and midterm election gamesmanship (Leonard, 2011).  
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Proponents argued that the ACA would improve the provision and delivery of health care 
services and supply necessary services to millions of uninsured Americans (Manchikanti, 
Caraway, Parr, Fellows, & Hirsch, 2011). 
In the case of Medicaid, the states challenged Medicaid expansion and the mandate that 
required all individuals to buy health insurance (Leonard, 2012).  The state of Florida filed a 
lawsuit in conjunction with 25 additional states that challenged the constitutionality of Medicaid 
expansion under the Spending Clause (Cohen & Blumstein, 2012).  The Spending Clause is a 
doctrine that is established under the U.S. Constitution. In the Supreme Court ruling; United 
States v. Butler1, the Court determined that “Congress is free…to condition the receipt of federal 
funds upon compliance with federal statutes and administrative directives” (Binder, 2001, p. 
150).  In further support of the Spending Clause, in South Dakota v. Dole2, the Supreme Court 
ruled that “Congress could condition the receipt of federal highway funds upon states raising the 
minimum drinking age to twenty-one” (Binder, 2001, p. 150).  In sum, the Spending Clause 
gives the federal government authorization to compel states to adhere to conditional grants to 
ensure accountability while providing for the general welfare of the public (Bagenstos, 2012).  
Although Congress has the ability to attach conditions to federal programs through funding 
mechanisms, the court has recognized and accepted this form of exchange between the states and 
the federal government (Jost & Rosenbaum, 2012).  However, the challenge to Medicaid 
expansion highlighted an inherent issue within the law that violated the Constitution: 
Federal conditions must be unambiguous, ensuring that states are given clear notice of 
their obligations when they accept federal funds so that they can knowingly exercise their 
                                                          
1 297 U.S. 1 (1936) 
2 483 U.S. 203 (1987) 
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choice (which is protected under the Constitution) about whether to participate; and the 
federal government may not employ the spending power in such a way as to ‘coerce the 
states into compliance with federal objectives.’ (Cohen & Blumstein, 2012, p. 104)   
The states that opposed the expansion claimed that the ACA crossed the line through coercion to 
participate in Medicaid expansion (Perkins, 2013).  The Supreme Court heard the case and 
decided that the “coercion doctrine is fundamental to federalism and that brandishing federal 
funding to coerce states to participate in federal programs threatens the states’ independent 
sovereignty” (Jost & Rosenbaum, 2012).  The Court made a distinction between Medicaid 
expansion and the existing Medicaid program and determined that Medicaid expansion was a 
new program (Hall, 2012).  This ruling eliminated the possible threat of losing federal funding 
for existing Medicaid programs for failure to adopt Medicaid expansion (Jost & Rosenbaum, 
2012).  As a result, the mandate was rendered unenforceable, but states were given the option to 
adopt Medicaid expansion with a munificent amount of federal funding (Hall, 2012; Jost & 
Rosenbaum, 2012).   
 The Supreme Court decision marked a historical moment in time for Medicaid policy and 
public policy, because it limited the power of the federal government in garnering the 
compliance of states and the ability of Congress to impose monetary constraints on joint federal-
state programs based on state actions or choices (Rosenbaum & Westmoreland, 2012).  As a 
result, states were given the choice to refuse Medicaid expansion without fear of losing federal 
funding or face penalization.  Conversely, states that had made the choice to adopt Medicaid 
expansion were able to take advantage of the federal funding that is available, which included 
100% of expansion costs until the year of 2016 and gradual reductions thereafter (Perkins, 2013). 
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Understanding State Policy Choices 
 The partnership between the states and the federal government in Medicaid policy 
encompasses two major components.  The first component involves federal matching funds, 
which first encouraged states to establish Medicaid and now incentivizes states to maintain 
Medicaid coverage (Rossi, 2014; Schneider, 1997).  The second component includes general 
guidelines set forth by the federal government, which serves as an overarching umbrella that 
allows states the freedom and flexibility to operate a Medicaid program in accordance with the 
needs and capabilities of each state (Schneider, 1997).  In the realm of health care, states are 
responsible for financing, delivering, and coordinating health care services (Adler, 2011; 
Huberfeld, 2011; Kronebusch, 1997).  More specifically, they must control health care costs, 
regulate medical providers and the sale of health insurance, set health care rates, determine 
benefits, define eligibility standards, and provide licensing services (Kronebusch & Elbel, 2004; 
Weissert, 2004). 
The management of Medicaid involves many choices.  The choice to expand Medicaid or 
adopt any new changes is limited by a variety of “pressures and realities in the environment” 
(Bachman, Altman, & Beatrice, 1988, p. 248).  Furthermore, limitations create a range of 
available policy choices, thus affecting the selection of proposed policy changes (Bachman, 
Altman, & Beatrice, 1988).  Policy choices in the arena of Medicaid policy are most affected by 
state regulations, policy instruments, and barriers and perceptions.   
 Regulatory policy choices at the state-level typically follow a consistent pattern or policy 
direction (McGinnis, 2002).  This type of policy controls private and market behavior and is 
often technically inclined (Gerber & Teske, 2000).  Health insurance coverage for low-income 
individuals is heavily impacted by state choices.  Regulatory choices faced by states considering 
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Medicaid policy changes include decisions on determining eligibility requirements, premiums, 
cost-sharing mechanisms, accepting federal funds with attached strings, and managing third 
party insurers (Cromwell, Hurdle, & Schurman, 1987; Holahan, Uccello, Feder, & Kim, 2000).  
While policies are the product of regulation, policymakers can choose to use regulation as a tool 
to mitigate market failure, deliver a service, or finance a program such as Medicaid (McGinnis, 
2002).  
 Policy instruments are tools such as regulations, grants, certifications, and contracts used 
by the government to implement public policies (Howlett, 1991).  State-based policies on 
Medicaid use tools that are redistributive in nature and allow states to have an active role in 
determining program features (Barrilleaux & Brace, 2007).  States may pursue policy 
instruments that offer flexibility and autonomy, such as block grants and waivers.  As Kronbusch 
(1997) noted, states have enjoyed greater flexibility and discretion over Medicaid using waivers 
to expand program services.  On the other hand, a market-based approach to managing Medicaid 
may focus on minimizing moral hazard and increasing economic development (Barrilleaux & 
Brace, 2007).  With market-based policies, states may seek contractual agreements with 
managed care organizations.  The selection or non-selection of policy instruments depends upon 
state preferences and choices that in turn affect the administration and implementation of 
Medicaid (Ewalt & Jennings, 2004).  While policy instruments provide a means to obtain policy 
objectives, their outcomes differ and states are given the opportunity to choose their instrument 
of choice, which might not serve a large population of low-income and/or uninsured individuals.   
 Multiple barriers and perceptions also affect state policy choices.  The cost of Medicaid 
reform is highly expensive and states must dedicate staff, time, and resources to a program that 
has sometimes produced uncertain and undesirable results.  Action at the state-level for Medicaid 
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reform will often require a real or perceived crisis (Bachman, Altman, & Beatrice, 1988).  
Perceptions of Medicaid needs may differ among policymakers.  Medicaid considers both 
medical and social needs, but some needs are believed to be more important than others 
(Kronebusch, 1997).  Last, barriers such as financial, political, legal, and managerial issues limit 
the ability of states to tackle problems effectively while serving the Medicaid population 
(Barrilleaux & Brace, 2007).  Perceptions and barriers can place constraints on state policy 
choices and thus affect state decisions.  State policy choices are an important component of 
decision making because they serve as an antecedent to the adoption of public policies.  While 
states are responsible for the welfare of its residents, they must decide on complex issues and 




Rationalization of State Decision Making 
 
The role of states in Medicaid policy is important because they decide how to control 
health care costs, improve quality, and increase efficiency and access while attending to a 
multitude of functions in the management of Medicaid (Miller, Wang, Feng, & Mor, 2012).  
Decisions at the state-level are influenced by competing institutional and environmental 
circumstances.  Political pressures from state leaders, political parties, interest groups, and 
industries infiltrate the policy making process thus impacting state decisions.  Economic 
constraints force states to prioritize their objectives and determine the best method for allocating 
resources (Kronebusch, 1997).  As states consider the expansion of Medicaid, deliberations 
concerning adoption are contextualized to state-specific issues, such as the population of low-
income uninsured adults and children, state resources and budgeted expenses, industries that will 
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be affected by the adoption or nonadoption of Medicaid expansion, the will of the people they 
serve, and impending state elections (Frakt & Carroll, 2013).  Other considerations that affect the 
decision making process of states include state priorities, the amount of discretion afforded by 
federal and state policies, and the ability to respond to a problem (Barrilleaux & Brace, 2007; 
Kronebusch, 1997; Leider, Resnick, Kass, Sellers, Young, Bernet, & Jarris, 2014).  
 The delivery of health care services is very expensive and states are burdened with 
balancing their budgets and making determinations as to how much they will spend on Medicaid 
relative to their overall expenses (Greipp, 2002).  Just on health care spending, states are making 
resource allocation decisions based on priorities.  State agencies have found that while public 
needs and adhering to mandates are top priorities; political interests and scarce resources can be 
challenging (Leider, Resnick, Kass, Sellers, Young, Bernet, & Jarris, 2014).  As federal policy 
changes have occurred over time, allowing states to have more discretion and flexibility in 
operating Medicaid, state priorities have shifted.  States are able to select their own social 
services programs, redefine mandated programs, reduce program benefits, and eliminate 
administrative personnel all of which are actions reflective of state priorities (Agranoff & 
Pattakos, 1984).  
 As states have gained more control over Medicaid policy, state discretion has increased, 
leading to a more flexible Medicaid program, but also wide variations in the delivery, financing, 
and coverage of health care services across states (Schneider, 1998).  State discretion has its 
strengths and weaknesses.  For instance, states could utilize discretion to create innovative 
programs with the aim to decrease health disparities and inequities.  In contrast, decreased 
federal oversight and direction may lead to an unbalanced use of state discretion spurring 
negative consequences, such as funding cuts and unmet health care needs (Budetti, Butler, & 
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McManus, 1982).  In principle, increased state discretion and authority allows states to adopt 
policies, but to avoid the mistakes of previous welfare reforms, states must move beyond 
proscribed federal guidelines and punitive consequences in order to be responsive to the needs of 
Medicaid beneficiaries (Lee, 2009; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001).  
 State responsiveness can occur through “policy liberalism,” in which policymakers 
determine program features and guidelines or actions taken by state agency administrators in 
implementing enacted laws (Fossett & Thompson, 2006).  Through policy liberalism, some of 
the factors that have compelled states to respond to Medicaid expansion include financial 
inducements and public and industry support.  On the other hand, countervailing forces include 
economic constraints, political resistance, and limited administrative and infrastructure capacity 
(Brecher & Rose, 2013).    
Since state representatives lack the resources and expertise to implement complex public 
policies, policy making authority is delegated to government agencies.  Depending upon the 
severity of the public problem (whether real or perceived), the delegation of authority can be 
expansive or limited.  As a result, there can be situations where state representatives set policy 
directions, government agencies such as state Medicaid agencies that operate with a great 
amount of autonomy, or circumstances where there is a struggle between political control and 
agency command (Potoski, 2002).  In the case of Medicaid expansion, the refusal by state 
officials to adopt expansion has overridden enticements such as a generous federal funding 
scheme and programmatic latitude (Callaghan & Jacobs, 2014).   Nonetheless, state participation 
is voluntary and states have a great amount of leverage in deciding upon the adoption of 
Medicaid expansion (Dinan, 2014).   
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The Utilization of Medicaid Expansion: Serving as the Dependent Variable 
 The full impact of health care reform cannot be realized if all states do not participate or 
believe in the objectives of the ACA.  As decreed by the ACA, access to health care services for 
millions of Americans is mostly dependent upon two programs: Health insurance exchanges and 
Medicaid expansion (Callaghan & Jacobs, 2014).  However, there are differences that exist that 
involve governance. Although States can decide whether to operate an exchange, the 
implementation of the ACA is not affected by the state’s refusal to manage an exchange because 
the federal government provides a federally operated health insurance exchange. The fallback 
system in place for state-based exchanges does not extend to Medicaid. 
   State participation in the expansion of Medicaid is voluntary.  Prior to the ACA, states 
had the flexibility and discretion to tailor Medicaid to fit their needs and budgets.  With the 
ACA, directives to increase eligibility to 138% of the federal poverty level for all individuals 
under the age of 65 regardless of whether they have a disability or children did not fare very well 
with all of the states (Sullivan & Gershon, 2014).  Many states refused Medicaid expansion 
based on the grounds that expansion would be too costly due to the new eligibility standards 
(Landers & Leeman, 2011).  However, recent scholarship on the progress of Medicaid expansion 
for states that have chosen to expand show that states are projecting budget savings in Medicaid 
for the next decade.  Additionally, the majority of states are optimistic about the benefits that will 
be gained by the beneficiaries in regards to better health, financial protection, and access to 
health care services (Sommers, Gordon, Somers, Ingram, & Epstein, 2014). 
 State decisions concerning the adoption of Medicaid expansion have many implications.  
The same problems that have persisted across states such as variability in Medicaid policies, 
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rates of uninsured individuals, health disparities, and spending will still remain with almost half 
of the states refusing to expand Medicaid.  Moreover, these state differences and coverage gaps 
will widen as implementation of Medicaid expansion and the ACA progresses (Richardson & 
Yilmazer, 2013).  For these reasons and more, Medicaid expansion is the dependent variable of 
significance.  This variable is measured by analyzing the decisions of states for the year 2012 
and grouping state decisions in the following categories: Adopt Medicaid expansion, support 
Medicaid expansion, undecided, and decline Medicaid expansion. The year 2012 is used in this 
study as the cross-sectional year because states are given the option to expand Medicaid as the 
result of the Supreme Court decision, National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. 
Sebelius3 in 2012.  
This study will examine the factors that drive states to expand Medicaid.  The forces 
driving states to adopt Medicaid expansion will be analyzed through five models as follows: The 
political model, the economic model, the needs-based model, the state capacity model, and the 
state innovation and diffusion model.  The literature review of the models is centered on studies 
that discuss the adoption of Medicaid policies by states.  The assumptions of each model are 
explicitly stated at the beginning of each model and hypotheses are provided based on the 
success or promising theories of prior studies.  The full model of state decision making in 
Medicaid expansion can be seen in Figure 2.1 below.   
                                                          
3 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) 
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Figure 2.1. A Model of State Decision Making in Medicaid Expansion 
 
Political Model 
Political explanators permeate the literature on state decision making and Medicaid 
policy.  While a political model is not established within the literature on Medicaid policy, this 
research proposes a model that is based on established exegetic variables.  The political model 
assumes that the composition of the state’s legislative body and the competition of major parties 
influence the adoption of new initiatives or programs (Walker, 1969).   Moreover, this model 
assumes that state legislators consider the concerns of its constituents; however, the degree of 
consideration depends upon the responsiveness and actions of voters and interest groups 
(Grogan, 1999). The Political model comprises variables that demonstrate an effectual change in 
state decision making.  The agents of change include electoral politics, race, ideology, and 
governorship. Figure 2.2 depicts the Political model below. 
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Figure 2.2. Political Model 
Electoral Politics  
Major parties represent the political will of states shaping the scope of policy designs and 
“structuring the control of implementation” (Koski, 2007, p. 414).  Previous studies involving 
welfare policy postulated that political factors were secondary to socioeconomic factors in policy 
making (Kousser, 2002, Key, 1949, Lockard, 1959, Fenton, 1966; Hanson, 2004). Dawson and 
Robinson (1963) analyze the relationship between the adoption of state welfare policies and 
political processes and determine that state wealth and socioeconomic forces play more of a role 
in shaping public welfare policies than politics.  Furthermore, they conclude that inter-party 
competition is not a significant factor in determining the scope and nature of public policies 
concerning welfare.  In a study analyzing the redistributive impact of the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) welfare program, Plotnick and Winters (1985) find that there is not 
a link between liberal party control and redistribution policies.  They conclude that party control 
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may serve as an indirect factor or an interaction variable when there is party competition or a 
change in party control.  Buchanan, Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt (1991) find that state Medicaid 
spending levels are heavily influenced by social factors as opposed to political forces.  The 
authors conclude that one of two possible explanations could account for their findings.  The first 
explanation consists of the idea that the measure used to assess political underpinnings did not 
encapsulate the ideology of politicians. The second explanation suggests that state spending on 
Medicaid is unaffected by politics. 
 Due to further research and refined instruments, scholars have established a link between 
politics and welfare benefits.  Scholarship on the power of the major parties has shown that the 
influence of Republican control is linked to reductions in welfare benefits and restrictive welfare 
policies (Kim & Jennings, 2012; Rom, Peterson, Scheve, 1998).  However, Grogan’s (1999) 
examination of the effect of party control on AFDC benefits shows mixed results.  Democratic 
control supports the expansion of financial eligibility as expected.  On the other hand, 
Republican control did not appear significant for policies on benefits and coverage for those 
considered medically needy.  Nonetheless, Grogan’s (1999) study did find a negative association 
between Republican control and payment policies.  This difference in support for Medicaid 
policies suggests that context and degrees of support for different policies within a singular 
program should be considered.  As Grogan (1999) mentioned, “this finding supports that 
Republican control does not lead to retrenchment in welfare benefits due to pressure put on the 
party not to appear mean-spirited” (p. 28).  Brown’s (1995) analysis on the impact of political 
parties on state policy reveals that party control is a significant factor in influencing state welfare 
efforts when examined in context and partisan divisions exist. 
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 While studying state variations on Medicaid spending, Kousser (2002) tests the theory 
that party control is a driver of health policy.  He mentions that, “controlling more than 50 
percent of legislative seats is the ‘magic number’ for Medicaid policy making” (Kousser, 2002, 
p. 650).  Through testing the strength of a party and party control, Kousser (2002) discovers that 
there is evidence to support the notion that party control shapes policy, especially when specific 
policies such as spending, are isolated to control for rival causal explanations.  In a study 
analyzing the influence of party control on Medicaid programs and the uninsured based on state 
population, Cummins’ (2011) is surprised to find that there is an association between unified 
Republican control and a reduction in the uninsured population for average sized states.  On the 
other hand, for average-sized states, Cummins also finds that a majority control of Democratic 
legislative seats led to an increase in an uninsured population.  Cummins (2011) suggests that 
Republicans may be more effective in reducing the uninsured rate due to the adoption of more 
policy reforms and implementation of established and successful programs than Democrats.  
However, Cummins (2011) warns that the policy reforms that were analyzed for the purposes of 
his study were adopted during times of a divided government.   
 Shifting to current studies, Kim and Jennings (2012) analyze state variations in Medicaid 
managed care and conclude that states with a unified Democratic Party tend to have more 
extensive primary care case management programs.  They also have fewer managed care 
programs based on risk.  In contrast, Kim and Jennings (2012) did not find a statistically 
significant relationship with a unified Republican party in regards to either managing care 
programs (risk-based models or primary care case management models).  Jacobs and Callaghan 
(2013) also find that there is a strong correlation between Medicaid expansion and party control 
while examining variations in Medicaid expansion.  In states with Republican control, the 
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expansion of Medicaid is rejected or involves a slow process of implementation.  In contrast, for 
states under Democratic control, Medicaid expansion is implemented very quickly.  Jacobs and 
Callaghan (2013) point out that the opposition or support for the ACA among party lines crosses 
over to Medicaid expansion, which in turn affects state adoption and implementation decisions.   
 Interparty competition is also an important component of electoral systems within each 
state (Soss et al., 2001).  The pluralist view of party competition holds that in states with 
electoral competition, officials that are elected are more responsive to median voters (Jenkins, 
Leicht, & Wendt, 2006).  In describing V.O. Key’s (1949) analysis on southern politics and 
interparty politics, Soss et al. (2001) note that “the policy process is more likely to respond to the 
needs of the disadvantaged when political parties are more evenly matched and, hence, forced to 
contend with one another by mobilizing and swaying voters” (p. 383).  While analyzing the 
differences between state and market strategies for health reform in the 1990s, Barrilleaux and 
Brace (2007) characterize electoral competition as “the closeness of races in terms of votes” (p. 
668), versus the dissemination of legislature seats among parties.  They conclude that more 
health reform policies are adopted when there is a high degree of electoral competition, health 
insurance coverage issues, high resident incomes, and a history of policy adoptions.  
Bernick (2001) tested the notion of partisan competition while examining policy diversity 
and state variation for managed care programs using a measure developed by Holbrook and Van 
Dunk (1993). The measure includes several factors at the legislative district level such as the 
proportion of popular votes, margins of victory, contested elections, and the safety of legislative 
seats occupied by a major party (Bernick, 2011; Holbrook & Van Dunk, 1993).  Bernick (2011) 
finds that states with a greater degree of partisan competition tend to have more liberal policies.  
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Additionally, Bernick (2011) suggests that noncompetitive states are those that know what they 
want or need politically from policies in relation to managed care in welfare reform.  
The influence of party control could be linked to a school of thought that suggests 
Medicaid policies are reflective of the values of the controlling party in office.  This reasoning 
stems from a decisional aspect of policy making where Medicaid policies are typically made by 
fiscal and health committees, and members of the committees are appointed by an elected 
official of a controlling party (Kousser, 2002).  This line of thought presumes that the party in 
control has longevity and very little competition.  Traditional measures of party control do not 
take into account interparty competition.  Many studies analyze party control using a 
dichotomous measure and evidence that demonstrates a link between a particular policy and the 
dominant political party under study (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Kim & Jennings, 2012; 
Kousser, 2002; Satterthwaite, 2002; Volden, 2006).  Other studies utilize additive scales to 
measure party control employing a continuum from republican to democrat or vice versa 
(Callaghan & Jacobs, 2014; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013).  While there are a variety of methods to 
measure party control, the environment surrounding health care reform requires a system of 
measurement that takes into account the contentious nature of Medicaid expansion.  Thus, in 
relation to the dominant two-party political system in the U.S., we will investigate the influence 
of interparty competition on Medicaid expansion. 
Interparty competition is a subject of debate among scholars of American politics because 
of its potential to influence policy outputs (Holbrook & Van Dunk, 1993).  The prevailing 
thought raised, by Key (1949) is that competition among political parties produces liberal 
policies versus conservative policies enacted by noncompetitive systems of government.  
Although Ranney (1976) developed an index to measure interparty competition, the index 
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focuses on measuring the influential power of the Democratic Party.  Building on Ranney’s 
index, Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) create an index that measures the competitiveness of state 
legislative elections at the district level using the following components: the victor’s percentage 
of popular votes, margin of victory, “whether or not the seat is safe,” and whether the race was 
contested (p. 956).  Shufeldt and Flavin (2011) analyze both the Ranney index and the Holbrook 
and Van Dunk measure of interparty competition from 1970-2003 and find that Holbrook and 
Van Dunk’s measure is more stable over time because electoral competition does not vary much 
across state elections. Due to the stability of Holbrook and Van Dunk’s interparty competition 
measure, we will test the following hypothesis: 
H1:  States with a high degree of interparty competition are more likely to adopt Medicaid 
expansion. 
Race 
Redistributive policies, such as, welfare can be thought of as a pulley system in the 
context of a politicized process.  In this sense, public policies are pushed and pulled in a 
multitude of directions.  Political parties compete for votes by appealing to the interests of 
constituents, whether they are poor or rich.  Promises are made and money or benefits are 
extracted from the uninformed or wealthy (Downs, 1957; Plotnick & Winters, 1985; 
Schumpeter, 1947).  While there are limits to this process, many factors influence the 
development and progression of public policies.  Brown (1995) finds that the population of 
African-American residents impacts state welfare efforts.  Brown’s (1995) empirical analysis 
reveals that as the proportion of African-Americans multiplied, welfare efforts decreased.  Kim 
and Jennings (2012) also test the impact of race on state Medicaid policy making, because 
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previous studies have demonstrated that African-Americans are negatively affected by welfare 
policies (see Grogan, 1994; Soss et al., 2001).  However, Kim and Jennings (2012) realize that 
racial politics is insignificant in relation to implemented policies on the receipt of cash 
assistance. 
 The findings of many studies demonstrate that Medicaid politics are shaped by race 
(Brown, 1995, Kim & Jennings, 2012; Soss et al. 2001).  Additionally, scholarship on this topic 
repeatedly reveals a consistent link between the proportion of American Americans on Medicaid 
and welfare generosity (Soss, 2001).  To measure the effect of race on Medicaid expansion, we 
use the percentage of African-American voters as a proxy.  Prior research suggests that states 
with a high population of African-Americans are more likely to provide minimal welfare benefits 
(Howard, 1999; Soss et al, 2010).  We assume that African-American voters represent the 
interests of minorities and that states’ responses to welfare policies are predicated on community 
engagement.  Therefore, we expect states to decline Medicaid expansion when there are a low 
proportion of African-American voters.  
H2: States with a low proportion of African-American voters are more likely to reject 
Medicaid Expansion. 
Ideology 
The motivations driving legislators to adopt certain policies coincide with ingrained 
ideologies.  Republicans tend to favor policies that reduce uncompensated health care and 
decrease health expenditures. On the other hand, Democrats support policies that increase access, 
improve continuity and quality of care, and curtail stigmas on welfare recipients (Pracht, 2007). 
Moreover, states with a liberal ideology have provided strong fiscal support for welfare programs 
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(Barrilleaux & Miller, 1988; Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, & Goldstein, 2002; Schneider, 1993, 
1997).  Political philosophies are infused in public policies because the policy making process is 
not easily translated and enacted based on the interests of advocacy groups and the electorate 
(Grogan, 1999).  
There is a plethora of research that demonstrates that ideology influences public policy 
and health policy.  Soss et al. (2001) find that conservative governments are more likely to enact 
restrictive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) policies.  Volden (2006) discovers 
that government ideology is significant among all different types of policy changes tested in 
relation to eligibility requirements, types of programs, premiums, waiting periods, and co-pay 
benefits for the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP).  Bernick (2011) finds that liberal 
states have diverse Medicaid managed care programs, but moderate states have the most diverse 
Medicaid programs.  Mayer, Kenter, and Morris (2015) determine that state decisions in regards 
to public policies are not fueled by policy needs, but instead by ingrained ideological beliefs. 
Ideology has been considered a significant determinant in the shaping of public and 
health policies (Berry, Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, & Klarner, 2010; Coggburn & Schneider, 
2003; Fossett & Thompson, 2006).  When examining ideology and the consideration of the 
adoption of a policy by states, Grossback et al. (2004) point out that there is an assumption that,  
the policy can be described along some dimension (which we refer to as liberal-
conservative, although it need not be) and that the preference of the government can be 
described as a point on this continuum.  The implication is that if ideology were all that 
mattered to the state government, a state would adopt a policy if its placement on this 
continuum were closer to the state’s ideal point than the status quo. (p. 524) 
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Following the logic of this basic assumption, we will examine the influence of state government 
ideology on Medicaid expansion.  
H3:  State governments with a conservative ideology are more likely to oppose Medicaid 
expansion. 
Governorship  
Governors are considered key actors in promoting policy change and influencing 
Medicaid policy (Soumerai, Ross-Degnan, Fortress & Walser, 1997).  Barrilleaux and Rainey 
(2014) examine the decisions of governors in support or opposition of Medicaid expansion and 
find that Republican governors are more liable to resist Medicaid expansion than Democrats.  
Moreover, there is a strong indication that Republican control of state legislatures is associated 
with opposition to Medicaid expansion. This finding supports Barrilleaux and Rainey’s (2014) 
hypothesis that “governors should be more likely to oppose the funds when they can expect their 
decision to oppose expansion to be supported by the state legislature” (p. 443).  Although there is 
evidence that demonstrates that the decisions of governors in supporting or opposing Medicaid 
expansion are influenced by the support of state legislatures (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014), the 
constitutional power of state governors is worthy of examination.   
 The role of governors in state decision making and policy making is dependent upon state 
constitutional powers and policy arenas (Randall & Parente, 2012).  Woods (2004) posits that 
governors utilize their formal powers to influence policy. Institutional power varies by state; 
some governors are able to exercise their power through appointments and line-item vetoes. 
Alternatively, other governors are constricted by constitutional strongholds (McLendon, Heller, 
& Young, 2005).  Kousser (2002) mentions that the power to veto items is granted to some 
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governors to reduce wasteful spending.  Kousser (2002) adds that following this logic; the power 
to veto items leads to a diminution of Medicaid expenditures. Therefore, we expect states to 
decline Medicaid expansion when governors have high institutional powers. 
H4: Governors with a high level of institutional powers are more likely to oppose 




The Economic model assumes that the wealth of a state impacts the adoption of new 
programs as a result of the availability and accessibility of resources (Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973).  
Additionally, the model presupposes that larger states with greater financial freedom are able to 
adopt new programs faster than smaller states or financially burdened states with less capital.  
Moreover, the choices states make are dependent upon state resources (Goggin, 1999). 
Hanson (1984) argues that economic factors constrain the behavior of policymakers and 
place limitations on policy options.  While this model analyzes economic forces, the other 
models in this study observe a variety of internal and external forces that influence the decision 
making process. Consequently, this model will examine state wealth, tax effort, state budgets, 
health care expenditures, and federal aid. Figure 2.3 represents the economic model below. 
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Figure 2.3. Economic Model 
State Wealth 
 Wealth is an important criterion that affects the actions of decision makers.  The 
availability of resources and relative wealth are considered determinants of innovation, which 
represents the willingness of decision makers to adopt new policies (Walker, 1969).  There is a 
notion that progressive states, also known as liberal states, have generous welfare benefits and 
tend to be richer states with great economic wealth (Gray, 1973).  However, it should also be 
noted that wealthier states also have the ability to pay for Medicaid services (Buchanan, 
Cappelleri, & Ohsfeldt, 1991). 
 Walker (1969) measures state wealth as per capita personal income and finds that 
wealthier states are more likely to adopt an array of policies. Tropman and Gordon (1978) 
investigate the relationship between state demographics and public welfare activity and ascertain 
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that per capita income, serving as a proxy for state wealth, explains 60% of the variance in their 
model.  The model reveals that there is a link between the wealth of a state and the number of 
individuals who are covered by Medicaid services, and wealthier states tend to provide more 
state welfare coverage. Buchanan, Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt (1991) also use per capita personal 
income as a measure for state wealth and find that economic factors are more significant than 
political forces when examining state spending levels on Medicaid.  Grogan and Rigby (2009) 
study the effect of partisan conflict on the enactment of the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP) and report that per capita income is significant when predicting the design of 
the SCHIP program, but it is not important when predicting SCHIP program eligibility.  Other 
measures of state wealth, such as, the cost of living are associated with higher eligibility levels.  
Grogan and Rigby’s (2009) findings provide mixed results with partisan factors being more 
prevalent than state resources, benefits, and costs in eligibility setting, but not important in 
regards to choice of program design. 
 For this study, we will examine state wealth using two indicators that are popular within 
the literature on Medicaid policy.  First, we will analyze per capita income as a measure of state 
wealth.  Then, we will assess the effect of tax effort on Medicaid expansion.  Per capita income 
is used in many studies and research on state wealth demonstrates a consistent link between the 
adoption of a policy and the wealth of a state (Grogan & Rigby, 2009; Satterthwaite, 2002; 
Tropman & Gordon, 1978; Volden, 2006; Walker, 1969).  Based on previous research, we 
expect to see a positive relationship between states with high per capita income and the 
expansion of Medicaid. 
H5: States with a high level of per capita income are more likely to expand Medicaid. 
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While the literature on state wealth mainly uses per capita income as a measure, more 
studies are using tax effort or tax capacity as an indicator of state wealth. The importance of tax 
effort is evident when considering the function of taxation.  When state revenues are low, states 
must choose to either limit state spending or raise taxes (Grogan, 1999).  In the context of 
Medicaid, state dollars for Medicaid are drawn from the total revenue of state budgets and even 
if the tax base is reduced, states must account for rising medical costs (Grogan, 1999).  
Satterthwaite (2002) notes, “wealthier states…have a greater capacity to deal with fiscal stress 
because of their ability to generate new revenue through taxation” (p.199).  In a study examining 
inequalities across state-level welfare policies on U.S. immigrants, Graefe, De Jong, Hall, 
Sturgeon, and Van Eerden (2008) find that smaller states with reduced tax capacity have 
stringent eligibility rules.  
Many scholars utilize either tax effort or tax capacity to assess state-level policy 
decisions or choices.  Tax capacity measures the amount of income a state could generate 
through taxation; while tax effort measures the “extent to which [state governments] utilizes its 
tax capacity” (Berry & Fording, 1997, p. 158).  More specifically, tax effort represents the 
amount of taxes that states collect from residents.  We are particularly interested in tax effort 
because it captures the actual revenue of state governments derived from common state tax 
collections.  Tax capacity is not a desirable measure for this study because the decision to expand 
Medicaid by states is optional and the federal government covers 100% of expansion costs for 
the first 3 years from 2014-2016.   Then federal funds for Medicaid expansion slowly decrease 
over the next few years, but by the year 2020 and after, the government covers 90% of program 
costs related to Medicaid expansion (Angeles, 2012).  Due to the financial federal scheme of 
Medicaid expansion, tax capacity is not as important as tax effort. When states have a sufficient 
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amount of funds and resources through the collection of taxes, they are able to experiment and 
take risks with slack resources (Satterthwaite, 2002).  An accurate account of available state 
funds enables states to make action-oriented policy decisions when making the decision to 
expand Medicaid.  We expect to observe states opting to expand Medicaid when tax efforts are 
high.  
H6: As tax efforts increase, states are more likely to expand Medicaid. 
State Budget 
 State governments are responsible for balancing their budgets.  As budgets become 
constrained, state legislators will often cut Medicaid benefits and fees to providers (Olson, 2012).  
Budgetary considerations for Medicaid reveal differences in benefits, prices, fiscal capacity, 
political ideology, and reimbursement policy leading to wide variations across states (Boyd, 
2003).  In a study analyzing the decision making process of state budget cuts and Medicaid 
programs, Hoadley, Cunningham, and McHugh (2004) find that states contain costs by reducing 
provider payments, imposing cost-sharing plans, limiting or eliminating eligibility for some 
recipient groups, and choosing to indefinitely cancel plans to expand Medicaid services.  
Additionally, some states reduce enrollment by reducing outreach efforts, putting a freeze on 
enrollment, and instituting administrative barriers. While analyzing the ACA’s impact on 
Medicaid participation rates, Sonier, Boudreaux, and Blewett (2013) find that states with a low 
baseline participation rate could experience a large woodwork effect (meaning a sizeable influx 
of new enrollees) with the expansion of Medicaid thus negatively affecting state budgets. 
 This study will use state budget shortfalls to assess the likelihood of Medicaid expansion 
among states.  Budget shortfalls represent “the extent to which states’ revenues fall[s] short of 
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the cost of providing services” (Oliff, Mai, & Palacios, 2012, p. 2).  This measure provides a 
realistic depiction of the financial health of states because the size of the budget shortfall is an 
indicator of how well states are managing their financial resources.  Therefore, we expect states 
to decline Medicaid expansion when state budget shortfalls are copious. 
H7: The larger a state’s budget shortfall, the less likely they are to expand Medicaid.  
Health Care Expenditures 
 Medicaid expenditures account for a large portion of state expenditures and policymakers 
respond to rising costs through adjusting Medicaid policies and benefits (Lukens, 2014).  As 
Grannemann and Pauly (2010) note, analyzing health care expenditures is a reflection of “the 
overall level of resources a state devotes annually to meeting the needs of a typical low-income 
person” (p. 55).  Colby, Lipson, and Turchin (2012) declare that Medicaid spending on children 
is a predictor of health insurance adequacy, where adequacy represents access to health care, 
covered benefits, and preventative services. For the most part, these authors find that states with 
high Medicaid expenditures provide children with better insurance adequacy.  However, there 
are six states with lower than average health care expenditures that provided adequate health 
insurance: Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, South Carolina, and Tennessee (Colby, Lipson, 
& Turchin, 2012).  Although these states are outliers, the relative growth of health care 
expenditures affects states negatively in a multitude of ways.   
Patrick and Freed (2012) investigate the relative growth of Medicaid health care 
expenditures in adults and children from 1991 to 2005 and discover that, although disabled 
individuals make up a small fraction of Medicaid recipients, Medicaid spending for this 
population accounts for 43% of total Medicaid expenditures.  The next largest group of high 
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utilizers of medical care is long-term care patients with expenses accruing up to 31% of 
Medicaid costs.  Patrick and Freed (2012) argue that the cost of Medicaid programs is straining 
states and opportunities to institute cost-saving strategies. States are struggling to implement case 
management programs, control fraud and abuse, reduce long-term care payments, and Medicaid 
benefits are becoming scarce or limited.  In a similar study on state Medicaid spending trends 
from 1992 to 2009, Cantor, Thompson, and Farnham (2013) find that Medicaid expenditures 
have increased annually at a rate of 3%.  They suggest that countervailing factors such as fiscal 
stress, political forces, and Medicaid spending that interfere with other investments (e.g., 
education) may contribute to the reluctance of state policymakers to expand Medicaid. 
The cost of health care services is a real concern for many states.  When making 
decisions in regards to Medicaid policies, states consider the cost of the program, the benefits of 
the program, and the population of people who will receive the benefits (Kim & Jennings, 2012).  
These considerations are based on the projected cost of Medicaid expenditures.  State budgets 
are negatively affected when Medicaid expenditures are high, thus leading to less monetary 
funds for other investments (Cantor, Thompson, & Farnham, 2013).  Therefore, we expect to 
observe a positive effect on Medicaid expansion with the presence of low Medicaid 
expenditures. 
H8: States with a low level of Medicaid expenditures are more likely to expand Medicaid.  
Federal Aid 
 Federal governments influence policy by requiring states to implement national initiatives 
or by enticing states to establish programs with financial incentives (Adler, 2011).  In a study 
examining state variation and the expansion of Medicaid, Jacobs and Callaghan (2013) contend 
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that federal funding may persuade states to adopt new Medicaid programs when states are facing 
economic uncertainty, thus suggesting that less affluent states will opt to receive federal 
matching funds to expand Medicaid.  Satterthwaite (2002) also analyzed the effect of federal 
contributions on Medicaid using the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP), which is the 
federal share of monetary assistance given to states to expand and/or operate Medicaid.  
Satterthwaite’s (2002) results reveal that states with a low FMAP rate are less likely to adopt 
new Medicaid programs.  Conversely, states with high FMAP rates are more likely to adopt new 
innovations. 
 The FMAP is a formula-based schema that governs the federal portion of funds dedicated 
to Medicaid state programs.  The federal government covers 50% or more of Medicaid costs 
depending on the established FMAP rate for each state (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured, 2012).  The dissemination of federal funds is more inclined to benefit states 
experiencing economic hardship in addition to states that dedicate additional efforts to provide 
more services for Medicaid (Dinan & Gamkhar, 2009).  Therefore, we expect states with a high 
FMAP rate to expand Medicaid.  
H9: States with high Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) rates are more 




 The needs-based model assumes that policy action at the state-level is more likely to 
occur following the presence or the severity of a problem.  In a problem environment, there is 
usually the existence of a gap between expectations and actual conditions (Nice, 1994).  
Research has shown that the existence of a problem influences the decisions of policymakers 
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(Anakwenze & Zuberi, 2013; Nice, 1994; Routhe, Jones, & Feldman, 2005; Shaxon, 2009).  
Problems may become worse over time or current programs or policies may no longer be 
effective (Nice, 1994). The severity of a problem serves as an impetus for change (Sapat, 2004).  
As an explanation of state policy choice and decision making, the common thought is that as 
problems become more severe, state policymakers will most likely respond to resolve the 
issue(s) (Olive, Gunasekara, Raymond, 2012).  Through the passing of new legislation, the needs 
of states are expressed (Satterthwaite, 2002).  States expressions are assessed through the needs-
based model, which includes variables that states monitor to ascertain the needs of its population. 
The variables are poverty rates, the percentage of the elderly in states, unemployment rates, 
uninsured rates, and health status.  Figure 2.4 illustrates the needs-based model below. 
 




 With a large proportion of individuals living in poverty, there is a need for an expanded 
system of Medicaid (Kousser, 2002).  Poverty is an indicator that signifies a demand for 
Medicaid services (Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, & Goldstein, 2002).  The decision to decline 
Medicaid expansion by states places additional burdens on many individuals living in poverty 
(Antos, 2013).  Frakt and Carroll note, “it is the poorest of the poor--- those with incomes below 
100 percent of the FPL [Federal Poverty Level] ---whose access to affordable insurance is most 
at risk” (p. 173). 
 Rom et al.’s (1998) research on welfare policy and interstate competition confirms 
previous research that demonstrates a correlation between low benefit levels and high poverty 
rates.  However, Rom et al. (1998) note that interactions between per capita income and the 
proportion of African-Americans in a state —in addition to poverty rates— may have obscured 
the effects of each individual variable.  Although Kousser (2002) views poverty rate as a 
demographic variable, the author asserts that there is a need for expanded Medicaid systems 
when states have a high proportion of poor people.  Moreover, while examining state 
discretionary spending, Kousser (2002) discovers that poverty is a driver of program size and 
total Medicaid expenditures per capita. 
 In a study analyzing the effect of Medicaid on poverty, Sommers and Oellerich (2013) 
find that Medicaid reduces poverty rates by 2.2% for disabled individuals and 1.0% for children.  
The authors conclude that Medicaid has kept 2.1 million adults, children, disabled, and elderly 
persons out of poverty.  Furthermore, Sommers and Oellerich (2013) suggest that Medicaid cuts 
and the elimination of benefits may result in further health care issues and an increase in poverty 
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rates.  In fact, Richardson and Yilmazer (2013) explore the impact of health care reform on states 
and find that in states opting out of Medicaid expansion, 4-10% of adults living in poverty will 
not have insurance.  Richardson and Yilmazer’s (2013) model also demonstrates that states with 
generous benefits will encounter a small growth in added Medicaid beneficiaries with Medicaid 
expansion.  On the other hand, states with high poverty rates will experience elevated levels of 
new Medicaid enrollees. 
 Although there is a line of thought that presumes that state policymakers respond to the 
needs of its citizens, research demonstrates that states with high poverty rates offer limited 
Medicaid benefits and are more likely to opt out of Medicaid expansion (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 
2014; Peterson & Rom, 1989; Peltzman, 1980; Rom et al. 1998).  Prior research on poverty rates 
uses the official poverty measure as a unit of measurement; however, for this study, we will 
analyze the effect of poverty using the Census Bureau’s supplemental poverty measure (SPM) as 
opposed to the official poverty measure.  The official measure of poverty “consists of a set of 
thresholds for families of different sizes and compositions that are compared with before-tax 
income to determine a family’s poverty status” (Bridges & Gesumaria, 2013, p. 49).  On the 
other hand, the SPM consists of “thresholds [that] are based on a broad measure of necessary 
expenditures (food, clothing, shelter, and utilities” (Bridges & Gesumaria, 2013, p.50).  
Additionally, the SPM takes into account cash income, government benefits, and geographical 
variations in relation to the cost of living (Bridges & Gesumaria, 2013).  We believe that the 
SPM provides a more accurate portrayal of poverty and we expect states to expand Medicaid 
when they have high rates of poverty using the SPM. 




 Ailments are a multifaceted burden affecting many elderly persons.  Additionally, 
chronic illnesses, which are more prevalent among the elderly, require increased use of medical 
services and ongoing health care expenditures. The elderly are eligible for Medicaid services if 
they are categorically eligible or medically eligible (Rowland & Lyons, 1996).   In 2009, 
Medicaid services were provided to 70% of nursing home seniors and total Medicaid 
expenditures on the elderly equaled $75 billion in 2008 (De Nardi, French, Jones, Gooptu, 2012). 
While Medicaid financially protects low-income persons who are elderly, the scope of available 
services is limited.  Although each state determines eligibility standards, the amount and type of 
health care services, reimbursement rates, and the scope of services, some elderly persons aged 
65 and older qualify for Medicaid coverage.  Moreover, under Medicaid, dual eligible and 
Medicare advantage beneficiaries are eligible to receive home health care services, outpatient 
care, durable medical equipment, physician services, and preventative care (Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, 2016).  The problems faced by the elderly include complex enrollment 
issues, negative social stigmas associated with welfare programs, and lack of understanding and 
awareness of Medicaid services (Rowland & Lyons, 1996). 
 While examining the effects of state policy on elderly Medicaid beneficiaries, Pezzin and 
Kasper (2002) also find that almost 50% of elderly persons meeting federal poverty levels at or 
below 100% are not enrolled in Medicaid. Moreover, they find that states with generous home- 
and community-based services have more Medicaid enrollees versus states with less generous 
Medicaid policies.  The authors suggest that not only do state policies influence participation in 
Medicaid; they may also shed light on the success or failure of Medicaid programs and whether 
the intended purposes are served.  In a similar albeit qualitative study exploring expanded 
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coverage for low-income elderly persons, Lamphere and Rosenbach (2000) acknowledge that the 
cost of medical care is a problem for individuals aged 65 and over and the low-income elderly 
account for a large proportion of state populations.  They note that a common problem that exists 
between the states and the federal government involves joint responsibility such as financial 
conflicts and confusion regarding mandated policies for the elderly with low-incomes.  
Moreover, Lamphere and Rosenbach (2000) argue that rising health care costs have “left federal 
and state policy makers wary of actions that commit the public sector to further underwriting 
health entitlements” (p. 216).  Furthermore, Kousser (2002) contends that policymakers must 
decide on a trade-off between serving the needs of the state or supply funds for the health care of 
many seniors with exacerbated health care costs.  
 As medical technology advances and citizens live longer, the population of elderly 
persons on Medicaid will be a topic of central concern in Medicaid policy.  While Medicare 
provides medical care to individuals age 65 and older, Medicaid acts as a safety net for low-
income and disabled elderly adults (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid Facts, 2010).  As of 2011, 
adults aged 65 and older account for 9% of the total Medicaid population (68 million) and 21% 
of Medicaid expenditures while overall Medicaid expenses total $397.6 billion (Paradise, 2015).  
Even though the elderly population is very small in comparison to other groups (children, adults, 
and the disabled), this population is a high consumer of medical services. Moreover, the elderly 
have Medicare coverage, and knowledge of this fact could give states the impression that 
expanded services under Medicaid are not a necessity.  Therefore, we expect states with a large 
population of individuals age 65 and older to reject the expansion of Medicaid.  
H11: States with a high proportion of elderly persons are less likely to expand Medicaid. 
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The Unemployed 
 State action in relation to Medicaid policies can be influenced by fluctuations in the rate 
of unemployment.  For instance, Grogan (1999) hypothesizes that as the rate of unemployment 
rises, the number of eligible persons for Medicaid increases along with program costs, which 
serves as a catalyst for states to respond by reducing Medicaid benefits. However, Grogan’s 
(1999) research produces mixed results, revealing that an increase in unemployment leads to 
stricter state eligibility policies, but also unexpectedly leads to a positive effect on benefit 
policies.  Soss et al. (2001) also study the effect of the unemployed while recognizing that 
welfare systems and policies function to meet the societal needs of states under a labor-market 
hypothesis. The authors predict that, “states with lower unemployment rates will adopt more 
restrictive TANF policies” (p. 383). They find that the chances that a state will adopt work 
requirements increases when unemployment rates decrease.  Soss et al. (2001) conclude that 
lawmakers use work requirements as a way of controlling the poor instead of outright denying 
benefits. 
 The rate of unemployment can reflect a greater issue that is present in state economies.  
High unemployment rates signal higher incidences of poverty, divorce, physical and mental 
health issues, and long-term earnings loss and instability (Schmitt & Jones, 2012).  On the other 
hand, low unemployment rates tend to be associated with reduced poverty rates, an expanded 
labor force, and reductions in welfare caseloads (Blank, 2000; Schoeni & Blank, 2000).  
Previous research demonstrates that high rates of unemployment are associated with a plethora 
of problems and states respond to this policy problem with restrictive welfare benefits (Grogan, 
1999; Schmitt & Jones, 2012; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001).  Since most private 
and public organizations offer insurance to their employees, we expect states to expand Medicaid 
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when the unemployment rate is low because the gainfully employed are less likely to sign up or 
meet eligibility standards for Medicaid.  
H12: States with low unemployment rates are more likely to expand Medicaid.  
The Uninsured 
 Many individuals lack health insurance and this can be problematic for several reasons: 
(a) Health status and outcomes are typically poor for this population; (b) there are financial 
implications for both states and the uninsured when health services are needed due to the rising 
costs of health care; and (c) hospitals are burdened with uncompensated care because they treat 
individuals without health insurance (Frakt & Carroll, 2013).  The barriers to care affecting the 
uninsured are getting and maintaining health insurance, meeting restrictive requirements to 
obtain Medicaid services, and finding providers that will accept Medicaid (DeVoe, Baez, Angier, 
Krois, Edlund, & Carney, 2007).  As DeVoe et al. (2007) note, unmet health needs have 
contributed to high medical expenditures, which are not affordable for the uninsured. 
 Just as there are individual barriers to health care for the uninsured, there are barriers that 
limit the ability of states to address the problem which are political, financial, and legal in nature. 
States may not have the support of the public on policies aimed at reducing the uninsured rate; 
the cost of insuring the uninsured may not be conducive to state budgets; and federal mandates 
may coincide with proposed health reforms at the state-level to reduce the number of uninsured 
individuals (Barrilleaux & Brace, 2007; Skocpol, 1993). While analyzing state policy strategies 
to reduce the proportion of uninsured persons, Barrilleaux and Brace (2007) find that as the rate 
of the uninsured rises, the adoption of state policies aimed at reducing the uninsured decreases.   
The authors suggest that “heightened demand for relief may have the perverse effect of leading 
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state governments to enact policies that attempt to shift the problem to the market place” 
(Barrilleaux & Brace, 2007, p. 673). 
 In a study analyzing the decisions of governors and Medicaid expansion, Barrilleaux and 
Rainey (2014) argued that there was an expectation from policy makers that states would adopt 
Medicaid expansion because many states had mission statements and strategic plans to reduce 
the rate of uninsurance.  With the expansion of Medicaid, many parties would benefit from 
expansion: managed care organizations, hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, low-income individuals, 
physicians, and health care suppliers.  This, in turn, would benefit states by addressing a public 
need.  Although Barrilleaux and Rainey (2014) hypothesized that, “governors are less likely to 
oppose the federal Medicaid expansion funds as the percent of uninsured in their state increases” 
(p. 444), their results indicated otherwise.  They found that regardless of need or the political 
party of the governor, as the level of uninsurance increases, the level of opposition also rises. We 
will test Barrilleaux and Rainey’s finding to determine if the results can be reproduced. 
 H13: States with high uninsurance rates are more likely to oppose Medicaid expansion. 
Health Status 
 The health status of states can signal whether a need exists among state populations. With 
the provision of health care services and early treatment, major illnesses or chronic diseases can 
be prevented.  Moreover, early treatment can also reduce expensive health care costs that could 
arise later in life (Copeland & Meier, 1987).  Hill, Abdus, Hudson, and Selden (2014) suggest 
that states expanding Medicaid may not have to deal with issues of adverse selection with new 
enrollees meeting the federal eligibility requirements because they are healthier than the typical 
Medicaid population. They tested several health indicators, such as mental health, physical 
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health, and chronic diseases. The authors conducted sensitivity tests to determine the differences 
between pre-ACA enrollees and post-ACA Medicaid beneficiaries. 
 Grogan (1999) utilizes an index variable to measure the health status of states, which 
includes a state’s violent crime rate, death rate, frequency of smoking, and total number of 
accidental deaths.  While Grogan (1999) assumes that states respond to increasing health service 
needs by reducing benefits, the author finds that states respond positively to recognized medical 
and health needs.  Many scholars utilize infant mortality as an indicator of health, which is what 
Satterthwaite (2002) uses in the study examining Medicaid managed care programs. However, 
Satterthwaite does not find a statistically significant relationship and concludes that the need for 
better health care services does not affect a state’s determination to adopt managed care for 
Medicaid. 
 Barrilleaux and Rainey (2014) measure the health status of states by analyzing low birth 
weight, heart disease, death rate, and life expectancy.  They discover that all of the health 
measures, with the exception of life expectancy, had “little to no effect on governors’ decisions 
to support or oppose expansion” (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014).  Regardless of the level of need, 
their analyses reveal that there are other factors, such as politics, that influence governors to 
oppose Medicaid expansion (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014).  
 Although states spend a significant amount of money on health care services, a major 
concern confronting states, and the nation as a whole, is that the level of spending on health does 
not equate to better health outcomes or a qualified health care system.  Because of this mismatch 
between spending on health and health outcomes, states have opportunities to invest in 
prevention programs and to maximize their dollars spent on health care (Wold, 2010).  
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Furthermore, knowledge of the health needs and overall health of state residents’ helps states in 
determining health-related services and prospective costs when making decisions to expand 
Medicaid (Hill, Abdus, Hudson, & Selten, 2014).  To measure the health of state residents, we 
examine perceptions of overall health status, mental health, and low birth weight. We choose to 
measure mental health because there is a growing trend of increased services and expenditures 
for this population of Medicaid utilizers that indicates a need for expanded services (Soni, 2015).  
We also include overall perceptions of health because we believe that understanding the 
perceived health needs of residents can help states develop interventions to address systems and 
health-related deficiencies in Medicaid (The Pew Charitable Trusts and John D. and Catherine T. 
MacArthur Foundation, 2014b).  Last, we examine low birth weight because this measure 
signifies the health and survival of infants.  When infants weigh less than 5 pounds 8 ounces, 
they are more likely to suffer from chronic illnesses or some form of disability than babies within 
average weight limits.  States that invest in maternal health and comprehensive prenatal services 
can reduce the incidence of low-birth weight babies (The Pew Charitable Trusts and John D. and 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 2014b).  To capture a cumulative measure of health status 
we develop an index to test the influence of health status on Medicaid expansion. We choose 
indicators relevant to the decision making process of Medicaid policies, and thus expect to 
observe states expand Medicaid when its residents are in good health. 








State Capacity Model 
 
The state capacity model is based on Bowman and Kearney’s (1988) conception of state 
government capability and assumes that states have the capability to respond effectively, 
efficiently and responsibly to change, decisions, and conflicts.  More specifically, Bowman and 
Kearney define state government capability as “three activities that are most salient for state 
government: (1) to respond effectively to change; (2) to make decisions efficiently, effectively 
(i.e., rationally) and responsively; and (3) to manage conflict” (p. 343).  By means of capacity 
building, states are able to implement a broad array of initiatives through the selection and 
establishment of institutional arrangements, which allows them to be more responsive to the 
public (Bowman & Kearney, 1988). The constructs that will represent this model include 
legislative professionalism, institutional capacity, and governance.  Figure 2.5 presents the state 
capacity model 
below.  




 State legislatures have undergone many reforms over the years to increase their capacity 
to respond to pressing problems, implement many programs and deliver services (Bowman & 
Kearney, 1988).  While administrative professionalism within government agencies is 
recognized as an indicator affecting performance and decisions, the importance of 
professionalism can be difficult to assess at the state level (Sapat, 2004).  The Citizens 
Conference on State Legislatures (CCSL), which concentrates on the concepts of independence, 
representativeness, accountability, functionality, and informedness, created the first evaluative 
measure of state legislatures.  These concepts are examined in-depth by examining committee 
structure, leadership, staffing, rules and procedures, time, facilities, ethics, and size (Bowman & 
Kearney, 1988; Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, 1971).   
 Since the CCSL’s evaluative measure of state legislatures was published, many scholars 
have expanded upon the concepts.  Grumm (1971) created a professional index with five 
indicator variables for legislative professionalism.  The measures include length of session, a 
legislative service score based on the CCSL report, the number of bills introduced, and 
legislative compensation (Bowman & Kearney, 1988).  Morehouse (1973) updated Grumm’s 
index and substituted the measure on the number of bills introduced with “the average population 
per house seat” (Bowman & Kearney, 1988, p. 344). 
 Over the years, state legislatures became more professional and the development of 
administrative capacity led to more responsibilities in a wide range of policy areas, such as 
environmental, economic, and social programs (Jenkins, Leicht, & Wendt, 2006).  In an article 
analyzing the circumstances in which health policy reforms are adopted, Carter and LaPlant 
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(1997) explore the effect of legislative professionalism.  The basis for studying legislative 
professionalism came out of a concern for criticisms of state governments being repressive and 
deficient in professionalism.  They assume that the more professional a state legislature became, 
the more likely state legislatures were able to manage complex policy problems and adopt health 
policy reforms.  However, Carter and LaPlant’s (1997) study reveals inconsistent results. They 
discover that there is a statistically significant relationship between highly professionalized 
legislatures and the adoption of pre-existing condition policies.  On the other hand, less 
professionalized legislatures are more likely to adopt riskier reforms with less state involvement 
(i.e., contracted services with third parties), which could be the result of poor fiscal health.  
Barrilleaux and Brace (2007) also study state capacity and the ability of state governments to 
address complex problems through policy making in the Medicaid arena.  They contend that 
“more capable state governments should produce more state center policy solutions, as the 
strength of governing institutions is an important determinant of both what polities do and how 
they do it” (Barrilleaux & Brace, 2007, p. 668).  They analyze the strength of state legislatures 
using the following indicators: salaries of public personnel, publications authored by public 
employees, staff education, the size of staff, and the proportion of protected civil service 
employees.  These authors find that increased state capacity led to few policy adoptions, more 
reliance on state-based policies, and less dependence on market-based strategies.  The authors’ 
findings are unique because prior scholarship on state capacity associated highly 
professionalized legislatures with heightened government activity. Although Barrilleaux and 
Brace (2007) refer to legislative professionalism as institutional capacity, they admit in their 
study that their measure is based on Bowman and Kearney’s (1988) legislative professionalism 
construct.   
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  The reformation of state legislatures over the years has led to improvements in 
addressing complex policy problems, the administration and delivery of state services, and 
conflict resolution skills (Bowman & Kearney, 1988; Jones, 1994).  Professional state 
legislatures are known to have long-term appointments, high salaries, and adequate support staff.  
They also tend to support progressive policies (Brace & Ward, 1999; Finegold & Skocpol, 1995; 
Jenkins, Leicht, Wendt, 2006).  Thus, we expect states with a high level of professionalism to 
expand Medicaid.  
H15: States with a high degree of legislative professionalism are more likely to adopt 
Medicaid expansion. 
Institutional Capacity 
 Institutional capacity refers to organizational structures and processes, which give state 
legislatures the ability to carry out a wide range of activities.  This definition of institutional 
capacity is quite different from legislative professionalism, which focuses on societal traits of the 
legislative body culturally accepted as professional (Bowman & Kearney, 1988).  In reference to 
the distinction between professional and institutional capacity, LeLoup (1978) states that 
“professionalism appears to be something that the wealthier states can afford, but many reforms, 
structures, and procedures that make legislatures more capable are not bound by high monetary 
costs… [which] suggest[s] that professionalism and capability are empirically distinguishable” 
(p. 618).  With this distinction in mind, this research will focus on organizational and 
administrative traits to assess institutional capacity. 
 Prior studies exploring institutional capacity in Medicaid programs focus on identifying 
administrative issues.  Gold, Sparer, and Chu (1996) realize that states need to concentrate on 
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oversight and observe the following: There is a lack of policies and procedures guiding health 
plans; administrative tasks are fragmented and decentralized causing increased administrative 
costs; there is a shortage of resources and staff, and states are lacking in information technology 
to track and monitor Medicaid trends and patterns.  Gold et al. (1996) suggest that while states 
need to tailor their methods of managing Medicaid, they should also consider the following: (a) 
investing in administrative infrastructure that allows states to meet program demands, (b) design 
policies that are comprehendible for their servicing population, (c) develop strategic plans that 
allow program growth and are compatible with existing plans, and (d) dedicate an adequate 
amount of time and resources to implement new systems and programs. While examining the 
experiences of states and Medicaid managed care, Holahan, Zuckerman, Evans, and Rangarajan 
(1998) also find that complex administrative issues affect many facets of service.  Many states 
engage in negotiations, competitive bidding, and rate setting, which require a certain level of 
capacity building to ensure low risks, the protection of state funds and Medicaid beneficiaries, 
and mutually satisfying contracts between providers and states. 
 More recent studies have analyzed and operationalized institutional capacity at the state-
level.  Through the devolution of services and programs created at the national level, states are 
compelled to manage many government programs, which require the development and 
succession of administrative capacity (Bowling & Wright, 1998).  To assess institutional 
capacity, many scholars have used the Government Performance Project which was created in 
1996 to better understand the functions of state governments in respect to management and 
performance (Barrett & Greene, 2008).  Coggburn and Schneider (2003) analyze state 
managerial capacity using data from the Maxwell School’s Government Performance Project 
(GPP), which provides letter grades in the areas of human resources management, capacity 
 60 
management, information technology, managing for results, and financial management.  These 
components are converted to a grade point average scale and serve as a proxy to measure 
managerial capacity.  Coggburn and Schneider (2003) find that management capacity not only 
influences state priorities but also shapes the outcomes of programs.  They conclude that states 
with a high level of management capacity make decisions or choose policy alternatives that 
benefit the majority.   
Fossett and Thompson (2006) also use the GPP to measure administrative capacity with 
the inclusion of other indicators (i.e., performance, information technology) known to affect the 
adoption of administrative orientations.  However, they do not find administrative capacity 
predictive of best practices related to administrative responsiveness to the disadvantaged (ARD).  
While they admit that half of the variance of their study is not explained, they suggest that 
certain characteristics of “administrative agents” may not have been captured in their study 
(Fossett & Thompson, 2006).  However, their qualitative analysis reveals that there is concern 
among administrators in regards to the high rates of enrollment and having the administrative 
capacity to deal with new enrollees for the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) 
program (Fossett & Thompson, 2006).  In a study analyzing the impact of internal state 
characteristics on the extensiveness of managed Medicaid programs, Kim and Jennings (2012) 
also use the GPP to measure management capacity.  They use data from 2001 and 1998 and 
average the scores from the areas of financial management, human resource management, 
information technology, capital management, and management for results.  While they expected 
a positive relationship between the adoption of risk-based program enrollment and management 
capacity and a negative relationship between the adoption of primary care case management and 
 61 
management capacity, the results of their analysis was not statistically significant (Kim & 
Jennings, 2012).   
With inconsistent and inadequate measures of administrative capacity, the most recent 
scholarship on administrative capacity focuses on the development of a new measure to assess 
this construct.  Jacobs and Callaghan (2013) develop a composite measure that includes 
insurance oversight, the prevention of fraud, and expanding high-risk pools to eligible persons.  
They find that there is a great deal of variation among the states, and states with a lower level of 
administrative capacity are slower to adopt or establish health care reforms. In a later study, 
Callaghan and Jacobs (2014) use the same measure for administrative capacity with slight 
modifications to study the progress of implementation of Medicaid expansion.  Their findings are 
insignificant and they suggest that financial incentives and institutional resources, which are 
drivers of vertical federalism, could be at odds with administrative capacity. 
Although some studies on institutional capacity produce insignificant results, we suspect 
that there is a connection between the expansion of state programs and the ability of states to 
implement such services (Callaghan & Jacobs, 2014; Fossett & Thompson, 2006; Kim & 
Jennings, 2012).  As scholars experiment and test new measures, there is always the chance that 
a variable does not measure the intended concept or construct. These issues may be indicative of 
measurement validity such as content validity, face validity, or perhaps construct validity.  To 
test the influence of institutional capacity on Medicaid expansion, we will use Coggburn and 
Schneider’s (2003) grade point average scoring system to assess institutional capacity.  We 
expect states to support Medicaid expansion when they have a high level of institutional 
capacity. 
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H16: States with a high level of institutional capacity will be more likely to expand 
Medicaid.  
Governance 
 Governance arrangements have yet to be studied in Medicaid policy.  Much of the 
literature on governance focuses on the role of states, governments, agencies, providers, and 
individuals (Freeman, 2000; Kettl, 2000; Morgan & Campbell, 2011; Rowland & Tallon, 2003).  
However, there is one article by Plein (2004) that examines the role of administrative structures 
for SCHIP programs.  This study explores administrative arrangements by assessing SCHIP 
programs by determining whether the program is a stand-alone entity, combined, subsists within 
an existing Medicaid bureaucracy, or exists aside from an existing Medicaid agency.  While this 
study captures certain elements of governance within one aspect of Medicaid policy, it would be 
difficult to measure this administrative typology because the study is specific to the SCHIP 
population.  Additionally, this dissertation is different because it is focuses on Medicaid 
expansion as a whole rather than on a single program.  
  While there is a lack of scholarly research on governance structures focusing on 
Medicaid, there is a wealth of literature on this subject within the area of postsecondary 
education (Delaney & Doyle, 2011; Hearn & Holdsworth, 2002; Mokher & McLendon, 2009; 
Tandberg, 2010). McGuinness (1988, 1994) developed a classification system of state structures 
that describes how states govern public entities. There are three types of state structures:  (a) 
consolidated governing boards, where a single entity develops and implements policy, 
coordinates responsibilities, allocates resources, and appoints personnel, and governs other 
institutions within its own jurisdiction; (b) coordinating boards, which are decentralized and act 
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with the authority to serve either as a regulatory entity or an advisory bureau; and (c) planning 
agencies, which do not have much authority, but facilitate planning and implementation 
functions between selected sectors and institutions (McGuinness, 1994).  The state structures 
differ in strength.  The consolidating and coordinating/regulatory boards are strong in nature, 
while the coordinating/advisory and planning boards are weak (McLendon, Heller, & Young, 
2005).  Although McGuiness’ research focuses on postsecondary education governing boards, 
Hearn and Griswold (1994) note that state governing arrangements have been around since the 
1950s.  However, with the growth of government and the demand for expertise, evaluations, and 
the recognition of institutional needs, states have developed governing arrangements to fit their 
needs.  This research will apply this method of reasoning to Medicaid agencies.  Every state has 
a Medicaid agency and a corresponding governing board.  As a result, we will test McGuinness’ 
governance typology to determine if the arrangements of Medicaid agencies impact the decision 
making process of states. 
While McGuiness’ governance typology is based on the governance arrangement of 
postsecondary state boards of education, some studies suggest that there is a relationship between 
welfare and education programs and that the support and/or expansion of both programs are 
indicative of state policy preferences (Hega & Hokenmaier, 2002).  While research on higher 
education demonstrates a link between consolidated governing boards and expanded educational 
programs (McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009), we expect states to expand Medicaid when a 
consolidated governing board governs Medicaid agencies.  Following the same line of reasoning 
in accordance with research on higher educational governance boards, we also assume that 
advisory and planning boards are limited in decisional authority (Callan, 1975; Hearn & 
Griswold, 1994; McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005). 
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H17: States with centralized Medicaid governing boards will most likely expand 
Medicaid. 
State Innovation and Diffusion Model 
The state innovation and diffusion model assumes that internal and external dynamics 
drive policy adoptions (Berry & Berry, 2007).  State actions are the result of policy choices 
affected by propensities to innovate (Gray, 1973; Soss et al., 2001). This model accepts Walker’s 
(1969) definition of innovation, which is “a program or policy which is new to the states 
adopting it, no matter how old the program may be or how many states have adopted it” (p. 881).  
Complimentary to Walker’s definition, Roger’s (1983) description of diffusion also guides this 
model, which is, “the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels 
over time among the members of a social system” (p. 5).  Internal determinants are state specific 
factors and include social, political, and economic characteristics (Berry & Berry, 2007; Olive, 
Gunasekara, & Raymond, 2012).  For the purposes of this study, internal determinants will focus 
on state actions, which are the result of decisions that encompass social, political and economic 
characteristics. External determinants are elements that facilitate the diffusion of policies, such as 
the emulation of initiatives from other states, and competition amongst states (Olive, 
Gunasekara, & Raymond, 2012).  This model will analyze the impact of neighboring states, state 
competition, and prior policy adoptions on the expansion of Medicaid.  Figure 2.6 embodies the 
State Innovation and Diffusion model below. 
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Figure 2.6. State Innovation and Diffusion Model 
Regional Diffusion 
 The diffusion of a policy can occur through convergence.  Policy convergence is “the 
tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and 
performances” (Kerr, 1983, p. 3).  Moreover, policy convergence occurs through emulation, 
networking from influential leaders in an effort to standardize the implementation of a policy or 
to address pressures from interest groups and external actors (Bennett, 1991).   Through 
empirical testing, scholars in a variety of disciplines have found that neighboring states are 
influenced by the policies of their counterparts, thus increasing their motivation to innovate 
(Berry & Berry, 1990; Dye, 1966; Glick & Hays, 1991; Mintrom, 1997; Satterthwaite, 2002, 
Volden, 2006).   
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 In the realm of Medicaid policy, scholarly research is emerging on the influence of 
neighboring states on policy adoptions.  Carter and LaPlant (1997) study regional influences 
under the premise that, “policy adoptions in a nearby state can make it easier for politicians to 
justify similar adoptions to voters in their own state” (p. 22).  They analyze three regions (i.e., 
Northeast, West, South) and use the North Central region as a reference point to test their 
premise.  They find that while there is some evidence that supports the influence of regional 
diffusion, their findings are inconsistent and dependent upon the nature of specific policies.  The 
authors conclude that their study lacks sufficient evidence to establish a pattern of regional 
diffusion in the innovation of health care policies.  In a similar study, Kousser (2002) tests the 
policy convergence theory noting that state officials make decisions based on shared 
circumstances.  Kousser (2002) examines subregions (i.e., New England, Mid-Atlantic, 
Midwest) using the Statistical Abstract of the United States operating under the assumption that 
the New England, Mid-Atlantic, and Midwest regions share a common trait which is high 
spending, while Pacific, Southern, and Mountain regions are frugal.  Satterthwaite (2002) also 
references the policy convergence theory and claims that states seek policy direction from each 
other.  She finds that the more neighboring states adopt Medicaid managed care, the more likely 
it became that a state would adopt the same or similar policy.  However, Sattherwaite (2002) 
cautions that although regional diffusion occurs, the likelihood of diffusion is dependent upon 
certain conditions and/or when other factors such as state wealth are present. 
 Volden (2006) also examines the effect of state similarities on diffusion and policy 
learning and finds that while the relationship is positive, there is not a statistically significant 
relationship. Volden (2006) concludes that “an alternative hypothesis to the emulation of policies 
of similar states is simply that similar states adopt similar policies, without necessarily relying on 
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any learning from other states” (p. 304). Similarly, Kim and Jennings (2012) sought to 
distinguish internal learning from external learning by examining state characteristics on 
diffusion and program extensiveness of Medicaid managed care.  They also presume that states 
seek policy directions from each other to assess policy success.  However, in contrast to Volden 
(2006), Kim and Jennings (2012) find that neighboring states do learn from each other and that 
states with extensive Medicaid managed care programs contribute to the adoption of extensive 
programs by neighboring states. 
 The process of diffusion involves an assumption that, when state decision-makers are 
confronted with complex policy alternatives, they will take cues from their neighbors to decide 
on a course of action (Satterthwaite, 2002; Simon, 1957; Walker, 1969).  In relation to Medicaid, 
states are more likely to emulate their neighbor by pursuing similar policies.  We will gravitate to 
previous research that leads us to expect states to emulate their geographic neighbors in the 
adoption of Medicaid.  This will indicate whether geographic neighbors will emulate each other 
based on similar policies. 
H18:  States are more likely to emulate their geographic neighbors in choosing to adopt 
Medicaid expansion. 
State Competition 
 State competition is a construct that differs greatly from regional diffusion.  While 
regional diffusion assesses the process of diffusion through similar state characteristics, another 
school of thought is that the adoption of policies spread through state competition.  Dating back 
to 1956, Tiebout suggests that states compete for citizens through the provision of public 
policies, tax breaks, and program spending. There are two different thought patterns that drive 
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state competition.  The first pattern suggests that states seek to innovate, emulate each other, 
diversify, and experiment to better serve their constituencies (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Dye, 1966; 
Lowery, Konda, & Garand 1984). The second thought pattern implies that states manipulate 
welfare benefits and policies based on the actions of other states to prevent the occurrence of 
becoming a welfare state magnet (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Grogan, 1999; Peterson, 1995).  Rom, 
Peterson, and Scheve (1998) explains state competition as follows:  
The competitive model of interstate relationships…implies that states compete with one 
another, that states may pay a penalty if they do not attend to the decisions taken by their 
neighbor, and that more than just information is at work.  The competitive model also 
implies that states, when making decisions, may not be deciding autonomously whether 
or not to adopt policies enacted elsewhere.  On the contrary, the fact that these policies 
have been adopted elsewhere compels the state’s attention.  The competitive model also 
has more general application than diffusion theory.  It applies not just to new proposals 
but to any policies pursued by other states, whether these are marginal changes in 
existing laws or breathtaking new adventures. (p. 20) 
While testing this theory of interstate competition, Rom et al. (1998) find that competition 
between states influence welfare policies even when other phenomena such as political, 
economic, and demographic factors are controlled. 
 Similar to the concept of interstate competition and the second school of thought on state 
competition, Grogan (1999) hypothesizes that welfare migration takes place when Medicaid 
beneficiaries migrate to other states due to a reduction in AFDC payments. This action leads to 
higher program costs for the migrated state, which in turn triggers states to lower their welfare 
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benefits.  This suggests that while states may not compete to provide the best welfare programs, 
they could be in competition with each other to lower benefits. Berry and Baybeck (2005) also 
examine welfare migration and interstate competition using geographic information systems to 
study the propensity of poor individuals relocating to another state for better health benefits.  The 
authors assume that governors and state legislatures determine welfare policy, and the adoption 
of a policy is influenced by state officials’ concerns in regards to the behaviors of state citizens 
(i.e., relocating to another state for generous welfare benefits).  Berry and Baybeck (2005) find 
that states do not compete with each other over welfare benefits, but rather set reasonable benefit 
levels according to the benchmarks of neighboring states through policy learning.  While Berry 
and Baybeck (2005) do not find interstate competition to be a concern for states, they mention 
that their research applies to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits and that 
tight federal control of the program may account for the lack of competition amongst the states.  
On the other hand, the authors also note that the block program under Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) which allows for greater state autonomy and discretion may result in 
different findings due to the structure of the TANF block program (Berry & Baybeck, 2005). 
Bailey and Rom (2004) analyze the effect of interstate competition on welfare generosity, 
and find that there is competition amongst all welfare programs (except Medicare) as a result of 
state control over welfare programs.  They also find that competition is strongest in AFDC 
benefits, providing access to services, regulating Medicaid costs, and determining benefits.  
Bailey and Rom (2004) measure state competition by determining whether states are more or less 
generous than their peers. De Jong, Graefe, and St. Pierre (2005) take a different approach to 
analyzing welfare policy by modeling interstate migration and focusing on migratory behaviors 
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of families and the roles of states.  They discover that states’ stringent eligibility and 
expectations in modifying behavior through policies drive families to move to other states.  
Although there are alternative methods to examining state interstate competition, we will 
direct our attention to Bailey and Rom’s (2004) measures of state competition because they are 
more representative of state-level actions.  We will analyze the effect of neighbors, which is “the 
percent difference between states’ generosity and its neighbors’ generosity” (Bailey & Rom, 
2004, p. 333).  This measure assesses the extent states are influenced by the generosity of other 
states.  Then we will utilize the data derived from the effect of neighbors to determine if states 
are competitive with each other based on whether they are more or less generous than their 
neighbors.  If the thought that states will manipulate benefits and policies to avoid becoming 
welfare magnets remains supported, then we expect to observe states opt out of Medicaid 
expansion when they have less generous Medicaid policies than their competitive neighbors 
(competitive neighbors are also known as contiguous neighbor states). 
H19:  States with less generous Medicaid policies than their competitive neighbors are 
less likely to expand Medicaid.  
Prior Policy Adoptions 
 Policy history is an important component of the diffusion process because the history of 
previous policies can constrain or facilitate the policy making process, which in turn, affects the 
development and/or implementation of future policies (Kronebusch, 1997).  Cowart (1969) 
suggests that welfare policies are incremental and new programs are influenced by previous 
policies.  Additionally, Pierson (2005) notes the following in regards to policy history: 
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Studying the present as a ‘snapshot’ of a moment of time can distort what we see and 
how we understand it in profound ways.  Shifting to a developmental perspective presses 
us, even when we are focusing on the present, to pay more attention to the long-term 
sources of policy change, to address the central issue of policy sustainability, to consider 
the possibilities that in the long run ‘small’ outcomes may end up being very big, while 
‘big’ ones end up being small, and to adapt our analyses to the reality of ubiquitous 
unintended consequences (p. 48). 
Comparative studies on policy history provide insight on the evolving nature of policies and how 
problems are addressed through statutory tools.  Welfare policies, in particular, are well 
documented and they display differences among state policies and divergent methods of tackling 
a problem (Baldwin, 2005). 
 While studying the innovation and diffusion of Medicaid managed care programs, 
Satterthwaite (2002) also analyzes the effect of previous policies.  To assess policy history she 
uses the number of years a health maintenance organization (HMO) has been present in a state 
and whether a state has received a Section 1915 trial waiver as proxies to measure policy history.  
Section 1915 waivers enable states to require Medicaid beneficiaries to enroll in state-approved 
health plans, such as managed care organizations (MCO) and primary care case management 
programs (Maglione & Ridgely, 2006; Satterthwaite, 2002).  Satterthwaite (2002) finds that 
increases in both measures contribute to the adoption of managed care.  In a more recent study, 
Callaghan and Jacobs (2014) create a policy trajectory measure that takes into account 
established SCHIP and Medicaid policies to evaluate policy history.  The measure focuses on 
program generosity and their study reveals an association between the adoption of Medicaid 
expansion under the ACA and previous policy decisions that offer generous welfare benefits. 
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 Policy history plays a significant role in the adoption of any policy (Kronebusch, 1997; 
Satterthwaite, 2002).  Welfare policies signify the intentions of state policymakers and provide 
material/textual evidence by which to evaluate state Medicaid policies and rules (De Jong, 
Graefe, Irving, Pierre, 2006).  To observe the influence of policy history on Medicaid expansion, 
we will utilize the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database to assess Medicaid policies on a 
lenient to stringent continuum (De Jong, Graefe, Irving, & Pierre, 2006).   We believe that the 
assessment of documented Medicaid policies is an appropriate measure of policy history because 
of its comprehensive nature.  Previous studies analyze policy history by focusing on generous 
policies or prior Medicaid regulations (Callaghan & Jacobs, 2014; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013; 
Satterthwaite, 2002).  Since many studies have found a correlation between liberal Medicaid 
policies and the adoption of new programs, we expect states to expand Medicaid when they have 
adopted liberal policies in the past. 
H20: States that have adopted generous Medicaid policies in the past are more likely adopt 
Medicaid expansion.  
Chapter Summary 
 The objectives of this chapter are to shed light on the current state of Medicaid expansion 
and to review the extant literature on the adoption of Medicaid policies by states in an effort to 
understand what drives states to adopt Medicaid expansion.  An exploration of the literature 
reveals established explanators of state policy decisions which are then analyzed and fashioned 
into five models: the political model, the economic model, the needs-based model, the state 
capacity model, and the state innovation and diffusion model.  Much of the research that is 
presented in each of the models is based on the adoption of previous Medicaid policies, such as 
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the SCHIP program, eligibility requirements, and managed care programs by states. While there 
is a lack of research overall on the drivers of state decisions on Medicaid expansion, a few 
empirical articles have tested some of the factors influencing state decisions in the expansion of 
Medicaid (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Callaghan & Jacobs, 2014; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013).  
These articles conclude that politics trumps some of the drivers raised by this study including 
citizen needs, but they lack an all-inclusive set of factors that influence state decisions. This 
study is unique because it draws mostly on explanatory factors of prior Medicaid policies and the 
current studies on Medicaid expansion to provide a comprehensive picture of the adoption of 
Medicaid expansion by states. See Figure 2.7 below. 
 
Figure 2.7. A Model of State Decision making in Medicaid Expansion 
 A recap of the hypotheses in this study is provided below. 
H1:  States with a high degree of interparty competition are more likely to adopt Medicaid 
expansion. 
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H2: States with a low proportion of African-American voters are more likely to reject 
Medicaid Expansion. 
H3:  State governments with a conservative ideology are more likely to oppose Medicaid 
expansion. 
H4: Governors with a high level of institutional powers are more likely to oppose 
Medicaid expansion.  
H5: States with a high level of per capita income are more likely to expand Medicaid. 
H6: As tax efforts increase, states are more likely to expand Medicaid. 
H7: The larger a state’s budget shortfall, the less likely they are to expand Medicaid. 
H8: States with a low level of Medicaid expenditures are more likely to expand Medicaid.  
H9: States with high Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) rates are more 
likely to expand Medicaid. 
H10: States with higher supplemental poverty measure (SPM) rates are more likely to 
expand Medicaid. 
H11: States with a high proportion of elderly persons are less likely to expand Medicaid. 
H12: States with low unemployment rates are more likely to expand Medicaid.  
 H13: States with high uninsurance rates are more likely to oppose Medicaid expansion. 
H14: States with a high level of residents with good health statuses are more likely to 
expand Medicaid. 
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H15: States with a high degree of legislative professionalism are more likely to adopt 
Medicaid expansion. 
H16: States with a high level of institutional capacity will be more likely to expand 
Medicaid. 
H17: States with centralized Medicaid governing boards will most likely expand 
Medicaid. 
H18:  States are more likely to emulate their geographic neighbors in choosing to adopt 
Medicaid expansion. 
H19: States with less generous Medicaid policies than their competitive neighbors are less 
likely to expand Medicaid.  
H20: States that have adopted generous Medicaid policies in the past are more likely adopt 












Chapter 1 introduced the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the issue 
of Medicaid expansion. An explanation as to the significance and purpose of this study is 
offered, which is to examine the influence of multiple factors that affect the adoption of 
Medicaid expansion.  Chapter 2 provided a review of past research on the adoption of Medicaid 
policies and presented a model of state decision making in the adoption of Medicaid expansion 
using five models as explanators of state adoption.  This chapter will offer an explanation of this 
dissertation’s methodology. 
 This chapter commences with a discussion of the research questions along with the 
research design and approach.  Then, the variables of interest are defined and displayed in table 
form.  Subsequently, the method of data analysis is described and limitations are presented.  
Last, a summary of this chapter is provided to recapitulate the aims of this research. 
 
Research Questions 
 The research question underlying this study is as follows: What are the factors that 
influence states to adopt Medicaid expansion?  The other research questions derived from the 
proposed models suggested in this study, include the following: (a) Do political factors influence 
the decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion? (b) Do economic factors influence the 
decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion? (c) Do state population needs influence the 
decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion? (d) Does state capacity influence the decision of 
states to adopt Medicaid expansion? (e) Do innovation and diffusion influence the decision of 
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states to adopt Medicaid expansion?  The examination of these research questions will 
contribute to the body of knowledge on health policy and public policy by exploring influential 
factors at the decision making stage of policy making.  As the implementation of the ACA 
continues and the lines of authority between states and the federal government become blurred in 
the field of health care, the actions of states are of critical importance as states choose whether to 
implement certain aspects of the ACA.  While this study focuses on Medicaid expansion, one 
aspect of this research agenda is to develop a model that can be replicated in future studies on 
Medicaid expansion and adapted to other aspects of health policy making at the state-level.  
 
Research Design and Approach 
 This study utilizes a state comparative cross-sectional research design to examine the 
influence of political, economic, needs-based, state capacity, and innovation and diffusion 
factors on Medicaid expansion.  We primarily focus on the year 2012 because in the Supreme 
Court ruling National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius, the federal 
mandate to expand Medicaid was found unconstitutional and states were given the choice to 
expand Medicaid. Therefore, the year 2012 represents a turning point for states as they decide 
whether to adopt Medicaid expansion.  This design is appropriate because there is a wealth of 
information at the state level on the factors that play an influential role on Medicaid policy 
decisions. The availability of state-wide data and the research design of this dissertation provide 
a platform to examine and analyze the research questions in this study.  Additionally, a cross-
sectional design allows for the comparison of a geographically dispersed population and the 
collection of data at one point in time.  Although changes cannot be measured over time and 
causal inferences cannot be deduced, a cross-sectional design enables the researcher to analyze 
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multiple outcomes and expose intended and unintended relationships among variables 
(O’Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2003; Mann, 2003). 
 A comparative analysis at the state-level is utilized as a methodological strategy to 
inform this research. Comparing and contrasting phenomena with similar and dissimilar 
attributes contributes to the interpretation and application of knowledge to complex processes 
(Azarian, 2011).  Comparative analysis is useful because it can reveal the policy practices of 
states and provides insight into how states learn and borrow from each other (May, 2011, p. 249).  
This type of analysis helps to understand, explore, and explain divergences across similar cases 
(Azarian, 2011).  Also, comparative analyses “help us to make sense of the observed variations 
and capture the principles of both similarities and differences (Azarian, 2011, p. 118).  
Although many studies have utilized a comparative analysis approach to study health care 
policies at the state, national, and global level, scholars have questioned the validity of 
comparative studies due to observed inconsistencies in regards to the operationalization of 
variables (Wenzelburger, Zohlnhöfer, & Wolf, 2013).  This dissertation primarily relies on 
secondary data collected at the state-level and reported by federal agencies or reputable 
Foundations such as the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, the Federal Register, the Kaiser Family Foundation, or the Pew Research 
Center. Considerations for the measurement and selection of every variable are assessed 
according to the history of success of established variables, common criticisms associated with 
the selection of a variable, and the promising nature of variables.  Therefore, we examine 
variables that consistently demonstrate an effect on Medicaid policies.  We also evaluate 
contentious variables and determine the selection of a variable using the literature as a guide and 
the availability of data.  Last, we examine new concepts in an effort to provide an innovative 
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contribution to the body of health and public policy.  To ensure transparency and validity, a 
description of every variable is provided in this chapter.      
 
Unit of Analysis 
 States serve as the unit of analysis for this study, and the collection of data are drawn 
from a multitude of databases with state-level data.  According to Neuman (2002), “the units of 
analysis determine how a researcher measures variables or themes. They also correspond loosely 
to the level of analysis in an explanation” (p. 156).  All of the data for this study correspond to 
state-specific characteristics and themes; conclusions will be contextualized accordingly.  
Moreover, this study examines the influencers of the adoption of Medicaid expansion at the 
macro-level because all 50 states are included in the study.  
 
Dependent Variable 
 Although some may argue that the U.S. health care system is broken, fragmented, or 
unsustainable, there is a lack of consensus on how to remedy the health care problems faced by 
American citizens and states (Berwick, Nolan, Whittington, 2008; Chernew, Baicker, & Hsu, 
2010).  Although the original intention of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
was to provide affordable health insurance for all U.S. citizens, the decision to expand Medicaid 
became a choice for states that is riddled with competing philosophies.  To tease out these 
competing philosophies, five models are tested (political, economic, needs-based, state capacity, 
and state innovation and diffusion) in order to assess the influence of state-level factors on the 
adoption of Medicaid expansion.  The dependent variable of interest in this study is Medicaid 
expansion, more specifically, the actions taken by states in deciding to adopt Medicaid 
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expansion.  This measure is coded as 0 for states that have chosen to decline Medicaid 
expansion, 1 for states that are undecided, 2 for states that have supported Medicaid expansion, 
and 3 for states that have decided to adopt Medicaid expansion.  Data for this variable is 
collected from several sources for the year 2012.  To determine whether states declined, 
supported, adopted or are undecided about Medicaid expansion, we examine state legislation.  
The criteria for demarcating the decisions of states follows: (1) If a state passed a House and 
Senate bill in favor of Medicaid expansion and the Governor signed the bill or a Governor issued 
an executive order expanding Medicaid, then we count that state as adopting Medicaid 
expansion. (2) If a state passed a House and/or Senate bill in favor of Medicaid expansion, then 
we count that state as supporting Medicaid expansion. (3) If a state proposed a study to evaluate 
Medicaid expansion or a House or Senate bill is tabled or died without a decision being made by 
the legislature, then we count that state as undecided.  (4) If a state passed a House and/or Senate 
bill in opposition of Medicaid expansion, then we count that state as declining Medicaid 
expansion.  (5) If there is not a bill on file in regards to Medicaid expansion, then we direct our 
attention to states that challenged the constitutionality of Medicaid expansion (coded as “decline 
Medicaid expansion”), filed amicus briefs in support of Medicaid expansion (coded as “support 
Medicaid expansion”), or did not take a legal or formal position on Medicaid expansion (coded 
as “undecided”) in the U.S. Supreme Court case National Federation of Independent Business 
(NFIB) v. Sebelius to determine the status of state decisions on Medicaid expansion.  This 
information is reported by the Kaiser Family Foundation for the year 2012.  Data for this 





State Decision Status of Medicaid Expansion 
State State Decision Value Data Source 
Alabama Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
 





Alaska Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
 





Arizona Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
 





Arkansas Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a legal or 
formal position on 
Medicaid Expansion 
California Adopt Medicaid 
Expansion 
3 State Legislation 
SB 853 
Colorado Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 





Connecticut Adopt Medicaid 
Expansion 
3 State Legislation 
SB 1240 
Delaware Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 


























Georgia Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
 





Hawaii Support Medicaid 
Expansion 




Filed Amicus Brief 
Idaho Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
 







Illinois Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Filed Amicus Brief 
Indiana Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
 










Filed Amicus Brief 
Kansas Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
0 State Legislation 
HR 6011 
Kentucky Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a legal or 
formal position on 
Medicaid Expansion 
Louisiana Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
 


















Maine Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 





Maryland Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Filed Amicus Brief 
Massachusetts Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Filed Amicus Brief 
Michigan Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Filed Amicus Brief 
Minnesota Adopt Medicaid 
Expansion 
3 Executive Order 11-01 
Mississippi Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 





Missouri Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a legal or 
formal position on 
Medicaid Expansion 
Montana Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a legal or 
formal position on 
Medicaid Expansion 
Nebraska Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 










New Hampshire Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a formal 
or legal position on 
Medicaid Expansion 
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New Jersey Adopt Medicaid 
Expansion 
3 State Legislation 
P.L.2010, CHAPTER 
74 
New Mexico Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Filed Amicus Brief 
New York Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Filed Amicus Brief 
North Carolina Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a legal or 
formal position on 
Medicaid Expansion 
North Dakota Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 





Ohio Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 





Oklahoma Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a legal or 
formal position on 
Medicaid Expansion 
Oregon Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Filed Amicus Brief 
Pennsylvania Undecided 1 State Legislation 






Rhode Island Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a legal or 
formal position on 
Medicaid Expansion 
South Carolina Undecided 1 State Legislation 
H 3167 
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South Dakota Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 





Tennessee Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a legal or 
formal position on 
Medicaid Expansion 
Texas Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 





Utah Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 





Vermont Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Filed Amicus Brief 
Virginia Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
0 State Legislation 
HB 345 
Washington Adopt Medicaid 
Expansion 
3 State Legislation 
SB5596 
West Virginia Undecided 1 State Legislation 
SCR No. 80 
Wisconsin Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 






Wyoming Undecided 1 State Legislation 








Political factors permeate the decision making process of Medicaid policies.  State 
decision makers affect policies through the identification of problems and facilitation of health 
interventions via governmental action (Oliver, 2006). The political model in this study includes 
four variables: interparty competition, governor institutional power, African-American voter, and 
state government ideology.  These variables measure the strength of political parties, the impact 
of gubernatorial formal powers, the influence of race, and the ideological leanings of state 
governments.  A summary of the political variables is provided in Table 3.2. 
 Interparty Competition.  Interparty competition is defined as the degree of competition 
amongst elected officials in state legislative elections.  This study utilizes Holbrook and Van 
Dunk’s index to capture interparty competition with updated data collected from Shufeldt and 
Flavin with the aggregated years 1990-1999.  Although data for this variable are not available for 
the year 2012, Holbrook and Van Dunk’s measure has produced stable results over the last 30 
years (Shufeldt & Flavin, 2003). 
 Governor Institutional Power.  Governor institutional power is defined as “powers given 
to the governor by the state constitution, state statutes, and the voters when they vote on 
constitutions and referenda” (Ferguson, 2013, p. 220).  This study uses the index score for each 
state for the year 2010 because data for the year 2012 are not available.  Data for this variable are 
collected from Ferguson (2013) from the Book of States and the election results for the year 2011 
(Source: Book of States. [2010, 2011]. Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments). 
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 African-American Voter. African-American voter is defined as the percentage of African-
American voters for each state.  In an effort to measure the influence of race on Medicaid 
expansion, this study utilizes data collected from the U.S. Census Bureau: Current Population 
Survey for the year 2012.  
 Ideology.  State government ideology is defined as “the ideological ‘center of gravity’ of 
a state’s elected governmental institutions on a liberal-conservative continuum” (Berry, Fording, 
Ringquist, Hanson, & Klarner, 2010 p. 1).  This study utilizes the state government ideology 
score reported for each state for the year 2012.  Data for this variable are collected from the 
“Updated Citizen and Government Ideology Data, 1960-2013” data file (Fording, 2015).   
Table 3.2 
Political Model 





Range:            
(22.22-66.08) 


























 Economic factors play a critical role in determining the feasibility of adopting a health 
policy.  Although states consider the cost of operating Medicaid expansion, states also rely on 
assumptions of present and future fiscal conditions (Sommers & Epstein, 2010).  The economic 
model includes five variables: per capita income, tax effort, state budget shortfalls, health care 
expenditures, and the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) rate.  These variables 
measure the fiscal condition of states, expenditures incurred by Medicaid beneficiaries, and 
federal assistance given to states to operate Medicaid programs. A summary of the economic 
variables is provided in Table 3.3. 
Per Capita income.  Per capita income is defined as the average earned income of 
residents for each state.  Data for this variable are measured in thousands of dollars for each 
state.   This information is collected from the U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of 
Economic Analysis for the year 2012.   
 Tax Effort.  Tax effort is characterized as the amount of taxes paid to states per capita.  
This information is measured in dollars for each state.  Data for this variable are collected from 
the 2012 Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections and the U.S. Census Bureau 
Population Estimates.  This information is obtained by a computation method utilized by the 
Kaiser Family Foundation, which calculates state totals for income taxes, property taxes, license 
taxes, sales and gross receipts taxes, and unclassified state taxes marked as other for the year 
2012.   
 State Budget Shortfalls.  According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, budget 
shortfalls are defined as “the extent to which states’ revenues fall short of the cost of providing 
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services” (Oliff, Mai, & Palacios, 2012, p. 2).  Data for this variable are collected from the 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities using state estimates of budget shortfalls for the year 
2012.   
 Health Care Expenditures.  Health care expenditures are defined as spending on health 
care by states. This information is collected from the Pew Charitable Trusts and the John D. and 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (2014a) for the year 2012.  The data contains aggregated 
estimates of state-level spending on health care by services rendered to Medicaid beneficiaries, 
administrative costs, disproportionate share hospital payments, and local funding for Medicaid 
services.  
 FMAP Rate.  The Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) is classified as the 
percentage of medical costs paid by the Federal government for each state for Medicaid 
programs (Truffer, Klemm, Wolfe, Rennie, & Shuff, 2012).  Data for this variable are collected 











Variable Operationalization Data Source Level of 
Measurement 
Per Capita Income Per capita income is 
defined as the 
average earned 
income of residents 
for each state 





Tax Effort Total amount of 












for each state 
Center on Budget 




Total amount of 
state-funded 
Medicaid spending 
in each state 
The Pew Charitable 
Trusts and the John 




FMAP Rate Percentage of 
Medical costs paid 
by the federal 
government for 
Medicaid Services 
U.S. Department of 







 Needs-based factors are an integral component of state decision making.  State health 
policy priorities are based on the needs of the population.  The needs-based model includes five 
variables: poverty, the percentage of elderly, the percentage of the unemployed, the percentage 
of the uninsured, and health status.  These variables measure the prevalence of social conditions 
that contribute to poor standards of living and impact of health indicators. A summary of the 
needs-based variables is provided in Table 3.4.   
 91 
 Poverty. This variable is defined as the percentage of people living in poverty during a 
given calendar year.  Data for this variable are collected from the United States Census Bureau’s 
supplemental poverty measure (SPM) for the year 2012.  The SPM takes into account cash 
resources, noncash benefits, and also subtracts essential expenses such as childcare, health care, 
and taxes (United States Census, 2014).   
The Elderly.  This variable is defined as the percentage of elderly persons aged 65 and 
older living in each state.  Data for this variable are collected from the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services: Administration on Aging for the year 2012. 
Unemployed.  This variable is defined as the percentage of the labor force that is 
unemployed by state.  Data for this variable are collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for 
the year 2012.   
The Uninsured.  The uninsured is defined as the percentage of individuals who did not 
have health insurance by state for the year 2012.  Data for this variable are collected from the 
U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. Census Bureau and the by means of the Annual 
Social and Economic Supplement and derived from the Current Population Survey.   
Health Status/Health Indicators. Health indicators play an important role in the 
management of health care services.  Klazinga, Stronks, Delnoij, and Verhoeff (2001) state that 
“the link between indicators and public health lies in the extent that indicators measure for 
management purposes… aimed at preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health.  
Thus, indicators are management tools for health care services and health systems” (p. 433).  In 
the past, common health indicators, such as life expectancy, infant mortality, and cause-related 
mortality have directed population health priorities and assessments of health status (Robine, 
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Romieu, & Cambois, 1999).  Such indicators do not capture a holistic view of public health 
needs.  Currently, there is an acknowledgment amongst the healthcare community that measures 
of health status should include physical, psychological, and social features of health in addition 
to perceptions of well-being (Hennessy, Moriarty, Zack, Scheer, & Backbill, 1994).  While there 
are some health status measures that include an integrated assessment of health, there is no 
measure of health status that is amendable to the Medicaid population. As a result, we create a 
health status index that includes health perceptions, the mentally ill, and low birth weight.  We 
combine the percentages reported for each health indicator and divide the total score by three and 
perform an inverse transformation to create a range from low (poor health status) to high (fair or 
good health status).  This calculation and transformation produces an index score for each state 
and treats all indicators equally.  
Health Perception.  Health perception is defined as the percentage of state residents who 
reported an overall health status as either fair or poor.  Data for this variable are collected from 
the Pew Charitable Trusts and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Tracking 
Key Health Indicators (2014b) report for the year 2010 because data for the year 2012 are not 
available. 
Mentally Ill.  Mentally ill is defined as the percentage of persons who have been 
diagnosed as having a mental, emotional, or behavioral disorder by state.  Data for this variable 
are collected from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration using the 
National Surveys on Drug Use and Health for the combined years 2009-2010, because data for 
the year 2012 are not available.  
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Low-birth weight. Low-birth weight is defined as the percentage of babies born in each 
state that weigh less than 2,500 grams.  Data for this variable are collected from National Vital 
Statistics Reports for the year 2010.  Although data are available for the year 2012, we will 
compile information on this variable for the year 2010 to establish a consistent measure of health 

















Variable Operationalization Data Source Level of 
Measurement 
Poverty Percentage of state 
residents living in 
poverty 




Elderly Percentage of 
individuals aged 65 
and older 
U.S. Department of 





Unemployed Percentage of 
unemployed state 
residents 
U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
Ratio 
Uninsured Percentage of 
uninsured state 
residents 






Health Status Index 
1) Health Perception 
Percentage of state 
residents reporting 
an overall health 
status of poor or fair 
 
2) Mentally Ill 
Percentage of state 
residents diagnosed 




3) Low Birth 
Weight     
Percentage of babies 
born in each state 




Trusts and the John 




and Mental Health 
Services 
Administration; 
National Surveys on 










State Capacity Model 
 State capacity factors are an essential element of the decision making process of 
Medicaid policies.  States assess their ability to execute the stated objectives of Medicaid 
policies and consider the expertise of individuals in charge of handling complex health policies 
(Bowen & Zei, 2005).  The variables in the state capacity model include three variables: 
Legislative professionalism, institutional capacity, and governance.  A summary of these 
variables is provided in Table 3.5. 
Legislative Professionalism.  This variable is defined as state legislative characteristics 
that enable states to respond to problems and deliver services. Data for this variable are collected 
from Squire’s (2012) state legislative professionalization index for the year 2009 because data 
for the year 2012 are not available.   
Institutional Capacity.  Institutional capacity is defined as organizational structures and 
processes that give state legislatures the ability to carry out a wide range of activities.  
Institutional capacity is measured using data from the Government Performance Project on 
financial management, human resources management, infrastructure, and performance 
management for each state.  Data for this variable are collected for the year 2008 because data 
for the year 2012 are not available.  We adopt Coggburn and Schneider’s (2003) method of 
measurement by converting the assigned letter grades for each category to a 4.0 grade point 
average scale for each state. We also create an index variable by using the average score for each 
dimension of institutional capacity (financial management, human resources management, 
infrastructure, and performance management) and dividing the total score by four.  This 
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calculation produces an index score for each state that treats each dimension of institutional 
capacity equally. 
Governance. Governance is defined as the governance structure (centralized, shared, 
decentralized, and mixed) states utilize to manage Medicaid programs.  We adopt the 2014 
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) categorization of governance 
systems and assign a numerical value to each governing board based on ASTHO’s assessment of 
strength.  We utilize an ordinal scale with the highest value of 4 representing a consolidated 
board (the most powerful arrangement) to the lowest value of 1 representing a planning board 
(the weakest arrangement).  Data for this variable are collected from the Centers for Disease 












State Capacity Model 






Squire, 2012 Interval 
Institutional 
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Grade point average 






























State Innovation and Diffusion Model 
 State innovation and diffusion factors play an important role in the decision making 
process of Medicaid policies through emulation.  State decision makers approach policy 
problems by considering the actions or decisions of other states. The state innovation and 
diffusion model includes four variables: geographic neighbor, neighbor effect, state competition, 
and policy history.  These variables measure the impact of geographic neighbors on Medicaid 
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expansion and previous Medicaid policies enacted by states. A summary of each variable is 
provided in Table 3.6. 
 Geographic Neighbor.  Geographic neighbor is described as the proportion of a state’s 
bordering neighbors that have expanded Medicaid.  Data on this variable are collected from state 
legislation on Medicaid expansion and the Kaiser Family Foundation (2015) for the year 2012. 
 Neighbor Effect. Using Bailey and Rom’s (2004) definition of neighbor effect, this 
variable is defined as “the percent difference between a states’ generosity and its neighbor’s 
generosity” (p. 333).  Data for this variable are collected from the Kaiser Family Foundation 
using the amount of money a state spends per recipient annually on Medicaid for the year 2011. 
This variable is lagged based on the assumption that “a state’s generosity in a given year is 
influenced by its peers’ generosity in the previous year” (Bailey & Rom, 2004, p. 334). For the 
purposes of this study, we will analyze the differences in state generosity for the year 2011.  
Additionally, states are weighted according to the size of their population using the United States 
Statistical Abstract.  Although we do not directly test the neighbor effect variable in our study, 
we created this variable to test the influence of state competition on Medicaid expansion. 
 State Competition. State competition is defined as whether a state is competitive with its 
contiguous states based on generosity. This variable utilizes the neighbor effect variable to 
determine the generosity of a state to generate a dichotomous variable using Bailey and Rom’s 
(2004) operationalization of “compete,” where a state is assigned a value of 1 if it is more 
generous than its contiguous states and 0 if it spends less money on Medicaid enrollees.  Data for 
this variable are collected from the Kaiser Family Foundation for the year 2011.  This variable is 
lagged for the same reasons as the neighbor effect variable.  
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 Policy History.  Policy history is defined as previous welfare rules that have been enacted 
by states. To measure this variable we develop a coding scheme that assigns a value of 1 if a 
state adopted a guideline and 0 if a state had restrictions or did not adopt a guideline.  Then a 
total count of the adopted guidelines is reported.  High scores for this variable indicate that a 
state has liberal welfare policies, while low scores signify stringent state policies.  Our coding 
scheme is loosely based on De Jong et al.’s (2006) welfare policy measure.  De Jong et al. (2006) 
utilize a lenient-to-stringent coding schema and determine the stringency/leniency of welfare 
policies through dichotomous and ordinal measures.  Since we are more interested in the factors 
that influence states to adopt Medicaid expansion, we assign a value of 1 to states that adopt state 
welfare guidelines to observe the prevalence of liberal policies.  We also do not utilize the 
ordinal component of De Jong et al.’s (2006) policy measure, because our study is not concerned 
with multiple levels of stringency and leniency.  Thus, we institute a continuous measure to 
assess state welfare policies.  Data for this variable are collected from the Urban Institute’s Rules 










State Innovation and Diffusion Model 
Variable Operationalization Data Source Level of 
Measurement 
Geographic State Proportion of a 
state’s bordering 







Neighbor Effect Difference in 
generosity between 
























 This research seeks to recognize, categorize, and apply meaning to the factors that 
influence states to expand Medicaid.  We test five research questions proposed by this study and 
utilize multinomial logistic regression to analyze each model using the statistical software 
program STATA.  This method of analysis is appropriate for this study because the dependent 
variable is categorical.  Moreover, multinomial logistic regression is suitable for our study 
because the predictor variables are continuous, categorical, or a combination (Lee & Pradhan, 
2007).  Our study respects the general assumptions of multinomial logistic regression and 
includes the following: (a) the relationship among the variables is not normally distributed, (b) 
 101 
Outliers are absent from the model, and (c) there is full model specification (Berman & Wang, 
2012).   
 In addition to multinomial logistic regression and predicted probabilities, descriptive 
statistics and cross tabulations will be performed to assure full model specification. We will also 
clean the data, check the data for outliers, and create new variables from existing databases to fit 
the parameters of our study.  Additionally, we will assess the goodness of fit for each model, and 
the log likelihood value to evaluate the entire model.  Moreover, the Cox & Snell R2 and 
Nagelkerke R2 will be analyzed to explain the variance of the model, and the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow statistic will be evaluated to analyze how close the observed frequencies and 
predicted frequencies match (Bayaga, 2010; Berman & Wang, 2012; Hosmer, Hosmer, Le 
Cessie, & Lemeshow, 1997).   Each model will be analyzed using this process and then a 
comprehensive model will be formed based on the significant factors that influence Medicaid 
expansion.    
 
Limitations 
 Although every effort is made to design this study carefully and methodically, there are 
some limitations.  This study utilizes a cross-sectional research design, but some of the data that 
are used in this study are not available for the year 2012.  As a result, we use data in preceding or 
latter years to measure certain variables.  To avoid using outdated data, we investigate the 
stability of the measures over time through literature searches. 
 Another limitation involves the generalizability of this study.  This study is limited to the 
United States and the policy issues and propositions that are contained in this study may not be 
applicable to other countries.  However, this study could be useful to other policy domains 
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within the United States.  The models comprise factors that affect the decision making process of 
states and are derived from a multitude of disciplines.   
Summary 
 This chapter provides an explanatory approach to the research methodology of this study.  
A description of the dependent and independent variables were presented along with the data 
sources used to collect the information.  This study will utilize multinomial logistic regression to 
analyze five models (political, economic, needs-based, state capacity, and state innovation and 
diffusion) and a resultant comprehensive model of state decision making in the expansion of 
Medicaid.  This research seeks to understand the factors that influence states to expand Medicaid 
and contribute to the academic body of knowledge by offering explanations on dominant state 
characteristics and prominent factors influencing Medicaid policy.  Chapter 4 presents the 











RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
 This chapter presents the descriptive statistics for the data used in this study and the 
results of the multinomial regression analysis for each model.  The software program utilized to 
perform statistical analysis is Stata/IC 12.1.  The results are represented in tabular displays and 
organized by each model and research question.  The chapter commences with a discussion of 
the dependent variable and follows with analytic descriptions and analysis of the data and 
findings.   
Dependent Variable 
Descriptive Statistics 
 The dependent variable is comprised of decisions made by states measured by analyzing 
state actions in adopting Medicaid expansion.  As discussed in Chapter 3, a coding scheme is 
developed to assess and measure the actions of states.  The measure is coded as 0 for states that 
have chosen to decline Medicaid expansion, 1 for states that are undecided, 2 for states that have 
supported Medicaid expansion, and 3 for states that have decided to adopt Medicaid expansion.  
The dependent variable is positively skewed to the right and leptokurtic.  Table 4.1 represents the 
descriptive statistics for Medicaid expansion for all 50 states.  Table 4.2 provides the decisions of 





Descriptive Statistics for Medicaid Expansion for all 50 States 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Kurtosis Range 
       
Medicaid Expansion 1 1.01 0 3 2.2 3 
       
 
Table 4.2 
State Decision Status of Medicaid Expansion 
State State Decision Value Data Source 
Alabama Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
 





Alaska Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
 





Arizona Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
 





Arkansas Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a legal or 





















Connecticut Adopt Medicaid 
Expansion 
3 State Legislation 
SB 1240 
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Delaware Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Filed Amicus Brief 
Florida Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
 
























Hawaii Support Medicaid 
Expansion 




Filed Amicus Brief 
Idaho Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
 







Illinois Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 





















Filed Amicus Brief 
Kansas Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
0 State Legislation 
HR 6011 
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Kentucky Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a legal or 
formal position on 
Medicaid Expansion 
Louisiana Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
 





Maine Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 





Maryland Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Filed Amicus Brief 
Massachusetts Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Filed Amicus Brief 
Michigan Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Filed Amicus Brief 
Minnesota Adopt Medicaid 
Expansion 




















Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a legal or 










Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a legal or 
formal position on 
Medicaid Expansion 
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Nebraska Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 










New Hampshire Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a formal 
or legal position on 
Medicaid Expansion 
New Jersey Adopt Medicaid 
Expansion 
3 State Legislation 
P.L.2010, Chapter 74 
New Mexico Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Filed Amicus Brief 
New York Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Filed Amicus Brief 
North Carolina Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a legal or 
formal position on 
Medicaid Expansion 
North Dakota Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 





Ohio Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 













Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a legal or 
formal position on 
Medicaid Expansion 
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Oregon Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Filed Amicus Brief 
Pennsylvania Undecided 1 State Legislation 






Rhode Island Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a legal or 
formal position on 
Medicaid Expansion 
South Carolina Undecided 1 State Legislation 
H 3167 
South Dakota Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 





Tennessee Undecided 1 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Did not take a legal or 
















Utah Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 





Vermont Support Medicaid 
Expansion 
2 Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
Filed Amicus Brief 
Virginia Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 
0 State Legislation 
HB 345 
Washington Adopt Medicaid 
Expansion 
3 State Legislation 
SB5596 
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West Virginia Undecided 1 State Legislation 
SCR No. 80 
Wisconsin Decline Medicaid 
Expansion 






Wyoming Undecided 1 State Legislation 





The political model consists of four variables; interparty competition, African-American 
voter, ideology, and governor institutional power.  Table 4.3 depicts the descriptive statistics for 
all 50 states.  The variables interparty competition and African-American voter are negatively 
skewed, but interparty competition is leptokurtic while African-American voter is platykurtic.    
The variable ideology is positively skewed and leptokurtic.  The variable governor institutional 
power is positively skewed and bimodal which indicates that two peaks are far apart (Knapp, 
2007). An analysis of the descriptive statistics reveals that the data are not normally distributed; 
however, multinomial logistic regression does not require nor assume normality, linearity, or 
homogeneity for independent variables (Bayaga, 2010; Berman & Wang, 2012).  For this reason, 






Political Model Descriptive Statistics for all 50 States 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Kurtosis Range 
       
Inter-Party Competition 44.40 10.84 22.22 66.08 2.31 43.86 
African-American Voter 39.83 29.77 0 82 -.49 82 
Ideology  41.48 30.32 2.58 91.63 1.58 89.05 
Governor Institutional Power 3.26 .48 2.3 4.3 2.34 2 
       
 
Correlation Analysis 
 An examination of correlations between the independent and dependent variables is 
performed.  Table 4.4 illustrates the results for the political model.  According to Guilford’s 
guidelines for interpreting Pearson r values (Sprinthall, 2012), there is a low negative correlation 
between interparty competition and African-American voter (r = -.34, p < .05).  Although there 
is an assumption that diversity leads to an increase in interparty competition (Hero & Tolbert, 
1996), the results of this study can reflect changes in voting patterns and diversity of political 
party representation amongst African-American voters (Griffin & Keane, 2006).  Moreover, 
there is a low positive association between Medicaid expansion and interparty competition         
(r = .30, p < .05).  This correlation supports the literature that demonstrates that states are more 
likely to adopt Medicaid expansion when there is interparty competition (Barrilleaux & Brace, 
2007; Bernick, 2011; Soss et al. 2001).  Last, there is a moderate positive correlation between 
Medicaid expansion and ideology (r = .69, p < .001). Again, the literature shows that liberal 
states are more likely to increase Medicaid expansion (Barrilleaux & Miller, 1988; Pracht, 2007; 
Schneider, 1993, 1997; Volden, 2006). 
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Since interparty competition and African-Americans is negatively correlated and 
multinomial logistic regression assumes that multicollinearity is not present, further investigation 
is warranted.  For linear regression, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is used to assess 
multicollinearity.  However, the VIF test is not an available function for multinomial regression.  
As an alternative method for analyzing multicollinearity, linear regression is performed due to 
the composition of the dependent variable to generate VIF values.  The mean VIF value for all of 
the variables is 1.13, which indicates that multicollinearity is not an issue for the political model 
because the threshold for collinearity is 10 and higher (Hair et al., 2010; Institute for Digital 
Research and Education, 2016).  As a result of the VIF test, all of the variables will remain in the 
political model. 
Table 4.4 











      
Inter-Party Competition 1.00     
African-American Voter -.34* 1.00    
Ideology  .27 -.11 1.00   
Governor Institutional Power .16 .06 .16 1.00  
Medicaid Expansion .30* .07 .69*** .13 1.00 
      
Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level, **Correlation is significant at .01 level, 
***Correlation is significant at .001 level. 
Data Analysis 
 Multinomial logistic regression is utilized to analyze the political model and to address 
the following question: Do political factors influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid 
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expansion?  The model is significant with a likelihood ratio chi-square of 56.74 and a p-value of 
.0001. Statistical tests to assess goodness of fit are performed and are presented in Table 4.5.  
The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test is not an available function with the software 
program Stata, however, an alternative test is used that produces the same results (Fagerland & 
Hosmer, 2012).  Although the Hosmer-Lemshow statistics are reported in the model summary, it 
should be noted that this test has limitations and one cannot conclude that the model is poorly 
fitted based on the results of one goodness-of-fit test (Fagerland & Hosmer, 2012).  The political 
model summary results indicate that 73.5% of the variance in state decisions in Medicaid 
expansion is explained by the model. 
Table 4.5 













      
56.74 (.000) .443 .678 .735 14.623 
(.931) 
 
      
 
The results from the multinomial regression analysis for the political model are displayed 
in Table 4.6.  For the purpose of interpretation, the relative risk ratio is utilized instead of the 
coefficients to lend understanding to the variables of interest.  Relative risk ratios provide 
meaningful applications to public health affairs because calculations are based on a proportional 




Table 4.6  
Political Model Multinomial Regression Analysis  
(Base Outcome Group: Undecided) 
 β RRR S.E.  
Decline     
Inter-Party Competition .04 1.04 .05  
African-American Voter .01 1.01 .02  
Ideology  -.04* .96 .02  
Governor Institutional Power 2.30* 10.01 11.26  
Constant -7.70 .00 .00  
Support     
Inter-Party Competition .04 1.05 .07  
African-American Voter .00 1.00 .02  
Ideology  .06* 1.06 .03  
Governor Institutional Power 3.57* 35.37 54.17  
Constant -17.01 4.11 2.66  
Adopt     
Inter-Party Competition .28 1.33 .20  
African-American Voter .05 1.06 .04  
Ideology  .07 1.08 .05  
Governor Institutional Power 3.30 27.21 53.09  
Constant -32.88 5.26 6.56  
     
Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level. 
 There is a wealth of literature that demonstrates that political factors influence Medicaid 
policies (Brown, 1995; Kim & Jennings, 2012; Rom, Peterson, & Scheve, 1998).  However, for 
the political model, only two variables are statistically significant.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that 
states with a high degree of interparty competition are more likely to adopt Medicaid expansion.  
Surprisingly, interparty competition did not have any effect on the decisions of states to expand 
Medicaid.  Although there is a positive relationship between ideology and Medicaid as expected, 
the results are insignificant.  An important factor that deserves consideration is the scale of 
measurement used to determine interparty competition.  The literature on political factors 
assessing interparty competition and party control is inundated with multiple scales of 
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measurement (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Callaghan & Jacobs, 2014; Satterwaithe, 2002).  
Although the most consistent measure of interparty competition is used in this study, there may 
be another measure that appropriately captures the influence of interparty competition on 
Medicaid expansion or perhaps Medicaid expansion is an issue that is nonpartisan.  The other 
variable that does not have an effect on Medicaid expansion is race.   
Hypothesis 2 approximates that states with a low proportion of African-American voters 
are more likely to reject Medicaid expansion.  Research on the influence of racial politics focuses 
primarily on welfare benefits (Howard, 1999; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001).  
However, there is a distinct difference between the actions of states on limiting benefits and 
implementing a large-scale program.  The findings indicate that racial politics in terms of voter 
participation does not affect the decisions of states on Medicaid expansion.  This finding could 
reflect a false notion that “as the number of African-Americans who vote increases, one would 
expect government to treat them more favorably” (Filer, Kenny, & Morton, 1991, p. 393).  On 
the other hand, the results could suggest a difference of representation among African-American 
voters.  Griffin and Keane’s (2006) study on the composition of African-American voters and 
voter turnout reveal that the policy preferences of conservative African-American voters are 
considered more than the policy preferences of moderate or liberal African-Americans by 
European American members of Congress.  
Although interparty competition and race do not have an effect on Medicaid expansion, 
ideology and governor institutional power are statistically significant.  Hypothesis 3 is supported 
by the findings and suggests that state governments with a conservative ideology are more likely 
to oppose Medicaid expansion.  A one-way table of summary statistics (See Appendix A) reveals 
that states that opt to decline Medicaid expansion have an average state government ideology 
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score of 19.65.  According to Berry et al.’s (1998) measure of state government ideology, low 
values on the continuum of state ideology represent conservative governments. Conversely, 
ideology is also statistically significant for states that support Medicaid expansion.  The 
ideological mean score of state governments that support Medicaid expansion is 71.67.  This 
mean score falls on the high end of the continuum thus indicating that liberal states support 
Medicaid expansion.  While the findings confirm that conservative governments are declining 
Medicaid expansion, we also see that liberal state governments support Medicaid expansion. 
Hypothesis 4 proposes that governors with a high level of institutional powers are more 
likely to oppose Medicaid expansion.  An increase in governor institutional power of one 
standard deviation is associated with a 910% greater relative risk of states deciding to decline 
Medicaid expansion (RRR = 10.01, p < .01).  This finding is consistent with other studies that 
find that gubernatorial institutional powers influence policy (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; 
Kousser, 2002; Woods, 2004).  Unexpectedly, governor institutional capacity is also positively 
statistically significant for states that support Medicaid expansion (RRR = 35.37, p < .05).  This 
finding leads one to suspect that conservative governors with a high level of institutional powers 
are more likely to take an affirmative stance on Medicaid expansion than liberal governors with 
high levels of institutional power. 
A comparison of state decisions using a one-way stable of summary statistics (see 
Appendix A) and using the mean score of each variable on Medicaid expansion reveals that 
states with a high degree of interparty competition choose to adopt Medicaid expansion versus 
decline, support, or are undecided on Medicaid expansion.  States that choose to support 
Medicaid expansion have a moderate degree of interparty competition.  States that decline or are 
undecided on Medicaid expansion have a low degree of interparty competition.  These findings 
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support the literature on interparty competition, which demonstrates a link between the adoption 
of Medicaid policies when states have a high degree of interparty competition and the non-
adoption of Medicaid policies when states have a low degree of interparty competition 
(Barrilleaux & Brace, 2007; Bernick, 2011). 
   An analysis of state decisions on the effect of African American voters on Medicaid 
expansion shows that states that choose to adopt Medicaid expansion have a higher percentage of 
African-American voters than states that choose to decline, support, or are undecided on 
Medicaid expansion.  For states that choose to decline Medicaid expansion, there are a moderate 
percentage of African-American voters.  There is not much of a difference between states that 
support or are undecided in regards to the influence of African-American voters on Medicaid 
expansion.  The states are similar in terms of the average population of African-American voters.  
This finding indicates that states with a lower population of African-American voters are more 
likely to support or are undecided on Medicaid expansion. 
For ideology, an examination of state decisions on Medicaid expansion demonstrates that 
conservative states are more likely to decline Medicaid expansion.  Conversely, liberal states are 
more likely to support and adopt Medicaid expansion.  This finding indicates that the defining 
characteristic that leads states to adopt or support Medicaid expansion is liberalism.  On the 
conservative to liberal continuum, states that are undecided fall in the middle.  This outcome 
provides additional evidence that Medicaid expansion may be nonpartisan. 
 A review of the effect of governor institutional power on state decisions on Medicaid 
expansion discloses that governors with higher than average institutional powers are more likely 
to support and adopt Medicaid expansion.  On the other hand, governors with slightly higher 
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than average institutional powers are more likely to decline Medicaid expansion.  These findings 
suggest that governors with high institutional powers exercise their rights to make affirmative 
decisions.  For states that are undecided on Medicaid expansion, the findings reveal that 
governors have low institutional powers.  This result alludes to the fact that states are slower to 
act on a decision when governors have a low degree of institutional power.  
 The decisions of states on Medicaid expansion in relation to political factors are varied, 
with the exception of governor institutional power.  The adoption of Medicaid expansion is 
associated with high percentages of African-Americans and high levels of governor institutional 
power, state government, and interparty competition.  However, for states that decide to decline, 
support, or are undecided on Medicaid expansion, the political factors do not display a pattern 
amongst each dimension.  Figure 4.1 represents the influence of political factors on Medicaid 





Figure 4.1. Pivot table displaying the effect of political factors on Medicaid expansion using 
mean values of the variables African-American voter, governor institutional power, ideology, 




The economic model consists of five variables; per capita income, tax effort, state budget 
shortfall, health care experiences, and federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) rates.  
Table 4.7 illustrates the descriptive statistics for all 50 states.  All of the variables are skewed to 
the right and leptokurtic.  The numerical value of the variables per capita income, tax effort, state 
budget shortfall, and health care expenditures are reduced for interpretational purposes.  The 
reduction of the data partially reflects the schema of government data reports.  For example, 1.5 
billion represents a value of 1.5; 700 million denotes 0.7; 115 million signifies 0.115; 11 million 
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indicates 0.011; 6 million conveys .006; and 62 thousand refers to .000062.  This study focuses 
on the relative size of each variable.   
Table 4.7 
Economic Model Descriptive Statistics for all 50 States 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Kurtosis Range 
       
Per Capita Income 0.0000432 6.72 0.000033 0.000062 2.95 0.000029 
Tax Effort 0.01592 0.02 0.002 0.115 15.75 0.113 
State Budget Shortfall 2.14 4.03 0 23.9 18.71 23.9 
Healthcare Expenditures 3.616 5.28 0.3 26.3 13.85 26 
FMAP Rate 59.42 7.96 50.00 74.18 13.85 24.18 




 Correlations between the dependent and independent variables are performed.  Table 4.8 
depicts the results for the economic model.  Using Guilford’s guidelines for interpreting Pearson 
r values (Sprinthall, 2012), there is a low positive correlation between per capita income and 
state budget shortfall (r = .29, p < .05).  This is consistent with the findings of other studies that 
show that states with great wealth have greater government expenditures (Baqir, 2002; 
Buchanan, Cappelleri, & Ohsfeldt, 1991; Gray, 1973).  Additionally, there is a negative high 
correlation between per capita income and FMAP rates (r = -.87, p < .0001) and a positive 
moderate correlation between per capita income and Medicaid expansion (r = .42, p <.01).  The 
negative correlation between per capita income and FMAP rates is due to the financing structure 
of the Medicaid program in which the federal government contributes less monetary funds to 
states with high per capita income (Hoffman, Klees, & Curtis, 2000).  The correlation between 
per capita income and Medicaid expansion is also indicative of the literature, which shows that 
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states with great wealth have a propensity to adopt Medicaid expansion (Grogan & Rigby, 2009; 
Satterthwaite, 2002; Walker, 1969). 
Tax effort is significantly correlated with four variables.  The results indicate that there is 
a very high positive correlation between tax effort and health expenditures (r = .94, p <.0001), a 
negative low correlation between tax effort and FMAP rates (r = -.31, p < .05), a very high 
positive correlation between tax effort and state budget shortfalls (r = .96, p < .0001), and a 
positive low correlation between tax effort and Medicaid expansion (r = .34, p < .05).  The 
positive correlations between tax effort and health care expenditures, state budget shortfalls, and 
Medicaid expansion represent the “economic reach of governments” and the capacity of state 
governments (Arbetman-Rabinowitz & Johnson, 2007, p. 2).  When states draw dollars from 
state government taxes, they can spend more money on health care, government expenditures, 
and expanded Medicaid programs. The negative correlation between tax effort and FMAP rates 
is also indicative of the financing scheme of the Medicaid program (Hoffman, Klees, & Curtis, 
2000).  States that receive fewer funds in taxes from state residents are most likely to have a low 
level of per capita income.  In such a case, a state thus qualifies for a high FMAP rate. 
 State budget shortfalls and health care expenditures are also significantly correlated with 
multiple variables.  The correlation analysis indicates that there is a positive high correlation 
between state budget shortfall and health care expenditures (r = .87, p <.0001), a negative low 
correlation between state budget shortfall and FMAP rates (r = -.36, p < .05), and a positive 
moderate correlation between state budget shortfall and Medicaid expansion (r = .42, p <.01).  
The correlation between state budget shortfall and health expenditures is most likely due to the 
cost of health care and its effect on state government budgets, such as creating large deficits 
(Bodenheimer, 2005).  The association between state budget shortfall and Medicaid expansion 
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might signify that states need to expand Medicaid because of large state government 
expenditures.   
   Since many of the variables in the economic model are correlated, a VIF test is utilized to 
assess multicollinearity.  The mean value for all of the variables is 13.93, thus signaling an issue 
of multicollinearity.  As a result, the variables tax effort and state budget shortfalls are excluded 
from the multinomial regression analysis.  Since governments have reactive tendencies 
(Haveman, 1994), we assume that states are more likely to make policy decisions in relation to 
Medicaid based on rising health care costs than tax effort and state budget shortfalls.  Health care 
expenditures have contributed significantly to state government deficits and many states are 
reluctant to increase taxes for state residents during times of economic uncertainty (Osborne, 
1993).   Moreover, health care expenditures remain in the economic model because the literature 
on indicators that impact Medicaid policies is slanted more towards the influence of health care 
expenditures rather than state budget shortfalls and tax effort.  
Table 4.8 















       
Per Capita Income 1.00      
Tax Effort .23 1.00     
State Budget Shortfall .29* .94*** 1.00    
Health Care Expenditures .27*** .96*** .87*** 1.00   
FMAP Rate -.87*** -.31* -.36** -.32* 1.00  
Medicaid Expansion .42** .34* .42** .33* -.42** 1.00 
       
Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level, **Correlation is significant at .01 level, 




  Multinomial logistic regression is utilized to address the following question: Do 
economic factors influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion?  The economic 
model in this study failed to achieve convergence.  To identify and address issues of 
convergence, Long (1997) suggests the following: (a) Data should be checked for incorrect 
variables, (b) convergence problems can occur when the proportion of observations in relation to 
the number of variables is large, (c) large differences in regards to the standard deviation among 
the variables can contribute to convergence failures, and (d) the distribution of the outcome 
variable and the number of cases that fall within each category can produce convergence 
problems.  An assessment of each suggestion offered by Long (1997) reveals that the economic 
model does not violate the common issues associated with convergence failure.  As a result, we 
utilize Allison’s (2008) approach for dealing with convergence failures; we report the results and 
notate the offending variables with an infinity sign.  Allison (2008) argues that, “if one leaves the 
offending variables in the model, the coefficients, standards errors, and test statistics for the 
remaining variables are still valid maximum likelihood estimates” (p. 8).   
 The model summary is presented in Table 4.9.  Statistical tests are performed to assess 
goodness of fit; however, an error message occurred that indicates that convergence is not 
achieved.  The model is significant, with a likelihood ratio chi-square of 22.12 and a p-value of 
.01.  The Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic is not reported for this model because it could not be 
estimated with the alternative test offered by Fagerland, Hosmer, and Bofin (Fagerland & 
Hosmer, 2012).  The results from the economic model summary suggest that 38.7% of the 
variance in state decisions in Medicaid expansion is explained by the model. 
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Table 4.9 













      
22.12(.003) .173 .357 .387 n/a  
      
 
The results from the multinomial regression analysis for the economic model are 
displayed in Table 4.10.  Relative risk ratios are reported for interpretation purposes. Again, the 
model did not achieve convergence and the infinity sign symbolizes offending variables and 
missing maximum likelihood estimates.  
Table 4.10 
Economic Multinomial Regression Analysis  
(Base Outcome Group: Undecided) 
 β RRR S.E.  
Decline     
Per Capita Income -20568.93 0.00 0.00  
Health Care Expenditure .08 1.09 0.16  
FMAP Rate  -.03 0.97 .10  
Constant 2.56 12.90 138.72  
Support     
Per Capita Income -4378.52 0.00 0.00  
Health Care Expenditure .17 1.19 0.18  
FMAP Rate  -.10 .91 0.10  
Constant 5.14 171.33 2028.99  
Adopt     
Per Capita Income 754.97 ∞ ∞  
Health Care Expenditure .17 1.19 0.19  
FMAP Rate  -22.79*** 1.27 2.06  
Constant ∞ ∞ ∞  
     
Note: ***Correlation is significant at .001 level. 
∞: Maximum likelihood estimates do not exist. 
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For the economic model, one variable out of three is statistically significant.  Hypothesis 
5 specifies that states with a high level of per capita income are more likely to expand Medicaid.  
Although many studies find that per capita income has an effect on the adoption of Medicaid 
policies (Grogan & Ribgy, 2009; Satterthwaite, 2002; Volden, 2006), per capita income is not 
statistically significant in this study. Hypotheses 6 and 7 are omitted from the analysis due to 
issues of multicollinearity.  Nor are health care expenditures statistically significant.  Hypothesis 
8 suggests that states with a low level of Medicaid expenditures are more likely to expand 
Medicaid. Surprisingly, health care expenditures did not have an effect on the adoption of 
Medicaid expansion.   Again, the results of the economic model are affected by convergence 
failure. 
 The only significant variable in the economic model is FMAP rate.  Hypothesis 9 
proposes that states with high FMAP rates are more likely to expand Medicaid.  The findings 
indicate that a one standard deviation in FMAP rate is associated with a 27% greater relative risk 
of states adopting Medicaid expansion. Unexpectedly, the results indicate that although this 
variable is significant, it is significant in the opposite direction.  This finding runs counter to 
Satterthwaite’s (2002) study in which the results demonstrate that states with low FMAP rates 
are more likely to forgo new Medicaid programs while states with high FMAP rates were more 
likely to adopt innovative Medicaid programs.  This counterintuitive finding could result from 
changing economic conditions.  In 2002 many states were facing budget deficits and FMAP rates 
were declining because the formula was based on data from times of economic prosperity.  As 
states were struggling to pay for Medicaid programs with fewer federal funds, the Greater 
Access to Pharmaceutical Act was passed to provide an increase in matching funds for a 
temporary period of time (Ku, Ross, & Nathanson, 2002).  
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A comparison of state decisions using a one-way stable of summary statistics (see 
Appendix B) and using the mean score of each variable on the influence of per capita income on 
Medicaid expansion reveals that states that choose to decline or are undecided on Medicaid 
expansion have lower than average per capita income.  This finding could signal that states are 
unwilling to expand Medicaid when they cannot draw a substantial amount of tax dollars from 
per capita income.  On the other hand, states that choose to support or adopt Medicaid expansion 
have higher than average per capita income.  This finding confirms the notion that states that 
have great wealth are more likely to experiment or adopt new programs (Gray, 1973, 
Satterthwaite, 2002; Walker, 1969). 
 An analysis of states decisions on the effect of health care expenditures on Medicaid 
expansion shows that states that support or adopt Medicaid expansion have higher than average 
health care expenditures.  This finding indicates that these states have a vested interest in 
expanding Medicaid due to the amount of state dollars that are spent on health care expenditures 
for Medicaid recipients.  Conversely, states that choose to decline or are undecided on expanding 
Medicaid have lower than average health care expenditures.  This discovery contradicts the 
proposed hypothesis, H8, that states with a low level of health care expenditures are more likely 
to expand Medicaid.  Although states assess their Medicaid programs and make policy decisions 
as a result of program expenditures (Kim & Jennings, 2012; Cantor, Thompson & Farnham, 
2013), the findings suggest that states are risk-averse. 
 An examination of FMAP rates in relation to the decisions of states in Medicaid 
expansion demonstrates that states that chose to decline or are undecided on Medicaid expansion 
have higher than average FMAP rates.  This finding indicates that these states are receiving a 
substantial amount of funding from the federal government based on the federal guidelines 
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formula for matching funds (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2012).  
Moreover, the results of this study indicates that there is little incentive for these states to expand 
Medicaid because they have low health care expenditures and the government subsidies a 
substantial portion of the Medicaid program.  In contrast, states that choose to adopt or support 
Medicaid expansion have low FMAP rates.  Again, the results demonstrate that states have a 
vested interest in expanding Medicaid because they are receiving fewer funds from the federal 
government to operate the current Medicaid program. 
 Overall, the economic model shows diverse patterns amongst the states in regards to their 
decisions on Medicaid expansion. However, the difference between states that adopt and decline 
Medicaid expansion is conversely related.  States that opt to adopt Medicaid expansion have low 
FMAP rates, high health care expenditures, and high per capita income, while states that decide 
to decline Medicaid expansion have high FMAP rates, low health care expenditures, and low per 
capita income.  Figure 4.2 represents the influence of economic factors on Medicaid expansion in 
graphical form.  The variables health care expenditures and per capita income are transformed to 
reflect whole numbers. 
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Figure 4.2. Pivot table displaying the effect of economic factors on Medicaid expansion using 
mean values of the variables FMAP rate, health care expenditures, and per capita income in 




 The needs-based model consists of five variables; poverty, the percentage of the elderly, 
the percentage of the unemployed, the percentage of the uninsured, and health status.  Table 4.11 
depicts the descriptive statistics for all 50 states.  The variables poverty and the percentage of 
uninsured are positively skewed and leptokurtic.  Alternatively, the variables percentage of the 






Needs-Based Model Descriptive Statistics for all 50 States 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Kurtosis Range 
       
Poverty 13.87 3.15 8.6 23.8 3.60 15.2 
% Elderly 14.03 1.68 8.5 18.2 5.22 9.7 
% Unemployed 7.34 1.71 3.1 11.2 2.81 8.1 
% Uninsured 13.61 4.14 3.9 22.5 2.59 18.6 
Health Status .07 .01 .06 .09 2.63 0.03 
       
 
Correlation Analysis 
Correlations are performed between the dependent and independent variables.  Table 4.12 
depicts the results for the needs-based model. The percentage of uninsured is correlated with all 
of the other variables at a significant level. Moreover, there is a low negative correlation between 
Medicaid expansion and the percentage of uninsured (r = -.33, p <.05).  This correlation 
demonstrates that states are not expanding Medicaid when they have a high proportion of 
uninsured individuals.  There is also a moderate positive correlation between poverty and the 
percentage of the uninsured (r = .52, p < .001).  This association may be the result of increases in 
part-time employees and minimum wage positions (Wilensky, 1988).  A moderate negative 
correlation between health status and poverty (r = -.45, p < .01), implies that people who have 
poor health also live in poverty.   
Since many of the variables in the needs-based model are moderately correlated, a VIF 
test is utilized to assess multicollinearity.  The mean VIF value for all of the variables is 1.82.  
The VIF test did not signal a need to account for an issue of multicollinearity, because the 
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threshold for collinearity does not exceed a mean value of 10.  As a result, all of the variables 
remain in the needs-based model. 
Table 4.12 
Needs-Based Model Correlations for Dependent and Independent Variables 




       
Poverty 1.00      
%Elderly -.10 1.00     
%Unemployed .69*** -.01 1.00    
%Uninsured .52*** -.37** .37** 1.00   
Health Status -.45** -.48** -.48** -.50** 1.00  
Medicaid Expansion .12 .24 .24 -.33* .15 1.00 
       
Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level, **Correlation is significant at .01 level, 
***Correlation is significant at .001 level. 
Data Analysis 
 To analyze the needs-based model, multinomial logistic regression is utilized to address 
the following question: Do state population needs influence the decision of states to adopt 
Medicaid expansion?  The model is significant with a likelihood ratio chi-square of 49.90 and a 
p-value of .0001.  Table 4.13 provides the results of the statistical tests used to examine goodness 
of fit.  The results indicate that 68.4% of the variance in state decisions on Medicaid expansion is 
explained by the model. 
Table 4.13 













      
49.90(.000) .390 .631 .684 37.56(.038)  
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The findings from the multinomial regression analysis for the needs-based model are 
displayed in Table 4.14.  Four variables are significant.  The relative risk ratio for health status is 
not reported due to estimation limitations, but the multinomial regression analysis reveals that 
health status is statistically significant.   
Table 4.14 
Needs-Based Multinomial Regression Analysis  
(Base Outcome Group: Undecided) 
 β RRR S.E.  
Decline     
Poverty .67* 1.96 .63  
%Elderly -.69* .50 .17  
%Unemployed  -.58 .56 .22  
%Uninsured -.22 .81 .16  
Health Status 121.28 4.68 3.48  
Constant -.40 .67 5.55  
Support     
Poverty 1.13** 3.11 1.30  
%Elderly -.58 .56 .27  
%Unemployed -.10 .91 .47  
%Uninsured -.83** .43 .13  
Health Status 168.20 1.12 1.33  
Constant -8.10 .00 .00  
Adopt     
Poverty .95* 2.59 1.16  
%Elderly -1.05 .35 .23  
%Unemployed  1.53 4.63 4.55  
%Uninsured -.72* .49 .17  
Health Status 741.62* ∞ 0  
Constant -58.01 6.43 2.28  
     
Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level, **Correlation is significant at .01 level.  
∞: Maximum likelihood estimate do not exist. 
 
For the needs-based model, four variables out of five are statistically significant.  
Hypothesis 10 suggests that states with higher supplemental poverty measure rates are more 
likely to expand Medicaid.  Although the findings produce mixed results, the findings suggest 
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that states are responsive to actualized needs and they are more apt to support (RRR = 1.96, p < 
.01) or adopt (RRR = 3.11, p < .05) Medicaid expansion rather than decline (RRR = 2.59, p < .05) 
Medicaid expansion.  The percentage of the elderly population is also significant in the expected 
direction.  Hypothesis 11 postulates that states with a high proportion of elderly persons are less 
likely to expand Medicaid expansion.  A one standard deviation increase in the percentage of the 
elderly is associated with a 50% lower relative risk that states will decline Medicaid expansion 
relative to the undecided referent group (RRR = .50, p < .05).  This finding supports the literature 
that states are less inclined to expand Medicaid services when there are a high proportion of 
elderly residents (Kousser, 2000; Lamphere & Rosenbach, 2000). 
 The only variable that is not statistically significant in the needs-based model is the 
percentage of the unemployed.  Hypothesis 12 proposes that states with low unemployment rates 
are more likely to expand Medicaid expansion.  Although prior research demonstrates a link 
between the rate of unemployment and restrictive welfare benefits, mixed results have been 
reported on the effect of unemployment rates on different types of Medicaid policies (Grogan, 
1999; Soss et al. 2001).  This model also produces mixed results on the effect of unemployment 
rates on Medicaid expansion.  The results indicate that states are more likely to adopt Medicaid 
expansion when unemployment rates are high. However, there is a negative relationship between 
states that support and decline Medicaid expansion and the percentage of unemployed 
individuals.  Although there is no clear explanation to account for the mixed results, possible 
reasons could be the cost of expanding Medicaid or political opposition. 
 While the percentage of the unemployed does not have an effect on Medicaid expansion, 
the last two variables (percentage of uninsured and health status) in the needs-based model are 
positively significant.  Hypothesis 13 estimates that states with high uninsurance rates are more 
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likely to oppose Medicaid expansion.  Contrary to the hypothesized direction for the percentage 
of the uninsured, states are more inclined to support (RRR = .43, p < .01) or adopt (RRR = .49, p 
< .05) Medicaid expansion when the uninsured rate increases. This finding implies that states are 
more apt to adopt Medicaid expansion when there is a real need as suggested for the case on 
poverty.  
Hypothesis 14 postulates that states with a high level of residents with good health are 
more likely to expand Medicaid.  Although the relative risk ratio for health status is not 
estimated, the findings support Hypothesis 14 with a significance level of p < .05.  This finding 
supports Grogan’s (1999) conclusion that states respond positively to recognized medical and 
health needs.  Moreover, the results from this study on health status also lend support to Hill et 
al.’s (2014) arguments that knowledge of overall state health needs aid states in determining 
prospective costs and expanding Medicaid. 
A comparison of state decisions using a one-way table of summary statistics (see 
Appendix C), and using the mean score of each variable on the effect of poverty on Medicaid 
expansion reveals, that states that choose to adopt or support Medicaid expansion have higher 
than average state residents living in poverty.  This finding is surprising because these states also 
have higher than average per capita income.  On the other hand, states that chose to decline or 
are undecided on Medicaid expansion have a lower than average proportion of state residents 
living in poverty.  These results speak to the issues of income disparities and economic 
inequalities throughout the United States.  A study examining economic inequality trends in 
industrialized countries found that “a low-income American at the 10th percentile in 2000 had an 
income that is only 39 percent of median income, whereas a high-income American in the 90th 
percentile had an income that is 210 percent of the median” (Smeeding, 2005, p. 959).   
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An analysis of the influence of the percentage of the elderly population on state decisions 
on Medicaid expansion demonstrates that states that choose to support or are undecided on 
Medicaid expansion have a higher than average population of elderly persons.  On the contrary, 
states that choose to decline or adopt Medicaid expansion have a lower than average elderly 
population.  For states that decline Medicaid expansion, these findings show that expanding 
Medicaid would not be as expensive compared to other states with a high population of elderly 
persons.  
An evaluation of the impact of the percentage of unemployed persons on Medicaid 
expansion reveals that states that choose to adopt, support or are undecided on Medicaid 
expansion have a higher than average population of unemployed individuals.  This finding 
suggests that the employment status of state residents is a motivational force in state decisions on 
expanding Medicaid.  Alternatively, states that chose to decline Medicaid expansion have a 
lower population of state residents who are unemployed.   
An investigation of the effect of health status on state decisions on Medicaid expansion 
shows that states that choose to decline, support, or adopt Medicaid expansion have state 
residents with good health statuses.  This finding indicates that while states are more inclined to 
adopt or support Medicaid expansion when they have healthy residents; some states do not 
consider the overall health status of state residents to be a driving force in expanding Medicaid.   
An examination of the influence of the percentage of uninsured of state decisions on 
Medicaid expansion reveals that states that choose to decline or are undecided on Medicaid 
expansion have a higher than average percentage of uninsured individuals.  This finding suggests 
these states are risk-averse to expanding Medicaid.  On the other hand, states that adopt or 
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support Medicaid expansion have a lower than average population of uninsured individuals.  
This result implies that these states are more inclined to expand Medicaid because there are 
fewer people to insure. 
The decisions of states on Medicaid expansion in relation to need-based factors show 
marginal differences amongst the states with the exception of the uninsured.  The variable health 
status is transformed to reflect a whole number.  Figure 4.3 illustrates the impact of needs-based 
factors on Medicaid expansion in graphical form. 
 
Figure 4.3. Pivot table displaying the effect of needs-based factors on Medicaid expansion using 
mean values of the variables percentage of the elderly, health status, poverty, the percentage of 






State Capacity Model 
Descriptive Statistics 
 The state capacity model consists of three variables: legislative professionalism, 
institutional capacity, and governance.  Table 4.15 illustrates the descriptive statistics for all 50 
states.  All of the variables are positively skewed and leptokurtic.   
Table 4.15 
State Capacity Model Descriptive Statistics for all 50 States 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Kurtosis Range 
       
Legislative Professionalism .19 .12 0.031 0.606 6.30 0.575 
Institutional Capacity 2.60 .53 1.325 3.825 2.95 2.5 
Governance 2.48 1.01 1 4 1.96 3 
       
 
Correlation Analysis 
 An examination of correlations between the dependent and independent variables is 
performed.  Using Guilford’s guidelines for assessing Pearson r values (Sprinthall, 2012), the 
correlation analysis indicates that there is a low negative correlation between governance and 
legislative professionalism (r = -.29, p < .05).  This relationship may result from differences in 
legislative values and institutional objectives when formulating and implementing public service 
initiatives.   Issues of contention revolve around power constraints, representation, leadership, 
responsiveness, efficiency and effectiveness, and autonomy (Bourdeaux & Chiukoto, 2008).  
Moreover, there is a positive low correlation between Medicaid expansion and legislative 
professionalism (r = .35, p < .05).  This association supports the literature that professional 
legislatures are more likely to shape and adopt public policies (Boushey & McGrath, 2015; 
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Brace & Ward, 1999; Finegold & Skocpol, 1995; Jenkins, Leicht, & Wendt, 2006).  A VIF test is 
performed to examine and identify issues relating to multicollinearity.  The mean VIF value for 
all of the variables is 1.06, thus signifying that multicollinarity is not a problem for the state 
capacity model.  Table 4.16 depicts the results for the state capacity model. 
Table 4.16 









      
Legislative Professionalism 1.00     
Institutional Capacity .01 1.00    
Governance  -.29* -.05 1.00   
Medicaid Expansion .35** -.11 -.02** 1.00  
      
Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level, **Correlation is significant at .01 level. 
Data Analysis 
 Multinomial logistic regression is utilized to analyze the state capacity model and to 
address the following question: Does state capacity influence the decision of states to adopt 
Medicaid expansion?  The model is significant with a likelihood ratio chi-square of 17.60 and a 
p-value of .05.  The statistical tests utilized to evaluate goodness of fit are presented in Table 





















      
17.60(.040) .138 .297 .322 19.159(.743)  
      
 
The results from the multinomial regression analysis for the state capacity model are 
displayed in Table 4.18.  Two variables have an effect on Medicaid expansion: legislative 
professionalism and governance.  Relative risk ratios are reported for purposes of interpretation.  
Table 4.18 
State Capacity Multinomial Regression Analysis  
(Base Outcome Group: Undecided) 
 β RRR S.E.  
 
Decline     
Legislative Professionalism 1.21 3.36 16.00  
Institutional Capacity 1.03 2.81 1.99  
Governance  .22 1.25 .46  
Constant -3.11 .04 .10  
Support     
Legislative Professionalism 12.50* 268141.3 1437493  
Institutional Capacity .40 1.49 1.33  
Governance 1.22* 3.39 1.86  
Constant -7.14 .00 .00  
Adopt     
Legislative Professionalism 9.27 10666.63 56817.92  
Institutional Capacity .74 2.10 2.35  
Governance  -.15 .86 .62  
Constant -4.53 .01 .04  
     
Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level. 
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For the state capacity model, the relationship between legislative professionalism and 
Medicaid expansion indicates that states are more likely to support Medicaid expansion as the 
degree of legislative professionalism increases relative to the referent group, undecided (RRR = 
268141.3, p < .05). The findings demonstrate that Hypothesis 15 is not supported, which 
postulates that states with a high degree of legislative professionalism are more likely to adopt 
Medicaid expansion.  This finding should be understood in the environmental context of 
Medicaid expansion.  In June of 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that compelling states to expand 
Medicaid is unconstitutional (Jost & Rosenbaum, 2012).  As a result, many states did not 
formally adopt Medicaid expansion until the following year or years after.  Although many states 
did not formally adopt Medicaid expansion, the results demonstrate that there is a positive 
relationship between highly professionalized legislatures and Medicaid expansion in the 
expected direction, but the results do not reach a significant level.  Consequently, there is reason 
to believe that legislative professionalism will have more predictive power in analyses conducted 
for future years to come.   
 Institutional capacity also did not have an effect on Medicaid expansion.  Hypothesis 16 
estimates that states with a high level of institutional capacity will be more likely to expand 
Medicaid.  The insignificant results for institutional capacity could be due to a number of 
problems.  First, the data used to measure institutional capacity is collected from the year 2008.  
Although this information is outdated, there is research that suggests that state characteristics do 
not vary much over time (Milward & Provan, 2000; Weaver & Rockman, 1993; West, 2004).  
The other issue is that prior studies have measured institutional capacity using multiple methods 
(Fossett & Thompson, 2006; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013; Kim & Jennings, 2012).  The 
insignificant results could suggest that the method selected for this study may not be the 
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appropriate measure to assess institutional capacity.  However, the institutional capacity measure 
used in this study is comprehensive and has been in existence for 14 years (Barrett & Greene, 
2008).  Moreover, many studies have reported significant findings using data from the 
government performance project (Fossett & Thompson, 2006; Hou, Moynihan, & Ingramham, 
2003; King, Zeckhauser, & Kim, 2004), on which this study draws for the institutional capacity 
measure. 
 Surprisingly, the findings indicate that states are more likely to support Medicaid 
expansion when Medicaid governance arrangements are centralized (RRR = 3.39, p < .05). 
Hypothesis 17 posits that states with centralized Medicaid governing boards will most likely 
expand Medicaid and it is unsupported.  In contrast, the findings demonstrate that states that 
adopt Medicaid expansion are more likely to have a decentralized governance arrangement.  
Again, since many states did not formally adopt Medicaid expansion in 2012, there is reason to 
believe that governance will have a larger effect on Medicaid expansion in future years.  
Nonetheless, the influence of state governance arrangement on Medicaid expansion may vary in 
future years because mixed and shared governance arrangements are gaining prominence in 
fostering and establishing collaborative partnerships to improve public health initiatives (Beitsch, 
Brooks, Grigg, Menachemi, 2006). 
 A comparison of state decisions using a one-way stable of summary statistics (see 
Appendix D) along with using the mean score of each variable on Medicaid expansion reveals 
that states that choose to support or adopt Medicaid expansion have higher than average 
legislative professionals.  This finding supports the literature, which indicates that professional 
state legislators support progressive policies (Brace & Ward, 1999; Finegold & Skocpol, 1995; 
Jenkins, Leicht, & Wendt, 2006).  On the other hand, states that choose to decline or are 
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undecided on Medicaid expansion have lower than average legislative professionals. This finding 
could indicate that these states do not have the knowledge and skills to effectively manage an 
expanded Medicaid program. 
 An analysis of the effect of institutional capacity of state decisions on Medicaid 
expansion reveals that states that choose to decline or adopt Medicaid expansion have higher 
than average levels of institutional capacity.  This finding demonstrates that although states have 
the institutional capacity to expand Medicaid, some states are making the choice to decline 
expansion.  States that choose to support or are undecided on Medicaid expansion have lower 
than average institutional capacity.  This outcome suggests that a lack of institutional capacity 
may be hindering states from fully adopting Medicaid expansion. 
 For governance, a chi-square analysis and summary of statistics table (see Appendix D) 
shows that there is no difference between a states’ decision to adopt, support, decline or remain 
undecided on Medicaid and the governance structure of state Medicaid agencies.  The 
decentralized governance structure comprises 54% of state Medicaid governance structures.  The 
findings indicate that most states adopt a decentralized approach to handle the health and welfare 
of state residents, but such an approach creates wide variations in health services and outcomes.  
Wallis and Oates (1988) maintain that,  
the decentralized provision of public services provides a means to increase the level of 
economic welfare by differentiating levels of public outputs according to the demands of 
local constituencies. The magnitude of the potential gains from such decentralization 
depends upon the variation in the optimal levels of public outputs across jurisdictions.   
(p. 12)   
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The negative consequences of decentralization include inequality amongst communities and 
regions and dominance of public policies by the political elite (Fauget, 2004).  The results of this 
study offer a glimpse of disproportionate effects, such as health outcomes and institutional 
capacity, which could stem from a decentralized approach to handling Medicaid policies.  
 Overall, the state capacity model shows similar patterns amongst the states in regards to 
their decisions on Medicaid expansion for governance and institutional capacity. However, the 
differences between states that adopt and support Medicaid expansion are more pronounced than 
states that decline or are undecided on Medicaid expansion.  Figure 4.4 represents the influence 
of state capacity factors on Medicaid expansion in graphical form.   
 
Figure 4.4. Pivot table displaying the effect of state capacity factors on Medicaid expansion 
using mean values of the variables governance, institutional capacity, and legislative 




State Innovation and Diffusion 
Descriptive Statistics 
The state innovation and diffusion model consists of three variables: geographic state, 
state competition, and policy history.  Table 4.19 depicts the descriptive statistics for all 50 
states.  The variables, geographic state and state competition assumes that all of the states share a 
border with another state and that a state is influenced by its border states.  Hawaii and Alaska 
are the only states that do not share a border with another state.  We included these states in our 
analysis and assigned them a value of 0 based on the assumption that since they do not share a 
border state, they are not influenced by the actions of other states.  The policy history variable is 
negatively skewed and leptokurtic.  On the other hand, the geographic state variable and the state 
competition variable are positively skewed and leptokurtic.   
Table 4.19 
State Innovation and Diffusion Model Descriptive Statistics for all 50 States 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Kurtosis Range 
       
Geographic State .08 .12 0 0.4 2.69 0.4 
State Competition .42 .50 0 1 1.11 1 
Policy History 20.70 3.57 8 27 4.75 19 
       
 
Correlation Analysis 
 Correlations between the dependent and independent variables are performed.  Table 4.20 
provides the results of the state innovation and diffusion model.  Guildford’s guidelines for 
interpreting Pearson r-values are utilized to assess each correlation (Sprinthall, 2012).  The 
correlation analysis reveals that there is a positive moderate correlation between geographic state 
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and Medicaid expansion (r = .46, p < .001).  This correlation corroborates the findings of other 
studies that demonstrate a positive correlation between geographic neighbors and the adoption of 
Medicaid or public policies (Berry & Berry, 1990; Satterthwaite, 2002; Volden, 2006).  
Moreover, there is a low positive correlation between geographic state and policy history (r = 
.39, p < .01).  This correlation suggests that states are influenced by their neighbors and share a 
history of adopting similar Medicaid policies from past years.  Last, there is a low positive 
correlation between policy history and Medicaid expansion (r = .35, p < .05).  Again, this 
association supports prior studies, which show that states are more likely to adopt Medicaid 
expansion when they have a history of adopting previous Medicaid policies (Callaghan & 
Jacobs, 2014; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013; Satterthwaite, 2002).  A VIF test produces a mean VIF 
value of 1.14, thus indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue for the needs-based model. 
Table 4.20 










      
Geographic State 1.00     
State Competition .14 1.00    
Policy History  .39** -.01 1.00   
Medicaid Expansion .46*** .00 .35** 1.00  
      
Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level, **Correlation is significant at .01 level, 
***Correlation is significant at .001 level. 
Data Analysis 
 Multinomial logistic regression is utilized to examine the state innovation and diffusion 
model to address the following question: Do innovation and diffusion influence the decision of 
states to adopt Medicaid expansion?  The model is significant with a likelihood ratio chi-square 
of 17.86 and a p-value of .05.  Statistical tests to assess goodness of fit are performed and are 
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presented in Table 4.21.  The state innovation and diffusion model summary results indicate that 
32.6% of the variance in state decisions in Medicaid expansion is explained by the model. 
Table 4.21 













      
17.86(.037) .140 .300 .326 11.588(.984)  
      
 
The results from the multinomial regression analysis for the state innovation and 
diffusion model are displayed in Table 4.22.  Of the three variables included in this model, 
geographic state is statistically significant.  The reporting of relative risks is reported to lend 














State Innovation and Diffusion Multinomial Regression Analysis  
(Base Outcome Group: Undecided) 
 β RRR S.E.  
Decline     
Geographic State -.37 .69 2.60  
State Competition -.26 .77 .55  
Policy History  .00 1.01 .10  
Constant .32 1.37 2.90  
Support     
Geographic State 3.48 32.34 128.46  
State Competition -.38 .69 .61  
Policy History  .18 1.20 .18  
Constant -4.34 .01 .04  
Adopt     
Geographic State 13.35* 626374.8 4035010  
State Competition -1.17 .31 .42  
Policy History  .46 1.58 .46  
Constant -13.04 2.17 .00  
     
Note: *Correlation is significant at .05 level. 
For the state innovation and diffusion model, there is only one variable that is statistically 
significant; the others were surprisingly insignificant.  The influence of geographic neighbors on 
Medicaid expansion is positively and statistically significant (RRR = 626374, p < .05) and 
supports Hypothesis 18, which postulates that states are more likely to emulate their geographic 
neighbors in choosing to adopt Medicaid expansion.  This finding confirms prior research, which 
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theorizes that states are influenced by their neighbors and pursue similar policies (Berry & Berry, 
1990; Satterthwaite, 2002; Walker, 1969).    
 State competition and policy history did not have an effect on Medicaid expansion.  
Hypothesis 19 predicts that states with less generous Medicaid policies than their competitive 
neighbors are less likely to expand Medicaid.  While the findings follow in the expected 
direction, the influence of state competition on Medicaid expansion is not powerful.  
Countervailing factors that could affect this finding include other policy priorities, such as 
education and transportation.  The prevalence of other policy priorities could hinder or stall the 
expansion of Medicaid (Hoadley, Cunningham, & McHugh, 2004).  Hypothesis 20 posits that 
states that have adopted generous Medicaid policies in the past are more likely to adopt Medicaid 
expansion.  Again, the findings follow in the expected direction, but the results are insignificant.  
These findings suggest that states are more inclined to learn from each other by pursuing similar 
policies than to compete (Berry & Baybeck 2005; Kim & Jennings, 2012).  Moreover, the 
findings also suggest that prior Medicaid policies have no bearing on the future of welfare 
policies. 
 A comparison of state decisions using a one-way stable of summary statistics (see 
Appendix E) and using the mean score of each variable on Medicaid expansion reveals that 
states that support or adopt Medicaid expansion are more likely to emulate their neighbor than 
states that decline or are undecided on Medicaid expansion.  This indicates that policy 
convergence is occurring, but only amongst 30% of the states.  For states that choose to decline 
or are undecided on Medicaid expansion, failure to innovate and diffuse could be the result of a 
lack of understanding concerning the impact of expanding Medicaid, incomplete or inaccurate 
information, or ingrained beliefs (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005). 
 147 
 An examination of the impact of state competition on state decisions on Medicaid 
expansion reveals that states that choose to decline, support, and adopt Medicaid expansion have 
lower than average scores for state competition.  This indicates that there is not much of a 
difference on states decisions for state competition on Medicaid expansion.  However, for states 
that are undecided on Medicaid expansion, there is a higher than average score on state 
competition.  This suggests that there is some form of competition going on within undecided 
states and it is most likely associated with declining Medicaid expansion since there is a negative 
relationship between state competition and Medicaid expansion. 
  An analysis of state decisions reveals that states that choose to decline or are undecided 
on Medicaid expansion adopt fewer prior policies than states that support or adopt Medicaid 
expansion.  States that decline and are undecided on Medicaid expansion are very similar in 
terms of the policies they support and adopt.  The findings demonstrate that there is clear line 
between states that have liberal Medicaid policies and states that have conservative Medicaid 
policies.  
 In general, the state innovation and diffusion model shows distinct differences amongst 
the states in regards to their decisions on Medicaid expansion with the exception of state 
competition.  Again, for state competition, the findings demonstrate that there is not much a 
difference between the states for this variable in relation to Medicaid expansion.  Figure 4.5 
represents the influence of state innovation and diffusion factors on Medicaid expansion in 
graphical form.  
 148 
 
Figure 4.5. Pivot table displaying the effect of state innovation and diffusion on Medicaid 
expansion using mean values of the variables geographic state, policy history, and state 
competition in relation to the decision of states on Medicaid expansion. 
 
The Model of State Decision Making in Medicaid Expansion 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, all of the variables that are significant in each model are 
included for analysis in a full model of state decision making in Medicaid expansion.  The model 
consists of ten variables: ideology, governor institutional power, FMAP rate, poverty, percentage 
of elderly, percentage of uninsured, health status, legislative professionalism, governance, and 
geographic state.  Additionally, the model provides results on cross tabulations, goodness of fit 
measures, and multinomial regression analysis.  
Correlation Analysis 
 Correlations are performed between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables.  Table 4.23 depicts the results for the full model of state decision making in Medicaid 
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expansion.  In view of the fact that many of the variables are correlated, a VIF is utilized to 
assess multicollinearity.  The mean value of all of the variables is 2.26, thus indicating the VIF 
scores are well below 10, which signifies that multicollinearity is not an issue (Hair et al., 2010).  
As a result, all of the variables are included in the model
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Table 23 
Full Model of State Decision Making in Medicaid Expansion Correlations for Dependent and Independent Variables 














              





 .16 1.00           
FMAP Rate   -.44*** -.29** 1.00          
Poverty  .09 -.19 .06 1.00         
% Elderly  .16 -.08 .14 -.10 1.00        
Health Status  .15 .33 -.64 -.45 -.04 1.00       
Legislative  
Professionalism 
 .20 .23 -.29 .45 -.02 .01 1.00      
Governance  .14 -.10 .11 .18 .17 -.10 -.29** 1.00     
%Uninsured  -.38** -.38** .35** .52*** -.37** -.50*** -.10 -.09 -.26 1.00   
Medicaid 
Expansion 
 .69*** .21 -.42** .12 .13 .15 .36** -.02 .46*** -.33* 1.00  
              





 Multinomial regression is utilized to answer the overarching question of this study: What 
are the factors that influence states to adopt Medicaid expansion?  The model is significant with 
a likelihood ratio chi-square of 107.02 and a p-value of .001.  The statistical tests used to assess 
goodness of fit are presented in Table 4.24.    The Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic did not produce a 
chi-squared statistic or a p-value.  However, it should be noted that an alternative test is utilized 
to generate the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic and this test is not recommended for model-building 
purposes (Fagerland & Hosmer, 2012).  The results from the other goodness of fit statistics for 
the full model of state decision making indicate; 95.6% of the variance of state decisions is 
explained by the model.   Governor institutional power, poverty, the elderly population, and 
health status significantly contribute to explaining the variance in Medicaid expansion.  As a 
result of the literature on Medicaid policies and state public policies, the full model sheds light 
on the positive and negative effects of influential factors on Medicaid expansion.  Overall, the 
model shows strong results for factors that influence states to decline Medicaid expansion.   
Table 4.24 










      
107.02(.000) .836 .882 .956 n/a  
      
 
The results from the multinomial regression analysis for the state decision making model 
are displayed in Table 4.25.  The variables health status and percentage of elderly are statistically 
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significant at the p = .05 level.  Other variables that are significant at the p = .10 level are poverty 
and governor institutional power. 
Table 4.25 
Full Model of State Decision making in Medicaid Expansion Multinomial Regression Analysis  
(Base Outcome Group: Undecided) 
 β RRR S.E.  
Decline     
Ideology -.04 .96 .03  
Governor Institutional Power 5.97* 392.75 3.37  
FMAP Rate  .21 1.24 .16  
Poverty 1.02* 2.76 .53  
%Elderly -.98** .38 .50  
Health Status 364.95** 3.10 184.42  
Legislative Professionalism -7.0 .00 8.93  
Governance .01 1.01 .65  
Geographic State -7.40 .00 8.70  
%Uninsured -.41 .66 .31  
Constant -48.51 8.59 27.06  
Support     
Ideology     4.28 72.57 1684.61  
Governor Institutional Power 110.50 9.80 51322.42  
FMAP Rate 14.10 1333149 11070.48  
Poverty .51 1.66 45714.8  
%Elderly -8.37 .00 24369.93  
Health Status 11929.87 ∞ 9517423  
Legislative Professionalism 882.43 ∞ 676444.1  
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Governance 28.94 3.71 79209.46  
Geographic State 188.78 9.64 202969.4  
%Uninsured 7.60 2004.38 25578.99  
Constant -2591.71 0 1389524  
Adopt     
Ideology .43 1.53 5285.44  
Governor Institutional Power 36.60 7.82 96720.09  
FMAP Rate  -6.09 .00 14988.62  
Poverty 25.30 9.68 27882.14  
%Elderly -20.07 1.92 125306.3  
Health Status 6330.32    ∞ 2.98  
Legislative Professionalism 201.06 2.09 413092.7  
Governance -25.69 6.94 87878.68  
Geographic State 661.85 2.70 940983.2  
%Uninsured -8.69 .00 57359.77  
Constant -367.64 2.20 4311921  
     
Note: *Correlation is significant at .10 level, **Correlation is significant at .05 level. 
∞: Maximum likelihood estimate do not exist. 
 
This study assumes that states make decisions based on political, economic, needs-based, 
state capacity, and state innovation and diffusion factors.  Again, the overarching research 
question driving this research is “What are the factors that influence states to adopt Medicaid?” 
The results from the full model of state decision making demonstrate that, as a whole, most of 
the factors do not have a significant effect on states decisions on adopting Medicaid expansion, 
but rather declining Medicaid expansion.  However, the model sheds light on an unexpected 
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result.  There are two variables that are statistically significant and they are the percentage of 
elderly (RRR = .38, p < .05) and health status (RRR = 3.1, p < .05). A one standard deviation 
increase in the percentage of elderly is associated with a 62% lower relative risk of states 
declining Medicaid expansion.  However, a one-way table of summary statistics (See Appendix 
F) reveals that the percentage of elderly mean score of states that chose to decline Medicaid 
expansion is 13.45.  This indicates that the majority of states that are declining Medicaid 
expansion have a moderate population of elderly persons.   
The results from the full model of state decision making took a surprising turn for the 
variable of health status.  The individual model on state health needs shows that states are more 
likely to adopt Medicaid expansion when state residents have good health status.  However, a 
one standard increase in health status is associated with a 210% greater relative risk of states 
declining Medicaid expansion.  Moreover, a one-way table of summary statistics (See Appendix 
F) reveals a health status mean score of .07 for states that chose to decline Medicaid expansion.  
This statistic also indicates that states are choosing to decline Medicaid expansion even when 
state residents have good health status.  Overall, contrary to the literature on Medicaid expansion 
and the overriding influence of political factors (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Brown, 1995; 
Kousser, 2002; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013), the findings from this study reveal that state health 
needs trumps politics.   
 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter provides descriptive statistics, cross tabulations, model summaries, and 
regression analyses of the following models: political, economic, needs-based, state capacity, 
and state innovation and diffusion.  Multinomial regression analysis is used to analyze each 
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model.  A resultant model, the state decision making in Medicaid expansion, is developed based 
on the significant indicators that have an impact on Medicaid expansion.   
 The overall results of this study indicate that state health needs are more influential than 
politics, economics, state capacity, and state innovation and diffusion.  Of the individual models, 
politics has the most explanatory power.  The factors, ideology and governor institutional power, 
have a considerable effect on Medicaid expansion.  Although the economic model fails to reach 
convergence, the findings reveal that states with a low federal medical percentage rate (FMAP) 
are more likely to adopt Medicaid expansion.  The findings also reveal that the needs-based 
model has the most variables that have a significant effect on Medicaid expansion.  The state 
capacity model does not have a large effect on Medicaid expansion, but there is reason to believe 
that changes over time in Medicaid expansion will produce different results.  Similarly, the state 
innovation and diffusion model does not have a large effect on Medicaid expansion.  In sum, the 
findings indicate that states do not compete with each other and past policies do not affect state 
decisions in Medicaid expansion.   
 The variance in the full model explains 95.6% of state decisions on Medicaid expansion.  
Such a large variance provides robust explanatory power for the full model of state decision 
making in Medicaid expansion and aligns with the literature on state health and public policies.  
Moreover, the results of this study demonstrate the utility and predictive power of each variable 
on Medicaid expansion.  Furthermore, this study provides insight into the complexities of 
Medicaid expansion and explains the differences between states when deciding to adopt, decline, 
support, or are undecided on expanding Medicaid.   
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 This study engages in hypothesis testing. Twenty hypotheses are derived from the 
literature and examined using multinomial regression.  However, due to issues of 
multicollinearity, only 18 hypotheses are tested.  Figure 4.6 displays the expected direction of 
each concept in relation to each hypothesis. 
 
Figure 4.6. A Model of State Decision Making in Medicaid Expansion 
Of the hypotheses tested for the full model of state decisions on Medicaid expansion, this 
study confirms the influence and effect of ideology, governorship, poverty, percentage of the 
elderly, the percentage of the uninsured, health status, and regional diffusion on Medicaid 
expansion.  The findings on FMAP rates runs counter to the literature on governance structures 
and the adoption of state policies is not supported by this study.  Figure 4.7 provides the end 
results of this study.   
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Figure 4.7. A Model of Best Fit of State Decision Making in Medicaid Expansion 
Each model offers substantial insight into the prominent factors that affect the decisions 
of states in Medicaid policy.  This study demonstrates that political, economic, needs-based, state 
capacity, and state innovation and diffusion factors play an important role in the adoption of 
Medicaid policies.  Moreover, the full model of state decision making in Medicaid expansion 
uncovers an essential set of needs-based factors that play a large role in the decision making 







IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
  
This chapter recapitulates the findings from this study as set forth in Chapters 3 and 4.  
Then, the theoretical and policy contributions and implications are discussed.  Next, study 
limitations and delimitations are offered to address the flaws inherent in this research.  Finally, 
areas of future research and a concluding section are presented to explicate the utility of this 
study. 
 
Summary of the Research 
 The purpose of this study is to explore instrumental factors that influence states to adopt 
Medicaid expansion.  This research is informed by a vast array of literature from multiple 
disciplines; five models that drive policy decisions at the state-level are identified and tested.  
This study is important because there is a gap in scholarly research on state-level decision 
making indicators that influence policy adoptions.  Moreover, this study fills the gap by 
introducing a comprehensive model of state decision making in Medicaid expansion that can be 
adapted and modified to apply to other policy arenas.    
 A state comparative cross-sectional research design governs this study; the relationship 
between Medicaid expansion and the influence of political, economic, needs-based, state 
capacity, and innovation and diffusion factors is examined.  The primary research question that 
guides this study is “What are the factors that influence states to adopt Medicaid expansion?”  
Secondary data are collected at the state level and multinomial regression is utilized to analyze 
the five models identified from the literature review and the comprehensive model of state 
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decision making in Medicaid expansion.  The results from this study are summarized and 
organized by research question in the proceeding section.  
 
Research Questions 
 The first research question pertains to the political model and asks the question: “Do 
political factors influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid?”  The significant factors in 
the political model are state government ideology and governor institutional power.  The data 
analysis supports Hypotheses 3 and 4 that conservative state governments and governors with 
high institutional powers are more likely to decline Medicaid expansion. The results of the 
analysis also reveal that liberal state governments and governors with high institutional powers 
are more likely to support Medicaid expansion.  The insignificant variables are African-
American voters and interparty competition.  None of the variables have an effect on the 
decisions of states to adopt Medicaid expansion.  This finding supports the literature on 
Medicaid expansion, which demonstrates that political factors have an overwhelming influence 
on the decisions of states to decline Medicaid expansion (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Jacobs & 
Callaghan, 2013).  In contrast, the results of this study in terms of the comprehensive model 
reveal that the decisions of states to adopt Medicaid expansion are not influenced by political 
factors.  However, the support of Medicaid expansion by states is influenced by ideology and 
gubernatorial institutional powers.  Likewise, the declination of Medicaid expansion by states is 
also influenced by gubernatorial institutional powers and ideology. 
 The second research question is related to the economic model and asks: “Do economic 
factors influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion?”  This model failed to 
reach convergence and some of the variables were omitted because they were highly correlated.  
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The federal medical assistance percentage rate (FMAP) appears to be a significant factor that 
affects the decisions of states to adopt Medicaid expansion.  This finding runs contrary to the 
hypothesized direction, but the results indicate that states are more likely to adopt Medicaid 
expansion when FMAP rates are low.  The other variables (per capita income and health care 
expenditures) do not have an effect on the decision of states to expand Medicaid.  Although per 
capita income and health care expenditures do not have an effect on the decisions of states to 
adopt, support, or decline Medicaid expansion, this study demonstrates that FMAP rates have 
considerable influence on state decisions to adopt Medicaid.  However, it should be noted that 
the results of this model should be interpreted with caution due to convergence failure. 
 The third research question is connected to the needs-based model and follows: “Do state 
population needs influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion?” All of the 
variables with the exception of the percentage of employed are statistically significant. The 
poverty variable produced mixed results.  The results reveal that states with a moderate 
population of people living in poverty are opting to decline and support Medicaid expansion.  
The findings also show that states are more apt to decline Medicaid expansion when there is a 
moderate population of elderly persons.  This could suggest that states are not willing invest in 
Medicaid expansion when they know that a certain population of high utilizers of health care 
services will increase health care costs and decrease state resources in relation to the provision of 
health care services.  
Unpredictably, the results reveal that states with a moderate level of uninsured persons 
are more likely to adopt Medicaid expansion.  Moreover, Hypothesis 14 is supported by the 
analysis and states with residents that have good health statuses are more likely to adopt 
Medicaid expansion.  This model suggests that states are responsive to some state population 
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needs.  In response to the third research question, the results indicate that poverty, the percentage 
of the uninsured, and health status influence states to adopt Medicaid expansion.  In contrast, the 
decision to decline Medicaid expansion by states is affected by poverty and high populations of 
elderly persons.  Last, states that support Medicaid expansion are influenced by poverty and high 
populations of uninsured individuals. 
 The fourth research question concerns the state capacity model and reads: “Does state 
capacity influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion?” Legislative 
professionalism is a statistically significant variable in the state capacity model and the results 
indicate that states with a high degree of legislative professionalism are more likely to support 
rather than decline or adopt Medicaid expansion.  Governance is the other statistically significant 
variable and this variable does not have an effect on the decisions of states to adopt Medicaid 
expansion as hypothesized, but instead is significant for the decisions of states in supporting 
Medicaid expansion.  Institutional capacity did not have an effect at all on the decisions of states 
to expand Medicaid.  The findings from the state capacity model suggest that the variables will 
have more predictive power in the future because states did not formally decide to take a position 
on Medicaid expansion until after the year 2012.  In conclusion, state capacity factors do not 
influence states to adopt Medicaid expansion.  Moreover, these factors do not have an effect on 
the decisions of states that decline Medicaid expansion as well.  However, the results indicate 
that states that support Medicaid expansion are influenced by legislative professionalism and 
governance arrangements.   
 The fifth research question involves the state innovation and diffusion model: “Do 
innovation and diffusion influence the decision of states to adopt Medicaid expansion?”  The 
variable geographic state is significant and supports Hypothesis 18, which indicates that states 
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are more likely to emulate their geographic neighbors in choosing to adopt Medicaid expansion.  
The other variables (state competition and policy history) are insignificant and do not have an 
effect on the decisions of states to expand Medicaid.  This model suggests that states are not 
influenced by past policy preferences and states are not competing with each other on any level 
in relation to Medicaid expansion.  In accordance with Question 5, the results indicate that states 
are influenced by their geographic neighbor.  The others factors that comprise the state 
innovation and diffusion model do not wield a significant amount of influence on state decisions 
to adopt Medicaid expansion.  For states that decline or support Medicaid expansion, the findings 
reveal that geographic neighbors, policy history and state competition do not influence state 
decisions. 
 Last, we revisit the overarching question guiding this study that relates to the full model 
of state decision making in Medicaid expansion: “What are the factors that influence states to 
adopt Medicaid expansion?”  Although 10 variables are included in the model, only 2 variables 
are statistically significant with a p-value of .05.  The two variables are the percentage of elderly 
and health status.  Poverty and governor institutional power are also significant with a p-value of 
.10.  The findings indicate that states are more likely to decline Medicaid expansion when they 
have a moderate population of elderly persons.  Additionally, the results reveal that states are 
also more likely to decline Medicaid expansion when residents have good health statuses.  The 
other variables in the model do not have a significant effect on Medicaid expansion. Moreover, 
of the variables that comprise the full model of state decision making in Medicaid expansion, 
none of them show influential power in states choosing to adopt Medicaid expansion.  
Surprisingly, this model suggests that in relation to Medicaid expansion state population needs 
are more influential than political factors.   
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Theoretical Contributions and Implications 
 The literature on Medicaid expansion and Medicaid policy does not acknowledge the 
different dimensions of influential factors that affect the decision making process of states, which 
in turn affect public health policies.  There is a gap in the literature that fails to connect why 
states make decisions and the implications that follow when states choose to adopt or refuse to 
adopt a given policy. The empirical findings from this study demonstrate that each model of 
prominent factors that influence state decisions in Medicaid expansion are important as they 
stand alone, but they also interact differently when combined. 
   The development of a comprehensive model for state decision making in Medicaid 
expansion is the first major contribution to this study.  The variance of this model explains 
95.6% of state decisions in Medicaid expansion.  Although high values for the coefficient of 
determination (r2) is uncommon in the field of social sciences, the full model is based on an 
interdisciplinary literature search that focuses on state-level factors that influence state decisions 
in public policy.  The drivers of state decision making fall under the following individual 
models; political, economic, needs-based, state capacity, and state innovation and diffusion. 
These factors comprise essential elements of the policy adoption stage of state decision making 
in public policies.  
The model of state decision making in Medicaid expansion can assist theorists in building 
knowledge and addressing additional gaps in research and practice.  Replication studies and 
model modifications can advance the field of public policy and health policy over time by 
lending consistency and reliability in the measures used to analyze the model.  Furthermore, the 
model can assist theorists in improving the decision making process of states by identifying 
problem areas through quantitative and analytical processes to inform practice on state policy 
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directives and management practices. State-level policy directives and management practices 
include, but are not limited to, factors involving resource management, issue management, and 
financial management. 
The second major contribution of this study involves revelatory insight.  Corley and 
Gioia (2011) maintain that a significant theoretical contribution “rests in the idea that 
contribution arises when theory reveals what we otherwise had not seen, known, or conceived” 
(p. 17).  This study identifies and illuminates the driving factors of state responses to policy 
adoption.  Until this study, research on state decision making in any arena does not encompass a 
wide-ranging model of influential factors that affect policy adoptions.  Moreover, this study 
reveals that state needs are just as important as politics, and this discovery is largely ignored or 
not fully explored in the literature on Medicaid expansion since the passage of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Brown, 1995; Jacobs & 
Callaghan, 2013).  This finding suggests that there should to be more emphasis on understanding 
issue definition in the context of Medicaid expansion.  Issue definition relates to the process by 
which the initial stage of policy development shapes policy deliberations, and certain interests 
are deemed important for policy decisions (Burgess, 2005).   Moreover, Mooney (1999) 
acknowledges that “issue definition is central to determining the politics of the policy making 
process.  Even a small change in this definition can affect the extent to which the process is 
driven” (p. 678).  When issue definition is understood, decision-makers can adequately assess 
constraints, examine alternatives, and direct and implement judicial decisions and agency policy 
directives (Stankey, Hendee, & Clark, 1975).  This study demonstrates how state concerns can be 
sorted based on an understanding of the drivers of state decisions.  
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Policy Contributions and Implications 
 States play an important role in the adoption and implementation of Medicaid policy.  A 
review of the literature (see Chapter 2) reveals that political, economic, needs-based, state 
capacity, and innovation and diffusion influences the adoption of state policies.  The results of 
this study indicate that policy adoption at the state level is influenced by a multitude of 
competing factors, but when all of the factors are combined, states are more inclined to respond 
negatively to state needs. Although Medicaid expansion provides an opportunity to improve the 
health status of state residents, eliminate gaps in coverage, and control variations in health 
outcomes across states (Crowley & Golden, 2014; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013; Richardson & 
Yilmazer, 2013), the far-reaching benefits of implementing Medicaid expansion are null if states 
do not adopt Medicaid expansion.  This research contributes to the fields of health policy and 
public policy in four ways. 
 First, an understanding of the factors that influence state policies and the problem that 
governs Medicaid expansion can provide a starting point for meaningful and factual discourse.  
Understanding the issues that affect Medicaid expansion can assist policymakers and policy 
advocates with demystifying inaccurate claims and personal biases by reframing policy 
problems.  Schon and Rein (1994) refer to reframing as a deliberative process that is based on 
evidence and policy debates that encourage participants to seriously reflect and adjust their 
original framing of the policy issue.  This process involves a paradigm shift of the policy 
problem.   In addition to recasting and reframing policy issues, rhetoric could also induce policy 
change.  To reorient policy problems through rhetoric, Gottweis (2007) suggests 
“conceptualiz[ing] these elements [emotions, virtue, trust, ethos, and feelings] in policy making 
not as expressions of irrationality but as inseparable from the operation of reason” (p. 248).   
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A simplistic form of using rhetoric in relation to this study would be to appeal to the 
public and lawmakers using reason and emotion to persuade states to adopt Medicaid expansion.  
A case could be presented where a healthy person who does not have health insurance lives in a 
state that is declining Medicaid expansion and cannot access affordable care.  A situation occurs 
where the healthy person neglects getting care and ends up in the hospital and costs the state 
thousands of dollars in uncompensated care.  Then, research into the cause of illness reveals that 
the illness could have been prevented by one trip to a primary care physician and medication that 
costs less than $25 with health insurance.  Soon after, a study is conducted using the model of 
state decision making in Medicaid expansion and the results of this study is confirmed and states 
are still declining Medicaid expansion when they have a high population of healthy residents.  
Further analyses of economic factors and forecasting reveal that states will save money if they 
expand Medicaid.  This case represents how lawmakers, researchers, policy entrepreneurs, 
interest groups, and public health advocates can use rhetoric and reason to influence policy 
adoption.  
Second, history demonstrates that states respond to financial inducements (Brecher & 
Rose, 2013; Pollack, 2013).  The findings from this study show that states are more likely to 
expand Medicaid when FMAP rates are low.  This suggests that states that are receiving more 
financial assistance are declining Medicaid expansion.   Although the federal government will 
fund Medicaid expansion at 100% from 2014 to 2016 and 90% thereafter, there is speculation 
that states are declining Medicaid expansion because they are afraid that future changes in the 
law or administration will shift the burden from the federal government to the states (Angeles, 
2012; Antos, 2013).  This highlights a need to understand and research the interplay between 
trust in government and the adoption of Medicaid policies as well as public health and public 
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policies. The influence of financial inducements or federal aid should be examined in more depth 
through qualitative inquiry.  
Third, the exploration of trend analysis can lend additional understanding to policy 
adoption in Medicaid expansion.  This study serves as a baseline design for decision making at 
the state level and can assist analysts in predicting what will happen in the future with Medicaid 
expansion.  Moreover, researchers and practitioners can use trend analysis as a strategic tool to 
identify common trends and pattern changes over time.  Additionally, the impact of Medicaid 
expansion and policy shifts can be evaluated.  Furthermore, targeted studies can assess and 
compare the relationship between Medicaid expansion and the predictor variables according to 
geographic areas and ideological stances over time. 
Fourth, practical application of this study may be guided through evidence-informed 
policy, which involves gathering contextual based evidence from a variety of sources.  Then, the 
evidence should be continuously assessed and research should be understood by the way the 
problem is framed, the interpretation of the research is analyzed, and the application is prioritized 
and effective.  Last, capacity should be assessed and determined to implement policies based on 
evidence (Bowen & Zwi, 2005).  Gambrill (2006) suggests that in order to employ an evidence-
informed approach to policy, practitioners should acquire information science skills, incorporate 
feedback in decisions, and have access to decisional tools, resources, and training to improve the 
quality of health care decisions.  However, Bowen and Zwi (2005) note that “the starting point 
for navigating the use of evidence in policy and practice is understanding diffusion (how ideas 
spread throughout systems), how decisions are made, how policy is developed, and how capacity 
is required to effectively use evidence in this process” (p. e166).  By examining Medicaid 
expansion through an evidence-informed approach, researchers and practitioners can better 
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understand state factors on a contextual level and determine the appropriate strategy to adopt and 
implement Medicaid expansion. 
The implications of this study are far-reaching.  States can use the model of state decision 
making in Medicaid expansion to assess political support for new and expanded programs and 
evaluate economic conditions that can impact the implementation of new initiatives.  States can 
also examine the needs of its constituents and provide services or expand programs that serve the 
welfare of the public.  Moreover, states can assess their capacity to implement new programs and 
learn from each other through innovation and diffusion. 
Practitioners can utilize the findings from this study by understanding the factors that 
affect state decisions in Medicaid expansion and assisting with the development of new policies 
to remedy policy problems.  Practitioners can also serve as health policy advocates and provide 
evidence-based research on the impact of health care policies on vulnerable populations.  
Likewise, policymakers can use the results of this study to champion new or expanded services.  
This study provides statistics for each state and policymakers can use the data from this study to 
identify problems and suggest a course of action.  Through active engagement and evidence-
informed policy, policymakers, practitioners, and states have the power to transform the delivery 
and service of health care. 
 
Study Limitations and Delimitations 
There are several limitations pertaining to this study. First, this research provides a 
foundational model that allows researchers to evaluate and test prominent factors at the state 
level that affect state decisions on Medicaid expansion.  Some of the factors are context specific 
and generalizations may not extend to others areas of Medicaid policy or other policy arenas.  
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This limitation can be managed by understanding the rationalization of state decision making and 
comprehending the context for each model and variable.  Furthermore, it should be noted that 
Medicaid expansion and the ACA is evolving and this study examines initial state policy choices 
and early-stage adoption in Medicaid expansion.  As implementation of the ACA continues, 
additional studies will need to be conducted to account for changes in state and federal laws as 
well as changes in state characteristics. 
The second limitation involves data limitations and data choices.  The selection of data 
for this study is based on literature reviews and cross comparisons from other fields.  This study 
utilizes a cross-sectional research design for the year 2012, but some of the data are unavailable 
for various reasons.  As result, this study uses data for prior years or proceeding years for 
variables that could not be obtained for the year 2012.   
The third limitation concerns multiple methods of measurement.  The literature on some 
of the variables in this study utilizes different measures to analyze various phenomena, such as 
party control and interparty competition (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013; 
Shufeldt & Flavin, 2011).  To mitigate this limitation, this study uses consistent or time-tested 
measures and also acknowledges that state characteristics do not vary a great deal over time 
(Weaver & Rockman, 1993; West, 2004).  Moreover, the selection of each variable is based on 
the availability of the data and prior research that demonstrates a consistent effect on the state 
decision making process.   
 The fourth litigation relates to model estimation errors.  The economic model failed to 
achieve convergence and goodness of fit measures could not be estimated.  To address these 
limitations, a literature review search on multinomial regression from experts in the field guided 
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the process on how to deal with model estimation errors and data reporting (Allison, 2008; 
Fagerland, Hosmer, & Bofin, 2008; Long, 1997). 
 
Future Research 
 This research examines dominant factors that influence the decisions of states to adopt 
Medicaid expansion.  Data from all 50 states for the cross-sectional year 2012 are utilized to 
inform the study on which factors have an effect on Medicaid expansion.  Now that a model of 
state decision making on Medicaid expansion is created and time has passed and more data will 
be accessible, the opportunity to examine this study through a time series analysis can offer 
insight on changes over time and also future trends can be forecasted (O’Sullivan, Rassel, & 
Berner, 2003). 
 Another line of future research is employing a multiple case study approach.  An 
understanding of state decisions among states with similar characteristics may provide insightful 
information on significant factors that influence the decision making process.  A mixed methods 
study may also add value to this line of research by gaining a deeper understanding of not only 
the influential factors used in this study, but other factors that may be revealed such as the 
influence of interest groups.  The influence of interest groups is difficult to measure, but a mixed 
methods study may uncover an important factor that has an effect on Medicaid expansion. 
 The most important line of research involves improving upon the model of state decision 
making in Medicaid expansion.  The findings indicate that the economic model needs to be 
revisited and modified.   Once the model is reevaluated, replication studies can be conducted for 
other cross-sectional years and different policy arenas.  Additionally, the data limitations will 
also need to be revisited.  As implementation of the ACA moves along, data on state factors that 
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comprise the full model will become available and readily accessible for future studies.  
Moreover, the issues involving multiple methods of measurement will need to be addressed via 
statistical methods such as factor analysis or an in-depth meta-analysis. Although the limitations 
will need to be remedied, researchers from other policy arenas can and should modify some of 
the variables in each model to substantiate the phenomenon of interest. 
 
Conclusion 
 This study explores and examines the effect of political, economic, needs-based, state 
capacity, and state innovation and diffusion factors at the state level on Medicaid expansion.  A 
number of hypotheses are tested using multinomial regression and state decisions on Medicaid 
expansion are analyzed in accordance with the influential factors of policy making and policy 
adoption.  This research is important because it addresses a gap in the literature and offers a 
model of state decision making in Medicaid expansion by which researchers can explain policy 
decisions and apply to other policy settings.   
 The results of this study indicate that when all significant factors of state decision making 
are considered, state needs are more influential than politics— contrary to the literature on 
Medicaid expansion post the ACA (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013).  
The results also offer an explanation for why states decline Medicaid expansion more so than 
adopt Medicaid expansion.  However, when the individual models are analyzed separately we 
see more variation in state decisions and the findings indicate that states are more inclined to 
support Medicaid expansion rather than adopt expansion.  Moreover, the overall findings of this 
study should be understood in the context of (a) the time period in which the data are collected 
and (b) the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the ACA (see Chapter 2).   
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The utility of this research are manifest.  This study provides a foundational path for 
researchers to explore the adoption of health and public policies at the state level.  This study 
also investigates an unexplored phenomenon and that is the effect of governance structures in 
health policy.  While the findings indicate that there is an association between governance 
arrangements and states supporting Medicaid expansion, further research will need to be 
conducted to evaluate the true impact of governance structures on Medicaid expansion decisions 
in future years.  Last, this research has the potential to transform policy making in the area of 
adoption at the theoretical and policy level.  An understanding of drivers of state decisions at the 
theoretical level will help inform policy and practice.  This study identifies state concerns and 
policy preferences; knowledge of why states make decisions gives researchers and lawmakers 
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APPENDIX D: STATE CAPACITY SUMMARY OF STATISTICS 
     leg_pro          50       .1906    .1229929       .031       .606
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize leg_pro
      Total         .1906   .12299295          50
                                                 
      Adopt     .27439999   .17286496           5
    Support          .263   .15946369          10
  Undecided     .15413333   .10116667          15
    Decline         .1608   .08089148          20
                                                 
  Expansion          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
   Medicaid             Professionalism
                    Summary of Legislative
. tabulate med_exp, summarize (leg_pro)
 
 
    inst_cap          50      2.5955    .5314039      1.325      3.825
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize inst_cap
      Total        2.5955   .53140386          50
                                                 
      Adopt          2.64   .67235594           5
    Support          2.53   .48229776          10
  Undecided     2.4516667   .51888159          15
    Decline         2.725    .5364356          20
                                                 
  Expansion          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
   Medicaid    Summary of Institutional Capacity
. tabulate med_exp, summarize (inst_cap)
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         gov          50        2.48     1.01499          1          4
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize gov
      Total          2.48   1.0149897          50
                                                 
      Adopt             2           0           5
    Support           2.9   .99442893          10
  Undecided     2.3333333   1.1751393          15
    Decline           2.5           1          20
                                                 
  Expansion          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
   Medicaid          Summary of Governance
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Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA      August 2015-Present 
 Graduate Research Assistant 
• Create and maintain data and documentation as needed for academic affairs. 
• Develop methodologies for using data analytics tools and manage reporting, 
visualizations, and statistical graphs to illustrate findings. 
• Collaborate with teams and committees to prepare internal reports for the Southern 
Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges accreditation requirements. 
• Arrange meetings with faculty to understand data opportunities and needs to drive data 
quality improvement. 
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• Analyze financial information and report discrepancies to assist in effective business 
decisions. 
 
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA             September 2011-May 2015 
 Graduate Research Assistant 
• Edited manuscripts for conferences and publication purposes. 
• Conducted literature reviews on corruption and state capture and other research-related 
activities. 
• Assisted advisor on teacher-related duties. 
• Prepared handouts and provided supplemental reading material for a doctoral level 
course PAUP 803 Multivariate Quantitative Analysis for Public Administration. 





Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA        October 2012-December 2014 
 Guest Lecturer 
• Provided a lecture on administrative reform detailing various strategies that the United 
States has implemented over time. 
• Lectured on accountability in nonprofits and engaged the students in an activity that 
allowed them to evaluate mission statements, fiscal duties, and operating budgets 
among other items to determine if nonprofits were meeting established best practices. 
• Prepared and presented two lectures on public administration theories, public trust, 
ethics, and the future of public administration.  
 
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA                January 2013- May 2013 
 Instructor 
• Taught an intermediate-level course on ethics, governance, and accountability online. 
• Integrated case studies, wiki assignments, blogs, discussion board posts, and video 
presentations. 
• Effectively encouraged growth and improvement through providing thorough feedback to 
students (Average enrollment=30). 
 
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA             September 2012- December 2014 
 Graduate Teaching Assistant 
• Assisted in developing PAS 301: Ethics, governance, and accountability by recording 
lectures, creating deadlines for assignments, and inputting information in Blackboard. 
• Contributed to the development of PAS 410 Public and Nonprofit Organization by creating 
PowerPoint slides, developing test questions, course objectives, and homework 
assignments. 
• Collaboratively worked with professors to develop and assist in teaching a Masters level 
online course for PADM 734 Negotiation and Dispute Resolution by organizing and 
entering the course content in Blackboard and Personal Learning Environment (PLE) and 
facilitating online interactions with students. 
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PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE  
 
Amerigroup Corporation, Virginia Beach, VA             March 2007-August 2011 
 Care Services Technician II 
• Performed telephonic outreach efforts related to the Medicaid population 
• Worked closely with members, providers, and community agencies to proactively 
coordinate and resolve issues involving access to health care services. 
• Coordinated, authorized, fulfilled, monitored, and tracked health care services 
• Worked collaboratively with departments within the health plans; which include but are 
not limited to, utilization management and case management. 
 
Virginia Beach Psychiatric Center, Virginia Beach, VA               July 2006 – March 2007 
 Mental Health Counselor 
 Provided counseling to adults and children’s with serious mental illness.  
 Performed technical nursing assignments; taking vital signs, weights, and 
laboratory specimens. 
 Facilitated and monitored therapeutic groups. 
 Trained and educated new hires on various policies and procedures on selected units. 
 
Rhode Island Department of Corrections, Cranston, RI            September 2005-December 2005 
 Therapeutic Assistant (Volunteer) 
• Co-facilitated therapeutic and education sessions/ groups 
• Monitored female offenders while they nurtured their children 
• Coordinated meetings, conferences, and morale related events 
 
Perspectives Corporation, Youth and Family Services, Wakefield, RI          March 2005– June 2005 
Behavioral Specialist 
 Worked individually with children on developmental issues and anger management 
techniques. 
 Arranged daily activity schedules for children.  
 Monitored behavior and activity by maintaining thorough records and worksheets.  




Henley, T. (October, 2013). Citizen Perceptions: Do they Influence the Economic Condition? Paper 
presented at the annual conference of the Southeastern Conference for Public Administration (SECoPA), 
Coral Springs, FL.  
 
Henley, T., & Miller-Stevens, K. (November, 2013). The Massachusetts Health Connector: A Trailblazer in 
the Transformation of Healthcare Reform.  Paper presented at the annual conference of the Northeastern 
Political Science Association (NPSA), Philadelphia, PA.  
 
Henley, T. (April, 2014). An Exploration and Emancipation for Workplace Complexity: Delving in the Lives 
of Nonprofit Employees. Paper presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science 
Association (MPSA), Chicago, IL. 
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Henley, T. (October, 2014). Value-Based Services: Is it Achievable, Operational, or Practical. Paper 
presented at the annual conference Southeastern Conference for Public Administration (SECoPA), Atlanta, 
GA. 
 
Henley, T. (October, 2015).  Health Care Policy from a Public Administration Perspective.  Poster 
presented at Commonwealth Graduate Education Day, Richmond, VA. 
 
Henley, T. (April, 2016).  Health Care Policy from a Public Administration Perspective.  Invited poster 






Miller-Stevens, K., Henley, T.*, & Diaz-Kope, L.* (2015). A new model of collaborative federalism through 
a governance perspective. In J.C. Morris & K. Miller-Stevens (Eds.) Advancing collaboration theory: New 




Henley, T., & Boshier, M. (2015). The future of health care services for Native Americans in the United 
States: An analysis of policy options using a multiple streams approach. Journal of Health Economics, 




Morris, J.C., & Miller-Stevens, K. (2015).  Advancing collaboration theory: New models and typologies. 
(Eds.). London, UK: Routledge Publishing. 
 
 
RESEARCH AND MANUSCRIPTS IN PROGRESS 
 
Henley, T. Value-based services: Is it achievable, operational, or practical.  
 
Henley, T. & De Leo, G. Early-stage prostate cancer: Proceed with caution. 
Henley, T. Collaboration meets accountable care organizations: Developing a framework for mental 
health collaboratives.  
Henley, T & Miller-Stevens, K. An exploration and emancipation of workplace complexity: Delving into the 
lives of nonprofit employees.  
GRANT AWARDED 
Co-Principal Investigators: Gordon, SB., Klinger, R., Henley, T., Cotterrell, P, Mengistu, M. 
(September 2015). Stakeholder Perspectives of the Needed and Actual Competencies, Values, 
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 Member, Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society, Present 
 Member, Pi Alpha Alpha Honor Society, Present 
 Member, Political Science Association 
 Member, American Society for Public Administration 
 Member, Onyx Senior Honor Society, Present 
 Faculty Summer Institute Workshop on Diversity, 2016 
 Panelist, Commonwealth Graduate Education Day, 2015 
 Faculty Summer Institute Workshop on Teaching and Learning, 2013 
 President, Public Administration and Urban Policy Ph.D. Student Organization, 2012-2013 
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 Volunteer, Amerigroup Real Caring Volunteers, 2007-2011 
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 Education Chair, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 2006 
 Recipient, Academic Achievement Award, American International College, 2003 
